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ABSTRACT 
BORN IN A STEELTOWN : CLASS RELATIONS AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STEEL INDUSTRY SINCE 1974 
DAVID SADLER 
Since 1974, the s t e e l industry in the European Community has seen 
a dramatic c r i s i s of over-production. In a desperate e f f o r t to 
cope with the problems of surplus capacity and mounting losses, 
s t e e l producers have closed tens of mi l l i o n s of tonnes of 
capacity and shed over three hundred thousand jobs. These job 
losses have been s e l e c t i v e l y concentrated in p a r t i c u l a r towns and 
regions where the s t e e l industry has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been the major 
provider of waged employment. International processes of change 
have been and are being experienced very v i s i b l y in these places. 
They were fashioned by c a p i t a l i s t production and in one sense 
swept aside as part of the continued dynamics of t h i s process. 
In another sense, however, the people of these settlements cannot 
be swept aside, for attachment to place and community i s becoming 
increasingly d i f f i c u l t to ignore. We therefore seek to consider 
here j u s t how these c o n f l i c t i n g processes have been acted out in 
and through some of these places - Consett in north east England, 
Ravenscraig in Scotland, Dortmund in West Germany and the region 
of Lorraine i n France. 
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PREFACE 
Since 1974, the s t e e l industry in the European Community has seen 
a dramatic c r i s i s of over-production. Growing surplus capacity 
and mounting losses have led many companies into a c r i s i s of 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . In a desperate e f f o r t to cope with these 
problems, tens of m i l l i o n s of tonnes of capacity have been closed 
and over three hundred thousand jobs have disappeared in a 
decline s i m i l a r to the c r i s i s in the European coal industry 
during the 1960's. 
These job losses have been s e l e c t i v e l y concentrated in p a r t i c u l a r 
towns and regions. In many of these places the s t e e l industry 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been the major provider of waged employment. 
Moreover, material prosperity has been d i r e c t l y related to 
s t e e l ' s f l u c t u a t i n g fortunes through economic linkages, w h i l s t 
s o c i a l l i f e has been heavily conditioned through the character of 
work in the industry. I n other words international processes of 
change have been experienced in these towns and regions. They 
were fashioned by c a p i t a l i s t production and in one sense swept 
aside as part of the continued dynamics of t h i s process. I n 
another sense, however, the people of these places cannot be 
swept aside, for the t r a d i t i o n of attachment to place and 
community represents a desire to be able to ' l i v e , l e a r n and 
work' there (to borrow a French Communist Party slogan) which i s 
becoming increasingly d i f f i c u l t to ignore. We therefore seek to 
consider here j u s t how these c o n f l i c t i n g processes have been 
acted out in and through some of these places - Consett in north 
east England, Ravenscraig i n Scotland, Dortmund in West Germany 
and the region of Lorraine in France. 
We commence with a re-examination of i n d u s t r i a l location theory, 
since t h i s i s c l e a r l y one t r a d i t i o n a l attempt to interpret the 
changing fortunes of s t e e l companies, towns and regions. We 
argue that to date nearly a l l analyses of the s t e e l industry have 
been fundamentally flawed in that they have ignored the s o c i a l 
bases of i n d u s t r i a l location, the dynamics of c a p i t a l i s t 
competition. We consider t h i s in Chapter I I through an appraisal 
of the emerging debate which seeks to r e l a t e society to space, to 
place i n d u s t r i a l change in a framework where i t i s neither the 
r e s u l t of nor the condition for s o c i a l change. In Chapter I I I we 
locate the growing occurrence of d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t s t a t e 
intervention in the s t e e l industry in t h i s framework through 
recent theories which r e l a t e the character of the c a p i t a l i s t 
state to the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s in which i t i s grounded. 
During the l a s t decade the European Community has played an 
increasingly a c t i v e part in terms of both regulating s t e e l 
production and attempting to a l l e v i a t e the consequences of i t s 
decline in p a r t i c u l a r towns and regions. We consider the 
development of these p o l i c y measures in Chapter IV, interpreting 
them within the framework of the Community as an embryonic supra-
national s t a t e . For a v a r i e t y of reasons, though, the main 
thrust of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the s t e e l 
industry has to be evaluated in the context of national s t a t e s 
and s o c i e t i e s . This we undertake in d e t a i l in Chapters V to V I I , 
seeking to draw out from a n a l y s i s of the events and actions an 
understanding of the broader s i g n i f i c a n c e of p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances. 
- i i i -
F i n a l l y , we p u l l together the main points of comparison and 
contrast from the three national states and s o c i e t i e s and re-
evaluate our t h e o r e t i c a l framework. We argue that the experience 
of the s t e e l industry in the l a s t decade i s l i k e l y to be more 
prevalent in the future, as the place-destructive consequences of 
capi t a l i s m become increasingly apparent. We argue too that 
conceptions of s p a t i a l d i v i s i o n s of labour as a way of accounting 
for t h i s can only be a descriptive construct which under-
emphasises consideration of the processes underlying changing 
s o c i a l conditions. These changes can only be considered through 
a recognition of people as active subjects. S p a t i a l d i v i s i o n s of 
labour are, a f t e r a l l , about people as (reserve) labour power. 
This necessitates recognition of the si g n i f i c a n c e of the 
constitution of places and s o c i e t i e s at a v a r i e t y of s c a l e s . The 
contrasting circumstances of change in the s t e e l industry i n 
d i f f e r e n t nations of Western Europe demonstrate c l e a r l y the 
regressive character both of action within a highly l o c a l i s e d 
i n t e r s e c t i o n of place and c l a s s i n t e r e s t and of a c e n t r a l i s t 
strategy of s o c i a l i s t change. We conclude not with the answer, 
but with a question. Given the experience of the s t e e l industry 
in the l a s t decade, and the strong p o s s i b i l i t y of further 
wholesale devalorisation of c a p i t a l and devastation of places, 
what can conventional p o l i t i c s do about the problems of growing 
unemployment in a society which remains geared to the r e l a t i o n of 
wage labour, which i s becoming increasingly scarce? 
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CHAPTER I 
With and against, l o c a t i o n tlieory i n tlie s t e e l industry 
1.1 Introduction - recent trends i n s t e e l production 
Since the early 1970's the majority of the world's major 
c a p i t a l i s t economies have fallen into a deep and lasting 
recession, associated with growing over-capacity in certain key 
sectors, f a l l i n g p r o f i t a b i l i t y and rapidly rising levels of 
unemployment (for example see Mandel, 1978; OECD, 1980). As one 
expression of this c r i s i s of overproduction, the steel industry 
has seen drastic changes on a scale rarely experienced before. 
World steel output has remained stagnant since 1973 (table 1.1), 
contrary to forecasts as late as 1974 of continued expanding 
demand for steel products; capacity expansions undertaken on the 
basis of these forecasts have served to emphasise the magnitude 
of the over-production c r i s i s facing the industry. The same 
period, though, has seen marked changes in the distribution of 
this production as a result of the closure of capacity in the 
U.S.A. and Western Europe and the concentration of new capacity 
in many newly-industrialising economies, chief among the latt e r 
being Br a z i l , South Korea, India, Mexico and Taiwan (for example 
see Archer, 1984; Aylen 1984; Balassa 1981). This s h i f t 
represents an aggregate trend resulting from diverging economic 
characteristics of the two groups of countries, in particular the 
collapse of steel-using sectors in the former and the planned, 
capital-intensive growth programmes of the latter, rather than a 
conscious drive by steel producers to re-locate their own 
capacity - although many former European steel producers, having 
diversified into the heavy engineering sector, now tender for 
contracts to construct new steel capacity i n the newly-
industrialising economies1. EEC trade in this period has not 
seen any substantial r i s e i n the volume of imports (table 1.2). 
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Indeed in times of recession there has been a tradition of 
protectionist measures aimed at limiting foreign imports of 
steel, dating back to the International Steel Cartel of 1926-39 
(Jones, 1979) and recently resurfacing with the American Trigger 
Price Mechanism (Walter, 1979) and EEC measures to r e s t r i c t 
imports as part of a broader restructuring programme. 
The broader developments have taken expression within the EEC 
(table 1.3). From a high-point of 155 m. tonnes in 1974, total 
Community steel production plummetted by 30 m. tonnes the 
following year; saw a shaky recovery to around 140 m. tonnes in 
1979; and further collapses in 1980 and 1982. This pattern has 
been more or less constant among a l l member states with the 
exception of one. I t a l y has seen limited decline in steel output 
- indeed, even in 1982 i t produced more than in 1974, reflecting 
p o l i t i c a l decisions within the country not to limit production at 
the small, privately-owned steel mills in the north (known 
collectively as the Bresciani) nor to i n i t i a t e cutbacks at the 
2 
large, state-owned coastal plants . Reductions in capacity made 
in other countries in response to declining demand have not 
proved sufficient to restore profitability, however. Capacity 
u t i l i s a t i o n ratios f e l l from 87% in 1974 to 57% in 1982 (table 
1.4). In part as a consequence of these declining margins, 
turning i n most cases to mounting losses, there has been an 
element of increased state intervention in the sector, taking the 
form of financial assistance to private capital in the f i r s t 
instance (Denmark, Netherlands, West Germany) and nationalisation 
(Belgium, France). At the same time a further consequence has 
been the reinforcement of a trend already apparent i n Europe in 
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the late 1950's and 1960' s, that of the concentration of capacity 
at coastal or semi-coastal plants in response to the greater 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y offered through the import of richer foreign ores 
and cheaper coal supplies (Bradbury, 1982; Fleming, 1967; 
Warren, 1975). A corollary of this has been the closure or run-
down of production capacity in several, higher-cost inland areas, 
in particular eastern France, east of the Ruhr valley in West 
Germany, and North East England. 
Hence, whereas h i s t o r i c a l l y analysis of the steel industry has 
concentrated on the location of new production f a c i l i t i e s within 
the developed economies, perhaps at the expense of an existing 
plant but more often as a complement, in the las t decade i t has 
become v i t a l l y necessary to consider the location of the closure 
of production f a c i l i t i e s within Western Europe and North America. 
Such analyses have tended, to date, to focus on the impact of 
such closures in the sense of the social and economic effects 
within a given area, just as in much the same way many ea r l i e r 
location studies took the broader, social and p o l i t i c a l 
environment of capacity expansion for granted. Here, however, we 
are more concerned to consider the wider implications of such 
changes, attempting to relate the framework of c a p i t a l i s t 
competition within which the steel industry operates to the 
reproduction of social relations, by concentrating on the 
formative moments in the constitution of society and space 
through an analysis of what have often loosely been termed 'anti-
closure campaigns'. In this fashion i t i s intended to 
demonstrate some of the ways in which c a p i t a l i s t societies unfold 
h i s t o r i c a l l y on a variety of dimensions, in a manner i t s e l f 
contingent upon the sometimes conflicting character of these 
dimensions. 
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Three regions have been selected as being worthy of deeper 
analysis, not only because of their h i s t o r i c a l relationship to 
one branch of the econony but also because of the nature of local 
social and p o l i t i c a l conditions arising in part from a dependence 
upon one industry. To a very real extent the reproduction of 
social l i f e in the broadest sense within these regions has been 
heavily conditioned for the past one hundred or so years by a 
clearly v i s i b l e association with steel production which could 
usefully be contrasted with the situation in, say, t e x t i l e s , 
which has seen similar decline throughout Western Europe (Steed, 
1978a; 1978b) without such readily apparent consequences for 
particular places or regions. This association i s clear in the 
sense not just of dependence on the upturns or downturns of what 
has been, h i s t o r i c a l l y , a very c y c l i c a l industry, for general 
prosperity or poverty - a dependence a l l the more significant i n 
a period of generalised recession and high unemployment - but 
also more generally in the form of local p o l i t i c a l associations, 
the nature of informal social institutions and the gender 
division of labour within the household. Furthermore, the nature 
of the technology in the industry, whilst approaching the 
Herculean i n i t s sheer physical extremes of temperature and 
scale, i s one which has seen comparatively few radical changes 
and i s thus more readily comprehensible than that of, say, 
chemicals or computer hardware. Consequently, given the 
combination of circumstances of h i s t o r i c a l dependence upon one 
industry facing a massive over-production c r i s i s , along with 
relat i v e l y simple production technology, then i t i s not 
unreasonable to expect that analysis of these inter-related 
- 5 -
conditions w i l l be rewarding in the sense of explaining how, i n 
this particular instance, the relations of cap i t a l i s t society are 
reproduced within a given region in a fashion which has 
implications for the broader constitution of (national) 
societies. For i f the reproduction of society can proceed more 
or less unproblematically within such regions this must surely 
demonstrate the s t a b i l i t y of late c a p i t a l i s t society. In 
contrast, i f in resolving such problems of steel over-production 
the state problematises i t s own existence, then this raises 
doubts and questions over the s t a b i l i t y of such a society with 
pressing and urgent relevance during the course of the present 
decade - the more so as further contraction looms increasingly 
close i n several sectors, notably bulk chemicals, vehicles, 
mechanical engineering and shipbuilding. 
Clearly what needs to be considered in this context i s the way i n 
which previous analyses have theorised the (more or less 
implicitly) locational aspects of the development of this branch 
of production, since i t i s helpful to counterpose the common 
themes arising from previous material dealing with the localised 
expansion of production capacity with more recent analyses of the 
localised reduction of capacity. This i s especially true in the 
sense that both groups of analyses face, in the main, the same 
set of criticisms in the context of the current analysis - a 
failure to appreciate and incorporate the broader social and 
p o l i t i c a l background to economic change, which can be 
demonstrated to have profound implications for the development of 
theory. Consequently the following sections seek to describe and 
account for some of the previous analyses dealing with ste e l 
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production and to develop from an exposition of their weaknesses 
an account of a more fully-informed theoretical platform from 
which to view recent changes in the European steel industry 
within particular regions. 
1.2.1 Previous locational analyses of the s t e e l 
industry 
Within the broader context of generalised expansion of steel 
production capacity (despite periodic c y c l i c a l fluctuations i n 
demand) u n t i l the early 1970"s, followed by drastic capacity 
reductions in Western Europe since that time, i t i s possible to 
consider how previous analyses have theorised the concrete 
expression of such general trends in the physical location of 
production f a c i l i t i e s . I t can be demonstrated how, in the main, 
locational analyses dealing with the steel industry's expansion 
or contraction have tended to f a l l into one or the other of three 
categories. The f i r s t of these categories concentrates on a 
series of 'location factors* i n a more or less sophisticated 
fashion, though always in a way which i s open to two specific 
criticisms. In the f i r s t place, emphasis on the physical 
characteristics of a region tends to s l i p easily into a statement 
which in some way credits or blames the inhabitants of that 
region for the decision to expand or reduce capacity there. 
Secondly, and i n a related fashion, emphasis on a series of 
location factors i n their own right tends to abstract location 
decisions from their broader societal and p o l i t i c a l context. A 
similar c r i t i c i s m can be levelled at those analyses in the second 
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category dealing with location decisions in a behavioural 
framework which attaches undue emphasis to the individual 
ca p i t a l i s t enterprise in responding to a host of often 
conflicting imperatives. In responding to this criticism the 
third category of analyses takes a broader view of the production 
process as indicating the position of an industry within the 
c a p i t a l i s t mode of production, although even here such analyses 
could be c r i t i c i s e d in that they ignore or assume away the broad 
diversity of options open to the c a p i t a l i s t firm and f a i l 
adequately to incorporate the broader p o l i t i c a l implication of 
i t s actions. Consequently i t w i l l be argued (in Section 1.3) 
that a more satisfactory framework from within which to analyse 
locational patterns in the steel industry i s one which centres on 
expansion or contraction decisions as one moment in a broader 
restructuring process, carried out through a system of closely-
linked regions within particular societies. This process i s 
contingent upon and at the same time cause of a wealth of local, 
national and even international imperatives of a social, 
p o l i t i c a l and economic nature. Implicit in this theoretical 
position i s a more satisfactory methodological framework, one 
which analyses not the existing use of space as the only possible 
result of a somehow given or pre-determined series of rational 
and hence somehow inevitable decisions but rather centres upon 
the way in which closure decisions (as the starkest, most 
localised expression of reduction of capacity) come to be made 
or, perhaps, averted. I t i s in the p o s s i b i l i t y of such "non-
closure" that one of the advantages of this methodological 
framework becomes apparent. For i f a proposed closure does not 
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take place this i s of significance for the generalised pattern of 
location yet in the e a r l i e r methodological frameworks exactly why 
the plant or works concerned remain part of this pattern does not 
come on to the agenda, i s not deemed worthy of explanation, 
thereby ignoring or assuming away a vast range of individual 
and/or collective a c t i v i t i e s which helped to prevent or delay 
closure. 
1.2.2 Location as the summation of a s e r i e s of 
factors 
In an early analysis typical of much later work Hartshorne (1928) 
considered the location factors influencing the iron and steel 
industry, taking as h i s i n i t i a l concern the 'general rule' that 
'iron moves to coal* since ' i t takes two (or several) tons of 
coal to smelt one ton of iron ore' (p. 241) and, via an empirical 
demonstration of ore/coal ratios, proving this statement to be 
over-simplistic and only valid i f the volume of coal required to 
convert iron into finished steel products was added to that 
required to convert iron ore into iron. From this starting point 
he progressed to argue that 'A complete analysis of the 
conditions influencing the location of the iron and steel 
industry i s yet to be made ... such an analysis i s greatly to be 
desired' (p.247). As an attempt to i n i t i a t e such an analysis he 
l i s t e d nine factors: limestone supply, water a v a i l a b i l i t y , land, 
labour, capital and taxes, previous fixed investment, iron ore, 
coal and the market (p. 248). 
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This analysis represents a c l a s s i c formulation followed by many 
later authors in that i t sees the location of the industry as the 
summation of a series of externally-given factors. An adequate 
explanation of the location pattern of the industry i s held to 
require only an exhaustive specification of these factors. Thus, 
for example, Gleave (1938) i n analysing the elements influencing 
the development of the Teesside steel industry concluded that i t 
was 'unlikely that many sites in the world have such advantages 
as Teesside for the manufacture of steel' (p. 464). Thomas 
(1963) considered factors influencing the location of a specific 
works, that at Newport in the U.K. owned by Richard Thomas and 
Baldwins, whilst Warren (1967) was concerned to specify the 
changing conditions behind the construction of new capacity 
within Europe at coastal locations. Further, in a useful and 
extensive review of the 'study of the economic geography' of 
steel, Warren (1979) demonstrated clearly how such analyses were 
typical of many others at this time. This he recognised as being 
inadequate: 
'There can be l i t t l e doubt that the early geographical study 
of the industry was narrowly conceived. I t focused on 
location but did not explore the width of meanings implicit 
in that single word' (p. 538). 
Unfortunately the suggested extension of the meaning of the term 
'location' appeared only to incorporate technological change as a 
further addendum to the l i s t of factors: 
'The geographers were, or seemed, ignorant of the implications 
of technology and of technological change' (p. 538). 
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The implicit formulation of technological change as an 
independent force in this paper presents a fine example of the 
limitation of this approach. For i t has consistently been argued 
(see for example Toft-vTensen et a l , 1983), that technological 
change i s not independent of society but i s rather s o c i a l l y -
determined in a complex, d i a l e c t i c a l fashion. More generally, 
'explaining' location as the summation of a series of such 
factors can be c r i t i c i s e d for abstracting a l l of them from their 
broader social and p o l i t i c a l framework. Even seemingly immutable 
characteristics such as, for example, the advantage of imported 
ore over European ore due to i t s higher iron content i s 
contingent upon a set of broader conditions: the relative wage-
levels in the ore-producing countries, their p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y 
and the strength of p o l i t i c a l t i e s between exporting and 
importing countries, to name but a few. Consequently this 
category of analysis can be regarded as providing only p a r t i a l 
explanation of the locational pattern of the industry. 
A further criticism of the approach which considers location in 
this way i s that by l i s t i n g those factors pertinent to a 
particular region or set of regions there i s a very grave danger 
of explaining investment decisions (perhaps only p a r t i a l l y ) as 
the direct consequence of the characteristics of the population of 
that region or set of regions. In a similar fashion Massey and 
Meegan (1982, p. 123; 195) have c r i t i c i s e d the use of s h i f t and 
share analysis in the explanation of regional unemployment 
trends. This (false) association between regional 
characteristics and regional investment not only has serious 
p o l i t i c a l implications but i t i s also analytically inadequate in 
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that i t f a i l s to specify the mechanisms which might be involved 
in the postulated causal framework. Just as correlation between 
two sets of variables can not be held to imply causation, so 
association between a set of regional characteristics and steel 
industry locational patterns should not be held to imply a 
relationship of a simple, mechanistic and causal nature. 
1.2.3 The l i m i t s to a geography of enterprise 
An attempt at resolving some of the problems implicit in the 
f i r s t group of analyses i s made by several studies which f a l l 
into the second category, introducing the behavioural element of 
the individual firm or enterprise as the focus of study. This 
enterprise i s conceptualised as responding to a series of factors 
just as considered under Section 1.2.2, but as an extension of 
such studies, the way in which the appropriate enterprise makes 
decisions when considering relevant information i s taken into 
account and given considerable explanatory power. As an early 
exponent, Krumme (1969, p.30) summarised the postulated 
advantages of this theoretical framework particularly well: 
'In economic geography - particularly in manufacturing 
geography - relat i v e l y few attempts have been made to take 
the phenomenon "enterprise" into account ... (this neglect) 
seems to have been due to the predominance of economic 
thinking with deterministic mono-causalities. This economic 
determinism resulted i n a pre-occupation of economic 
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geographers merely with geographic implications of optimal 
combinations of productive factors rather than with the 
underlying forces and the decision-making processes 
themselves 1. 
Moreover in an attempt to apply this framework within the steel 
industry, Fleming and Krumme (1968) analysed the locational 
implications of the formation of the West German steel company 
Hoesch from a series of constituent partners, and the 
significance of the t i e s between this company and the Dutch firm 
Hooghovens for the location of productive a c t i v i t y (see also Ch. 
V I I ) . 
Whilst the emphasis on the decision-making processes within the 
individual enterprise represents an advance on previous analyses 
which regarded a satisfactory explanation of location as the 
exhaustive specification of a series of external factors, there 
are at least two specific criticisms which can be made of this 
approach. In the f i r s t place, many analyses in this framework 
attach undue competence to individual enterprises in responding 
to a range of often contradictory imperatives. This i s i t s e l f 
problematic for i t runs the r i s k of ignoring the broader 
determinants of the economy outside the firm, in the sense not 
just of changing patterns of supply and demand for raw materials 
and imported goods but also of competition between individual 
firms in the search for surplus profits (see Mandel, 1975? esp. 
Chs. 3 and 10). This i s not to argue that these broader 
determinants specify exactly what an individual firm can do, 
however. The r e a l i t y i s far more sophisticated: actions of 
enterprises form the bounds of their own possible future actions 
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at the same time as constituting and replicating the c a p i t a l i s t 
system of which they are but a part. 
In a related fashion this emphasis on the individual accumulating 
unit as a decision-maker in i t s own right is incomplete and 
inadequate in that i t does not incorporate the actions and 
decisions of those able to influence the a c t i v i t y of the 
enterprise though not necessarily charged with nor identifiable 
with i t s long-term development, in particular trades unions but 
also other organisations or institutions within the broader 
lo c a l i t y or region. For example Hayter and Watts (1983) in a 
recent re-appraisal of 'enterprise geography' defined i t as: 
'the study of the policies and structures of multi-product, 
multi-plant enterprises on changes in industrial location and 
on processes of regional development' (p. 157, emphases 
added). 
In other words the policy of an enterprise i s seen as acting in 
some sort of unproblematic, straightforward way upon the region 
or lo c a l i t y in which i t i s situated. This i s clearly inadequate 
since i t ignores or assumes away the po s s i b i l i t y of any 
reciprocity in the relationship between an enterprise and i t s 
location(s). Just as the tradition of, for instance, male-
dominated shift-work has h i s t o r i c a l l y moulded and influenced the 
nature of social and economic l i f e in the steel-producing regions 
of Europe, so too i s i t possible to identify a recognition within 
these regions of the necessity to maintain these bases of 
production in terms of, at the least, employment security, 
leading to considerable pressure upon the respective enterprises 
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to continue operation, exerted through local structures of trade 
unions and p o l i t i c a l parties. Such an influence can in practice 
be either active or passive : active (as above) in the sense of 
openly encouraging an enterprise to locate or discouraging i t 
from disinvesting, or passive in the sense of representing (in 
the case of several steel regions, for instance) a tradition of 
union militancy and relatively high wage levels discouraging 
certain kinds of mobile investment from the area. In this way to 
conceive of an enterprise as acting in a region from above, as i t 
were, i s fundamentally wrong in that i t assumes away the a b i l i t y 
of those i n that region or even employed in that enterprise to 
influence the policy and a c t i v i t y of an enterprise (see also 
Weaver, 1978). 
1.2.4 Location and the production process 
In an extensive and influential series of writings, Massey has 
attempted, with a considerable degree of success, to incorporate 
several of those elements sorely under-theorised in many previous 
locational analyses, in particular the relationship of individual 
units of accumulation to the broader economy and to other 
elements of social relations (see Massey, 1973, 1978, 1979; 
Massey and Meegan 1978, 1982). Consequently, although not to 
date applied i n the steel industry, such analyses are considered 
here. In particular Massey and Meegan (1982) examine the nature 
of the production process within the enterprise or group of 
enterprises within a particular branch of the economy, where the 
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production process i s conceived as the way in which diverse 
inputs are combined and transformed to produce a series of 
products. In this analysis three forms of production 
reorganisation resulting in job-loss are recognised : 
intensification, where labour productivity increases without 
major new investment (e.g. speed-up of the line in conveyor-belt 
production); investment and technical change where labour 
productivity increases as a consequence of investment (e.g. 
introduction of capital-intensive machinery); and 
rationalisation, where employment i s reduced as a simple 
consequence of capacity reduction. Such a framework for analysis 
has the advantage of enabling consideration of the policy of an 
'enterprise' not as some pre-ordained decision by capital i n 
response to inevitable economic circumstances but rather as part 
of the broader functioning of ca p i t a l i s t society, where employees 
are not regarded as those to whom the system issues instructions 
but as partially-knowledgeable agents with their own capacity for 
meaningful collective action. For instance in many cases speed-
up i n conveyor-belt production has resulted in employee action to 
secure increased wage-levels thereby at least p a r t i a l l y 
nullifying the intended consequence of increased p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
(see Beynon, 1973). Equally the more general emphasis on the 
combination of productive forces, both physical in the sense of 
machinery and human i n the sense of more-or-less-skilled manpower 
i s of value i n that i t enables the analysis to relate to the 
broader characteristics of particular societies - their relative 
wage and income levels and class structures representing 
particular expressions of the nature of their development. 
Consequently this framework for analysis represents a significant 
advance over those discussed i n sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. 
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Despite these advances, however, i t i s possible to identify a 
number of limitations. In the f i r s t place, to identify just 
three possible strategies, whilst i n i t i a l l y helpful, runs the 
risk of ignoring the subtle complexity of options open to the 
multi-plant, multi-product c a p i t a l i s t unit. Thus whereas over 
the branch of production as an aggregate i t i s possible to 
categorise using this three-fold system, individual strategies 
can adopt a mixture of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s (a fact recognised in 
Massey and Meegan, 1982, p. 185). This i s most clearly 
i l l u s t r a t e d in the context of the current analysis by the West 
German steel industry, where job loss has occurred as a 
consequence of rationalisation and intensification i n the main 
but where this has been used by some companies, for example 
Hoesch, as a lever or bargaining counter to secure further job 
loss through investment and technical change. Moreover such an 
interplay can be given a spatial dimension across different works 
of the same company in a fashion which can, under certain 
circumstances, be capable of affecting i f not determining the 
aggregate trends. In other words i t i s necessary to distinguish 
between the analytic categories of intensification, 
rationalisation and technical change and the way in which the 
object of analytical separation i s recombined in later analysis. 
An aggregate analysis of the trends in labour productivity and 
capital investment i s sufficient to consider broader trends in 
the industry and relate these to the social fabric; to determine 
exactly the locational element of such trends requires more 
detailed consideration of individual company options. Similarly, 
locational analysis should entail a more satisfactory 
consideration of the multitude of divergent characteristics of 
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particular places (see Lipietz, 1977, 1983). To consider the 
social relations of capital as being imposed in some way upon an 
even plane i s inadequate in that location i s as much a social 
attribute as, for example, degree of capital investment, yet 
analysis of aggregate trends across branches pays insufficient 
attention to the place-specificity of the events constituting 
these trends. 
Secondly, i t i s necessary more carefully to consider the 
p o l i t i c a l aspect of such trends and their concrete expressions i n 
locational decisions. For i n part as a consequence of the 
significance of the steel industry for particular l o c a l i t i e s , i n 
many cases locational decisions have become openly p o l i t i c a l 
issues, especially where the steel industry has been nationalised 
- the Ravenscraig works of the B r i t i s h Steel Corporation being 
the most obvious example in the U.K. Indeed in some instances i t 
has been possible to talk of po l i t i c i s a t i o n as representing a 
further option to the individual c a p i t a l i s t unit, in particular 
in the hope of securing state financial support in the face of 
declining profit margins. More usually, however, the p o l i t i c a l 
aspect of location has come to the forefront as a consequence of 
strategy by those within the company and/or region threatened by 
a proposed closure or run-down of capacity. Hence this p o l i t i c a l 
element must be incorporated in a location analysis since i t i s 
crucial either in the sense of actually making the decision 
(nationalised st e e l producers), preventing closure (Ravenscraig), 
delaying i t (North East France before 1979) or injecting 
alternative resources with the intention of carrying out closure 
(North East France after 1979). 
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1.3 A framework for locational analysis 
From this broad review of previous approaches to locational 
analysis we are l e f t with a number of significant elements from 
which to build a more satisfactory framework. The most important 
of these i s the way in which the production process has i t s e l f 
been seen as central to locational decisions since, crucially, 
this process incorporates both the application of physical means 
of production (machinery, etc.) to raw materials and the human 
element of production, the question of s k i l l - l e v e l s , wages and 
union tradition of the workforce. In this way the representation 
of employee interests i s introduced not as some additional, 
neutral locational factor but i s rather accorded central priority 
as i l l u s t r a t i n g a more general point, the nature of the relations 
of the production process, the way in which a broader system of 
production i s given concrete expression on the factory floor in a 
fashion which i s central to the perpetuation of that system. 
This, then, should represent a point of departure for an adequate 
analysis of location. 
Moreover, a further element readily observable in the steel 
industry but also of more general applicability i s the openly 
p o l i t i c a l character of many locational decisions, in a fashion 
which bridges the " a r t i f i c i a l " separation of the spheres of 
economy and polity. This separation was integral to early 
c a p i t a l i s t society in the sense that the doctrine of " l a i s s e r -
f a i r e " was founded upon the apparent independence of economy from 
institutionalised p o l i t i c a l control and from p o l i t i c a l choices 
expressed "democratically" through the ballot box. A chronic 
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feature of late c a p i t a l i s t society has been the growing 
interpenetration of economy and p o l i t y , as evidenced not only by 
the growing extent of state intervention i n the economy but also 
by the emergent economic l i m i t s t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y (see 
Chapter I I I ) . Hence any adequate locational analysis must also 
incorporate awareness of the ' p o l i t i c a l ' implications of 
' economic' change, the extent t o which they derive from t h i s 
change and exactly how they might influence or determine i t . 
What t h i s suggests, then, i s a framework for analysis rooted i n 
the functioning of the c a p i t a l i s t system i n i t s most general 
sense. The framework should incorporate not just a series of 
somehow externally-given factors, but the changing response of 
individual (steel) companies' policies, of those influenced by 
such policies but able to influence them only i n d i r e c t l y or under 
particular circumstances, and of the elements of the p o l i t i c a l 
system i n some way involved or affected, within the broader 
l i m i t s of the existing social system but at the same time 
constituting and reproducing t h i s system. I n other words, t h i s 
analysis i s grounded i n a materialist epistemological position, 
one which recognises the overarching significance of the 
h i s t o r i c a l development of conf l i c t u a l social relations under 
capitalism and the need precisely t o examine why these relations 
are co n f l i c t u a l through consideration of t h e i r d i a l e c t i c a l 
performance^. 
A major implication of t h i s epistemological position i s that 
location of productive a c t i v i t y i n space should not be regarded 
as one facet of a series of broader conditions regarding t h i s 
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productive a c t i v i t y . For just as i t i s wrong to specify the 
structural conditions of c a p i t a l i s t society i n the abstract 
without regard t o t h e i r spatial expression (see Harvey, 1^82, 
esp. part 3), so too i s i t inadequate to consider the spatial 
expression of these trends as materialising i n some sort of 
mechanistic mono-causal fashion. That i s to say, production i s 
not imposed on a region but rather operates through i t , 
interacting i n a complex fashion with the broad diver s i t y of 
local social and p o l i t i c a l structures and agents. For instance 
Massey (1983) related the structures derived from previous layers 
of investment or rounds of productive a c t i v i t y t o the current 
soci o - p o l i t i c a l structures of several regions i n England and 
Wales, and considered t h e i r implications for the potential for 
future economic development. In a similar fashion the current 
analysis deals with the societal structures related t o the 
h i s t o r i c a l development of steel production i n several regions of 
Europe, and t h e i r responses t o , conceptualised as moments i n , the 
adjustment of these structures to changing circumstances i n the 
world economy. What t h i s suggests then i s a locational theory 
firmly embedded i n a broader social theory yet able to contribute 
t o t h i s theory i n that i t elaborates more f u l l y the changing 
circumstances of productive a c t i v i t y . 
Of equal significance are the methodological implications of t h i s 
framework, i n particular the implications of a focus on the 
active constitution and reproduction of social relations. For 
What t h i s implies i s that analysis should not be centred on the 
existing pattern or locational d i s t r i b u t i o n of productive 
a c t i v i t y but rather on the changing circumstances behind t h i s 
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pattern or, i f the pattern remains constant, on exactly how and 
why th i s i s so. Hence i n the context of the capacity contraction 
of the steel industry i n Western Europe since the early 1970's i t 
i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o analyse the where, why and when of the 
changing pattern i n the aggregate, i t i s necessary to consider 
also the ways i n which t h i s contraction i s actualised or made 
concrete i n particular instances - i n short, the how of capacity 
contraction. Thus i t i s necessary to consider the nature of the 
anti-closure campaigns waged i n many l o c a l i t i e s since these 
represent both a response to the broader dynamics of accumulation 
and at the same time an attempt t o challenge or direct them i n a 
fashion which has very strong implications for the reproduction 
of society. To t h i s end our empirical analyses of the steel 
industry (Chapters V-VTI) focus p a r t i c u l a r l y upon these campaigns 
- for i t i s only through an analysis of the 'how' of locational 
change that i t i s possible f u l l y t o comprehend the broader 
implications and determinants of th i s change. 
Moreover t h i s methodological approach has implications beyond i t s 
application here i n the context of declining output and 
employment i n one particular industry. Most especially, there i s 
a strong p a r a l l e l between the consideration of campaigns against 
disinvestment and those for investment, very relevant i n the 
context of the continuing recession and the limited amount of 
mobile manufacturing investment when compared to the 1950's and 
1960's. The most celebrated recent example i n the U.K. of t h i s 
i s perhaps that of the Nissan car plant, with a whole host of 
regional lobbies competing i n the hope of attracting the promised 
4 
fresh investment and employment , but t h i s competition 
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has been by no means unique and is highly l i k e l y to be replicated 
i n the future. The analysis of such campaigns to attract new 
investment t o a particular region can be undertaken in just the 
same way as that of campaigns against disinvestment. Further, 
the increasing frequency of both the former and the l a t t e r are 
suggestive of the broad a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the methodology adopted 
here. 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
This introductory chapter then, has attempted to relate the 
subject of study, the European steel industry since the early 
1970's, t o broader changes i n the sector of steel production 
during t h i s period and t o previous analyses which incorporated 
the locational aspect of t h i s industry. Building from a review 
of these i t has advanced a platform from which t o analyse 
locational change as part of the broader social system of which 
i t i s but a part, incorporating both the p o l i t i c a l element of 
these changes and the social and economic environment within 
which they take place. I t has been argued that an adequate 
explanation of these changes, however, necessitates some 
consideration of the 'how' of locational change, the way i n which 
decisions are made within t h i s broad framework, entailing i n turn 
consideration of the nature of anti-closure campaigns i n a sector 
i n decline or of pro-investment campaigns i n terms of 
internationally mobile capital. The following chapters seek t o 
theorise, f i r s t l y , the nature of t h i s relationship between 
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production and the space i n which i t i s located and, secondly, 
the extent and nature of p o l i t i c a l involvement through a 
consideration of recent theories of the state. 
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Table 1,1 Trends i n world s t e e l production, 1973-81 
Output m.t. % annual change, 
1973 1981 1973-81 
Western Europe 171.8 148.7 - 1.68 
Eastern Europe1 181.1 210.1 2.00 
Newly-industrialising 
economies 25.9 54.5 13.80 
U.S.A. 136.8 109.6 - 2.49 
Japan 119.3 101.7 - 1.84 
Others 2 62.7 83.1 4.07 
World 697.5 707.7 0.18 
1 excluding China and N. Korea, but including Yugoslavia. 
2 
including Canada, China, N. Korea, S. Africa and Australia. 
Source: Compiled from information supplied by International Iron 
and Steel I n s t i t u t e , Brussels, dated 21.1.83. 
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Table 1,2 EEC trade i n ECSC products, 1975 - 1983 
m. product tonnes 
Internal Imports Exports External 
trade balance 
1975 19.6 6.1 20.8 14.7 
1976 23.6 9.8 16.5 6.7 
1977 21.8 9.9 21.5 11.6 
1978 22.9 8.9 25.8 16.9 
1979 25.0 9.4 24.7 15.3 
1980 25.6 9.0 22.2 13.2 
1981 24.3 6.6 23.5 16.9 
1982 21.7 8.7 18.4 9.7 
1983 23.1 8.5 18.9 10.4 
data for 1973 and 1974 are only available for the six founder 
members of the EEC. 
Source: Euros t a t , Iron and Steel Yearbooks, 1978, 1982, 1984, 
table 5.5. 
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Table 1.4 Capacity u t i l i s a t i o n r a t i o s i n crude s t e e l 
production, EEC member s t a t e s 1973 - 1982 
% 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 
West Germany 84 88 64 64 58 60 67 66 61 55 
Belgium 90 91 61 65 59 63 69 62 69 58 
France 90 89 64 70 66 70 73 71 72 63 
I t a l y 75 82 67 69 69 68 67 67 60 58 
Luxembourg 91 96 61 56 52 63 67 72 60 55 
Netherlands 93 95 78 68 60 67 69 62 64 51 
U.K. 92 80 75 76 71 73 74 40 61 55 
Denmark 
Ireland 
EEC 86 87 66 68 63 66 69 63 63 57 
Calculation beyond one significant place inadmissible hence no 
value recorded. 
Source: ECSC, Investment i n the Camunity coalmining and iron 
and steel industries (annual surveys). 
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Footnotes t o Chapter I 
^ For example the West German company Mannesmann Demag was one 
of four companies t o sign a contract with the Pohang Iron and 
Steel Company i n South Korea, to construct an additional 2.7 m. 
tonnes of annual steel capacity on top of the existing 8.5 m. 
tonnes (see Financial Times, 21 December 1983). 
2 
Only recently has the possible closure of one of these coastal 
plants, the Cornigliano steel complex at Genoa, appeared l i k e l y . 
See, for example, Financial Times, 22 June 1984 and 19 December 
1984. 
3 
At the same time t h i s recognition that the way i n which we act 
i s simultaneously constrained by the material fabric of society 
and part of the reproduction of that fabric has to be extended to 
the role of academic research. I n the words of Harvey (1984, 7) 
'The geographical studies we make are necessarily a part of that 
complex of con f l i c t u a l social processes which give b i r t h to new 
geographical landscapes'? that i s , research i s not undertaken 
int o a subject i n a c l i n i c a l , observer-neutral fashion. Rather, 
the way i n which research i s conducted i s part of the broader 
material fabric of society. What we research i n t o i s not 
unchanged by t h i s act. I t i s necessary, therefore, to accept 
that there i s a p o l i t i c s of epistemology (Lewis and Melville, 
1978), and that i t i s preferable t o make th i s e x p l i c i t rather 
than t o ignore i t or assume i t away i n a fashion which i s not 
only i n t e l l e c t u a l l y dishonest but p o l i t i c a l l y inadequate. 
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Nissan formally announced i n March 1984 that i t intended t o 
establish i t s new car plant at Washington i n Tyne and Wear 
(Financial Times, 31 March 1984). I t later became apparent that 
should Nissan decide to go ahead with the larger, second phase of 
the project, the B r i t i s h Government was w i l l i n g t o provide £112 
m. i n financial assistance on a t o t a l project budget of £350 m. 
(Financial Times, 11 February 1985) . The conditions under which 
the choice of si t e was made by Nissan have been described as 
follows: 
" I t i s very d i f f i c u l t for the Government t o t e l l a company 
such as Nissan where i t should go and that would seem to be 
the only alternative t o allowing the various l o c a l i t i e s t o 
put t h e i r case ... What the Government was concerned with was 
t o make available t o Nissan the same sort of aid as would be 
available t o any motor manufacturer setting up business i n an 
assisted area and to leave i t to Nissan to decide where t o 
go". (qu 2757, evidence t o Public Accounts Conmittee, 
"Regional Industrial Incentives", House of Commons paper 378, 
1983/84). 
CHAPTER I I 
From i n d u s t r i a l l o c a t i o n t o the nature of place and 
c l a s s 
I I . 1 Introduction 
- 31 -
The previous chapter analysed the significance of the decline of 
the European steel industry in the period since the early 1970's 
i n the context of previous work, more or less e x p l i c i t l y 
geographical, concerned with the location of industrial a c t i v i t y 
i n space. I t concluded with a view of industrial location as 
4 
social process. The present chapter aims to build upon th i s 
foundation by considering the way i n which analysis of industrial 
change as a process within c a p i t a l i s t society entails 
consideration of the way i n which th i s society i s continuously, 
contingently reproduced. I t w i l l be argued that t h i s 
reproduction should be regarded as the ongoing result of the 
constitution of class relations i n space; that social 
development i s the outcome of a complex balance of, 
predominantly, class forces, t y p i c a l l y constituted with respect 
t o particular places; and that t h i s development is mediated by 
the appropriate state formation(s), a theme returned to i n the 
following chapter. 
Clearly, these statements require elaboration. To t h i s end we 
examine more closely just exactly what i s meant by social 
development, concentrating i n particular on the concept of class 
and accounting for the use of a Marxist conception of class with 
i t s emphasis on the contradictory position of capital and labour 
i n the process of production. I t i s recognised, however, that 
within t h i s broad framework a greater degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
than that postulated i n classical Marxist theory i s required, i n 
terms of the variety of possible positions with respect to class 
interest present i n c a p i t a l i s t societies. This d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
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i s , at least i n part, t y p i c a l l y constituted with respect t o 
particular places, hence we move on to analyse the significance 
and meaning of place, drawing on and developing from a critique 
of humanistic studies of 'sense of place' t o re-consider the 
a f y j j a l constitution of meaning of sense of place. This can be 
demonstrated t o be constantly-recurring, for social development 
i s a continuous, lived experience. Consequently we seek, 
f i n a l l y , t o draw together these strands through the co-
development of place and society through time i n a framework 
which underpins the reconstruction of socially and 
geographically-situated h i s t o r i c a l events. 
I I . 2 S o c i a l theory and i n d u s t r i a l change 
We have reached the point, then, where industrial location i s 
seen as a process, as a constantly reproduced feature of a 
constantly developing society; what needs to be accounted for i s 
the nature of the development of thi s society. A number of 
features stand out as being worthy of immediate comment. We are 
dealing here with c a p i t a l i s t society i n the generic sense that 
production i s mainly oriented according t o the c r i t e r i o n of 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . We are dealing too with c a p i t a l i s t societies -
for although the p r o f i t motive i s common, the h i s t o r i c a l 
development of t h i s motive has taken different expression across 
national and, i n some cases, regional boundaries. Across 
national f r o n t i e r s , though, p r o f i t has been the driving force 
through the development of the production of goods and 
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cortnodities for sale. I n B r i t a i n , for example, from the earliest 
roots i n the t e x t i l e trade, through the age of the Industrial 
Revolution, the development of the heavy industrial base centred 
on coal and steel, the expansion of motor vehicle production, and 
more recently with the age of computers and communication (to 
name but a few examples), the production of goods for p r o f i t by 
industry has been a recurrent feature despite turbulent change in 
terms of what i s produced. Although the products change, the 
motive remains the same. Accordingly, our present concern with 
production within modern society can be traced back to the 
foundations of that society, t o the onset of the industrial age. 
Equally, i n seeking t o understand modern society we can trace 
back a theoretical heritage t o the nineteenth century, t o the 
classical social theorists of Marx and Weber, and i n particular 
t o the ways i n which they theorised the relationship between 
social change and ind u s t r i a l development. 
For Marx and Engels the key t o understanding this relationship 
lay i n the division of labour within society, the distinguishing 
feature of which was the emergence of a body of people with 
nothing t o s e l l i n the market place other than t h e i r labour 
power, the a b i l i t y t o perform work (see, for example, Marx, 1977; 
Marx and Engels, 1962). This was accompanied by the emergence of 
those owning the instruments of production but dependent upon the 
purchase of labour-power i n order t o operate t h i s machinery. I n 
t h i s juxtaposition a contradiction was i d e n t i f i e d , between the 
forces of production on the one hand and the relations of 
production on the other. For whilst the reproduction of the 
forces of production, the transformation of nature by labour 
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power thereby deriving p r o f i t from that labour, required the 
reproduction of that labour power, the oppressive nature of the 
relations of production i n no way guaranteed that reproduction 
and indeed made for greater social inequality. I n the very 
process of production i t s e l f the f r u i t s of the socially-produced 
transformation of nature were appropriated by the owners of 
capital thereby denying the holders of labour power. I r o n i c a l l y 
enough, the source of thi s inequality lay i n the very fact that a 
surplus had been produced over and above the immediate 
requirements of the producers. This separation of interests, 
though, was for Marx and Engels at the heart of the formation of 
the classes of capital and labour? the division of labour led 
not t o a fragmentation of individual interests but a coalescence 
around class lines. Those i n a position to appropriate surplus 
value, whilst recognising the existence of competition between 
appropriators i n the search for p r o f i t , found i t convenient t o 
express some common motive; the holders of labour-power came t o 
realise both t h e i r common concerns and the opposition t o the 
interests of capital (see especially Thompson, 1963). 
For Weber, on the other hand, capitalism was not a type of 
relationship but rather a type of practice, a particular way of 
organising and giving meaning t o action (see, for example, Weber 
1930, 1968). He was pa r t i c u l a r l y concerned t o i d e n t i f y the 
reasons for the emergence of rational action, that which could be 
j u s t i f i e d according t o an economic plan, i n the rise of 
c a p i t a l i s t production. The break from 'traditionalism' i n t o 
rational action was supported by an ethos that defined as 
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necessary, possible and proper social relations and social 
practices which the whole ethos of traditionalism stamped as 
either inconceivable or obnoxious (Abrams, 1982, 94). This ethos 
he found in the r i s e of Protestantism in Europe in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, which challenged the ethos of 
traditionalism at i t s most influential and vulnerable point, the 
sphere of religious meaning. The austerity and ordered nature of 
Protestantism led, he argued, to a willing and conscious 
acceptance of the roles of employer and employed in the 
development of capitalism. This, in turn, was paralleled by the 
development of a rational, bureaucratic administration, based on 
a formalised set of laws, as the most efficient means of 
administering the population. 
Weber's main concern, then, was with the development of 
capitalism as a result of conscious action whilst specifying the 
preconditions for these actions. To the extent that the 
framework he presents represents a logical structure, i t i s 
possible to identify the implications of his conceptualisation of 
the early development of capitalism for an analysis of continued 
social development under c a p i t a l i s t conditions. While Weber 
would agree with Marx that the distinguishing feature of 
capitalism i s the way in which production i s organised, this was 
not carried through to an analysis of social organisation in the 
same manner. Following Giddens (1979, 109) two conceptions of 
class can be distinguished; the Marxist 'groups or 
c o l l e c t i v i t i e s ' and the Weberian 'category of aggregate qualities 
(chances i n the market, or t r a i t s of occupations)'. The former 
i s quintessentially related to social development but d i f f i c u l t 
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to identify i n practice; the lat t e r easily identifiable but 
distinguished only because of this ease of identification. And 
i t i s in this very grounding of Marxist class theory with the 
continuing development of c a p i t a l i s t society that the greater 
sophistication over Weberian conceptualisation becomes apparent. 
For many of the implications of Weber's concern with the 
development of capitalism for an analysis of continued social 
development have been subsumed under the debate concerning 
whether we have entered i n Western Europe and North America an 
age of post-industrialism, where the rational actions of 
c a p i t a l i s t society begin to break down (see for example Rell, 
1974; Touraine, 1980) under the influence of increasingly more 
capital-intensive forms of production. Modern interpretations of 
Marx, however, would distinguish contemporary capitalism from i t s 
heritage in terms of the evolutionary framework posited by Marx. 
And therein l i e s the explanatory power of Marx's method. Class 
should not, indeed cannot, be conceived of as a thing, but rather 
as a relationship, ever-changing, ever more complex, yet grounded 
upon a fundamental antagonism which i s at once inevitable and 
contradictory. I n the words of E.P. Thompson: 
'Sociologists who have stopped the time-machine and, with a 
deal of conceptual huffing and puffing, have gone down to the 
engine-room to look, t e l l us that nowhere at a l l have they 
been able to locate and c l a s s i f y a class. They can find only 
a multitude of people with different occupations, incomes, 
status-hierarchies and the rest. Of course they are right, 
since class i s not this or that part of the machine, but the 
way the machine works once i t i s set in motion - not this 
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interest and that interest, but the fr i c t i o n of interests -
the movement i t s e l f , the heat, the thundering noise.' 
(Thompson, 1965, 357; emphasis in original) 
In this very conceptualisation of class, then, i s an inherent 
dynamism which cannot be separated from i t s existence. And given 
that a l l society, in the sense that i t i s lived through, i s 
dynamic, a framework which can account for this has considerable 
explanatory significance. 
At this point in the argument we must step sideways a l i t t l e to 
emphasise that whilst the emphasis in Marx's analysis lay firmly 
on class relations in the f i e l d of production, this i s in no way 
to deny the significance of other possible sources of group 
formation, i n particular within the f i e l d of reproduction. 
Indeed, a multitude of alternatives can be observed, over issues 
ranging from gender, housing and ecology through to nuclear 
disarmament* (see also Doherty, 1983; Murgatroyd et a l 1984). 
The complex unity within c a p i t a l i s t society between production 
and consumption i s apparent where the failure to realise exchange 
values, that i s to s e l l as use-values coriiiodities produced in the 
production process, represents a disjunction between production 
and consumption, a c r i s i s of over-production, with implications 
for a l l aspects of social relations (see also Bleitrach and 
Chenu, 1979). What this suggests, then, i s a society riven with 
conflict on several planes simultaneously, with particular issues 
intersecting i n a contingent manner in a variety of 
circumstances, i n a way which requires analysis with respect to 
concrete situations. 
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I t i s precisely in this analysis of concrete circumstances that a 
more differentiated conception of class than that of capital 
versus labour i s necessary. For i t would be possible to 
c r i t i c i s e any analysis predicated on the existence of two major 
classes and concerned only with the manifestation of this simple 
division as grossly over-emphasising the significance of 
structural constraints within society (see Duncan and Ley, 1982). 
To take account of the broad complexities of the relationship 
between individual and structure we must incorporate a more 
differentiated conceptualisation of class relations. With regard 
to the differentiation of capital, Aglietta (1979) has analysed 
the significance of inter-capitalist competition, emphasising the 
importance of the increasing concentration and centralisation of 
2 
capital . By contrast Olin Wright (1978, especially 30-110) has 
considered the po s s i b i l i t y of a more differentiated notion of the 
class of labour through the concept of contradictory class 
locations. In this context 'contradictory' refers not to what i s 
commonly labelled the 'fundamental contradiction' between capital 
and labour but rather to the fact that certain clusters of 
positions within the social division of labour can be 
characterised as occupying objectively contradictory locations 
within class relations, being incapable of inclusion within the 
same major class at a l l times and under a l l circumstances. For 
example how can the position of middle management be incorporated 
into a two-class framework when the factory they operate i s 
threatened with closure leaving them equally as vulnerable to 
redundancy as those supposedly under their direction? (see also 
Abercrcrribie and Urry, 1983). 
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Examples of this need for differentiation can be highlighted from 
within the steel industry. Within the U.K. there are numerous 
examples of r i v a l r y between the multitude of unions representing 
steel workers/ whose diversity can be dated back to the original 
lines of craft demarcation in the industry during the nineteenth 
century. In France also division exists, in this instance not 
between occupationally-defined interests but arising from the 
highly p o l i t i c a l nature of the trade union structure ranging from 
the Communist Confederation Generale du Travail to the broadly 
right wing Force Ouvriere. In West Germany, by contrast, a 
single union organises the entire steel production sector, the IG 
Metall (for an overview see Owen Smith, 1981). Equally, the 
class of labour i s divided by industrial branch with, in the 
U.K., steel workers negotiating labour contracts independently of 
other metal production industries regardless of common union 
a f f i l i a t i o n . I n West Germany the organisation of union structure 
by industrial branch effectively isolates labour within each 
sector in a very r i g i d fashion. This can be contrasted to the 
French experience where, despite a federal structure on sectoral 
grounds within the small number of unions, i t has frequently been 
possible to observe more generalised action co-ordinated from the 
central Confederation. 
Whilst recognising the significance and explanatory value of a 
Marxist conception of class, then, i t i s imperative not to seek 
to apply a two-fold system in a rigid, deterministic fashion. 
For the very nature of class l i e s i n the working of the system 
i t s e l f , not i n some set of attributes analysed in a particular 
circumstance. I t follows from this that account must be taken of 
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the range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s for intra-class and even inter-class 
division within each and every passing moment. These moments, 
however, take place in space; for events must be h i s t o r i c a l l y 
and geographically situated. In the following section we move on 
to consider the significance of this geographical situation for 
the analysis of class relations. 
I I . 3 On the s o c i a l constitution of place 
Possibly the most distinctive contribution of the school coirmonly 
labelled humanistic geography during the 1970's was that of the 
differentiation between space and place, between location as a 
neutral attribute and location with meaning for the individual 
(see, for example, Ley and Samuels, 1978; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 
1977). Examination of this endowment of meaning was frequently 
undertaken within an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t framework which emphasised 
the significance and uniqueness of the individual. This emphasis 
has been c r i t i c i s e d as under-estimating the significance of the 
broader social fabric within which the individual i s constrained 
(see, for example, Thrift, 1982). The constitution of meaning 
does not take place in a vacuum: i t i s a social process where 
the individual can only act within the bounds set by social 
circumstances, at the same time reproducing these limits in that 
very action. And, crucially, the overriding influence on the 
social fabric i s the nature of class relations. Hence whilst 
space has to be distinguished from place, we seek here to locate 
place i n a socia l context, through the experiences of individuals 
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but recognising the significance of socially-produced 
constraints. 
The significance of place in the constitution of social relations 
i s most readily apparent in the workplace. For we have argued in 
Chapter I that a theory of industrial location has to be grounded 
in the labour process/ representing as i t does a medium for the 
social relations of capital and labour. This takes concrete form 
for the individual i n the very act of production, on the 
shopfloor i t s e l f . The nature of the labour process has 
systematic implications for labouring individuals, through for 
example the development of Taylorism (or s c i e n t i f i c management) 
and of Fordism (or c l a s s i c production line assembly) (see, for 
example, Braverman, 1974; Friedman, 1977). The implications for 
individuals of working in a c a p i t a l i s t society have been 
documented in detail in their own words, in motor vehicle 
production and bulk chemical manufacture, for example (see, 
respectively, Beynon, 1984; Nichols and Beynon, 1977). I t i s on 
the factory floor that the social relations of capital are played 
out, by actors who are, at the least, partly aware of the 
significance of their actions. 
At the same time, however, we can recognise a variety of spatial 
scales at which the relations of capitalism might become most 
readily apparent. One further p o s s i b i l i t y i s that of the town, 
village or community, especially i n cases where one industry i s 
the only large-scale provider of employment, for there work and 
home overlap as bases for the constitution of meaning in l i f e . 
For example the significance of coal-mining to a community in 
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North East England has been analysed through the l i f e of one man, 
the author's grand-father (Williamson, 1982), whilst the broader 
links between workplace and home have been especially apparent on 
the B r i t i s h coalfields during the 1^84/85 miners' strike (see 
Beynon, 1985; Hudson et a l , 1985). A number of comparisons can 
be drawn with the steel industry; for example towns such as 
Consett i n North East England or Longwy i n Eastern France have 
h i s t o r i c a l l y depended upon one industry as the sole source of 
employment, indeed developed largely to provide a labour force 
for that industry. Hence a threat to employment in the steel 
industry in such circumstances can, indeed should, be interpreted 
as a threat to the very place of the comnunity i t s e l f . 
I t i s similarly possible to identify the region, defined for the 
time being i n the broad geographical sense, as a focus for 
individual meaning and action. In an early work, Mandel (1963) 
considered the nature of regionally-based popular protest in 
southern Belgium, Wallonia, where economic problems (see Quevit, 
1978) have been and are today heightened by cultural and 
li n g u i s t i c differences from the north of the country, Flanders 
(see Bologne, 1973). Within the steel industry since the mid-
1970's there have been a number of similar developments. For 
example we can speak of a regionally-based movement in Eastern 
France during the early part of 1979 in specific response to the 
threat posed by the planned rundown of the industry there, a 
rundown affecting many small communities but challenged, at least 
i n i t i a l l y , within the region generally rather than by specific 
4 
communities individually . 
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Clearly, then, the social constitution of place cannot be 
distinguished from the characteristics of particular places. In 
this preliminary conclusion we are touching upon a recent and 
emerging theoretical debate which arises from a growing 
realisation of shared concern between social theory and human 
geography. This debate i s one which emphasises the fact that 
society i s not just constituted in space and time but that the 
web of space-time relations i s equally a formative moment in the 
constitution of society. Social relations no more determine the 
use of space than spatial relations determine the nature of 
society^. 
There i s by no means a single coherent theme to this debate, 
however. For example Soja (1980) identified three positions 
adopted with respect to the relationship between society and 
space. The traditional response has been to maintain that the 
centrality of class analysis i s inviolable, that organised space 
represents nothing more than a reflection of the relations of 
production (see, for example, Dunford and Perrons, 1983; 
O'Keefe, 1984). From this perspective analysis of spatial 
relations i s c r i t i c i s e d as fetishising the nature of space, 
f a i l i n g to reveal the true nature of the underlying mechanisms. 
This approach i s clearly unsatisfactory in that space i s not an 
empty container which i s somehow separate from the material 
objects (for example a steelworks) located within i t . Rather, 
location i s at the same time an attribute of the object and of 
the space (see Urry, 1981a). 
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Against this can be counterposed two related positions. The 
f i r s t recognises the significance of spatial relations but when 
pushed to an ex p l i c i t choice, the pre-eminence of aspatial social 
class definition i s maintained (see, for example, Castells, 
1977) . This approach, then, i s ultimately subject to the same 
cr i t i c i s m as the f i r s t . The second, which Soja ultimately 
favours and associates with Mandel and Lefebvre, (see, for 
example, Mandel, 1963: Lefebvre, 1971) acknowledges that social 
and spatial relations are d i a l e c t i c a l l y inter-reactive, that 
social relations of production are both space-forming and space-
contingent (see, for example, Cooke, 1983; Thrift, 1982). 
Care has to be taken, however, i n the specification of the 
meaning and nature of this inter-relationship between society and 
space. For example Peet (1981) i n a reply to Smith's (1979) 
cri t i c i s m of the term 'spatial d i a l e c t i c s ' claimed: 
'I used the term "spatial dialectics" as part of an account of 
the attempt by marxist geographers to move through spatial 
description into an analysis of the social processes which 
originate spatial appearance./ (p. 105, emphasis added). 
Thus i n t h i s instance he f a l l s into the second category of 
analyses, recognising the significance of spatial relations but 
maintaining the prime position of social relations. In a reply, 
Smith (1981) characterises this approach as "spatial 
interactionism", arguing that i t refines, but does not remove, 
the orthodox fetishism of space: 
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'In fact there i s nothing d i a l e c t i c a l about "spatial 
d i a l e c t i c s " ... I t begins from a dichotomy that i t never does 
transcend: space on the one side, social process on the 
other ... the theory treats space in practice as a relatively 
autonomous thing or f i e l d . ' (p. 112) 
What this suggests, then, i s that an analysis predicated on the 
inter-dependence of society and space i s one which must avoid 
attributing causal significance to either the development of 
social relations or of spatial relations. Rather, i t must 
consider, through the analysis of concrete circumstances, the 
ways in which, h i s t o r i c a l l y , this web of socio-spatial relations 
has developed and, just as importantly, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
presented for future development. This i s not to argue that 
theory must be constructed only from unique case studies nor even 
that there i s such an object as a unique case study. Rather, 
fu l l y informed theory can only be developed from consideration of 
concrete circumstances whilst, at the same time, recognising the 
causally-determining powers of unobservable structures, in l i n e 
with a r e a l i s t conception of theory (see, for example, Sayer, 
1982) 7. 
Briefly to i l l u s t r a t e this theme, i t i s possible to speak of a 
variety of possible bases for intersection between place and 
class when considering the diversity of experiences regarding the 
articulation of campaigns in defence of jobs i n the steel 
industry through the workplace and the community. This 
articulation i s i n part dependent upon whether the meaning of 
closure becomes broadly associated with, or intercepted by, the 
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family or household, and upon the absolute significance of steel 
employment to the community. The degree of local support for the 
campaign at Longwy i n France during the latter part of 1^79, for 
example, represented an expression of class interest 
predominantly, though not wholly, at the level of the community, 
in contrast to the situation in Dortmund, in West Germany, where 
following an i n i t i a l broad base of support the campaign became 
more narrowly based on the various workplaces of the steel 
company in the town. 
A corollary of this state of affa i r s i s that in a variety of 
circumstances i t i s possible for the realisation of class 
interest to be part of a tendency towards competition between 
workforces at different locations within the same company or 
between companies in the same branch of production. In this way 
many campaigns become af f a i r s of fighting for 'our workplace', 
for 'our town', at the expense of somebody else's workplace or 
town. For example, the history of works closure in the B r i t i s h 
Steel Corporation i l l u s t r a t e s clearly the a b i l i t y of the parent 
company to "play off" one works against another in this context 
of a highly localised intersection of place and class interest. 
In other circumstances, however, i t i s possible to recognise a 
far broader base to anti-closure campaigns where class relations 
are realised at the level of regional places. In a number of 
examples i t i s possible to demonstrate that at this level 
campaigns are characterised by a degree of cross-class support, 
that i s to say a purely regional alliance between locally-bound 
capital and labour in defence of the regional structure (compare 
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Kesselman, 1981, reviewing Dulong, 1978). In this category f a l l 
events in Lorraine during January 1979 and in Scotland during 
1982 in defence of Ravenscraig. 
Clearly, then, we have moved from a question of place versus 
class to one of their di a l e c t i c a l inter-relatedness and inter-
dependence. In this context i t becomes doubly necessary to 
consider the relationship between agency and structure, the way 
in which the action of individuals takes place within the 
framework of a certain space and a certain society. This 
question has been considered extensively by, among others, 
Giddens, in his theory of structuration (in particular Giddens, 
1979; also 1981) and within human geography by Gregory (1981) 
and Thrift (1983). Giddens (1979, 66) makes a useful distinction 
between system and structure, defining system as 'reproduced 
relations between actors or c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , organised as regular 
social practices' and structure as 'rules and resources, 
organised as properties of social systems', whilst structuration 
can be regarded as 'conditions governing the continuity or 
transformation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of 
systems'. Hence, in this terminology, systems have structural 
properties: they are not structures in themselves. Action takes 
place within a framework of partially-acknowledged conditions 
with a series of partially-intended consequences, in particular 
the reproduction or otherwise of the social system. This action 
i s regularly reflexively monitored with respect to the 
constitution of the system. In this, again, i t becomes apparent 
that class relations can only be analysed with regard to 
particular places, for the way in which the individual conceives 
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(in) action against a proposed closure depends upon her 
relationship to, indeed acceptance of, any number of place-
specific institutional formations: the works' union committee; 
the national trade union organisation, or more ad hoc bodies such 
as the Burgerinitiative Stahlwerk Jetzt in the town of Dortmund. 
A further element introduced by Giddens (1979, esp. 216-22), and 
of particular relevance for the current discussion, i s that of 
routinisation i n the production and reproduction of social 
systems. The significant characteristic of routine action i s 
that i t i s largely taken for granted and, as such, i s an implicit 
condition in the reproduction of social systems . For example in 
the case of language, the act of communication in that language 
i s simultaneously an act of motivated purpose (corrrnoni cation) as 
i t i s of generally non-motivated consequence, the reproduction of 
that language as a form of communication (although Giddens, 1979, 
218, observes the important exception of an ethnic minority 
attempting to preserve a language threatened with extinction). 
The notion of routinisation can be applied with equal aptitude to 
the characteristic of wage labour in c a p i t a l i s t society, with the 
'traditional' or routine way of l i f e associated with, for 
example, s h i f t work in the steel industry. When, however, the 
routine i s broken i n a drastic way such as the closure of a 
ccrtrriunity's main employer of wage labour, the p o s s i b i l i t y exists 
for a questioning, rich in p r a c t i c a l i t i e s ^ of the causes of the 
'de-routinisation' of l i f e , of the functioning of society at the 
level of structures. To borrow Habermas's (1976) term, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y exists of a 'legitimation c r i s i s ' i n the reproduction 
of society (see also Robinson and Sadler, 1985). 
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The h i s t o r i c a l development of class relations and of places i s 
also of significance for the circumstances of action. For the 
broader base of support for the defence of jobs in the steel 
industry in Scotland and Lorraine represented, as we shall see, 
recurring expressions of regional consciousness, which in the act 
of recurrence reinforced an element of regional identity - which 
has to be related to the h i s t o r i c a l development of the region in 
the broadest sense (see, for example, Hechter, 1975; Nairn, 
1977). This history has frequently been analysed in the context 
of changing patterns of h i s t o r i c a l domination or of some degree 
of ethnic feeling within the regions - of being Scottish or 
Lorrainese in a way which i s not readily observable in a l l areas 
of Europe. Rokkan and Urwin (1982), for example, provide a 
wealth of h i s t o r i c a l material on the changing patterns of 
p o l i t i c a l domination in what they identify as the 'peripheral' 
regions of Europe, and relate this to h i s t o r i c a l expressions of 
regional consciousness. Whilst i t has to be acknowledged that 
this h i s t o r i c a l tradition of attachment to place i s of great 
significance i n the broadening of anti-closure campaigns, an 
analysis predicated purely on h i s t o r i c a l development over a long 
time-period i s unable to incorporate the implications of economic 
changes such as plant closures in the development of 'regional' 
consciousness. To analyse changes such as these requires precise 
sectoral consideration of changing production trends (for example 
in steel) and examination of the relation between short- and 
long-term cycles of social and economic development. 
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TI .4 Concluding comments 
We have progressed, then, from consideration of the relationship 
between industrial location and social development to the point 
where social and spatial development are seen as simultaneously 
constitutive moments. Places are reproduced just as social 
relations are reproduced, by people; the motor of capitalism i s 
not just the class relation between capital and labour but also 
the development of place, the two combining and intertwining in a 
complex and intricate fashion (see also Pred, 1984). To a degree 
places are specific - they have their own characteristics which 
are the hallmark of their h i s t o r i c a l development (see Massey, 
1983). So too are people specific. But i t i s possible to 
consider the generality of experience of place and class through 
reconstruction of events within this two-dimensional structure. 
The way i n which to understand the relationship between society 
and space l i e s in the medium wherein they are similarly 
constituted. Hence the approach adopted here i s to reconstruct 
events within their place and class origins, recognising the 
specifi c i t y of these events but generalising the more relevant 
lessons. And to do this requires considerable detail. Bland 
statements of the kind ' i f x then y' or that regional economic 
problems are related to occupational structures (see, for 
example, Buck, 1979; Buck and Atkins, 1978) f a i l even to begin 
to get at the heart of the problem. A sympathetic yet c r i t i c a l 
understanding of detail i s necessary to reconstruct events i n 
their proper h i s t o r i c a l and social place. 
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This reconstruction of events, the re-creation of context/ 
accords with several recent contributions to social theory (see, 
for exanple, Giddens, 1984, ch. 3). Associated with these, there 
have been calls for a recognition of shared interest between 
social science and history. For exanple historians 
'cannot properly be regarded as specialists along a dimension 
of time, any more than geographers can be regarded as 
specialists along a dimension of space; such disciplinary 
divisions, as ordinarily conceived, are concrete expressions 
of the repression of time and space i n social theory.' 
and again 
' I f there are divisions between social science and history, 
they are substantive divisions of labour; there i s no 
logical or methodological schism.' 
(Giddens, 1984, 355, 358) 
The logic of these statements should by now be self-evident, 
given our ea r l i e r concern for the reconstruction of events i n 
t h e i r proper h i s t o r i c a l and social place. Abrams (1982) i n his 
c a l l for a h i s t o r i c a l sociology held that the reconstruction of 
events i s as much the work of the historian as of the social 
scientist, whether the events are past, present or future tense. 
The problems of social theory, of agency, structure and 
explanation, are shared by a l l the social sciences. I t i s i n 
t h i s shared set of problems that the present research has been 
grounded. 
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Footnotes t o Chapter I I 
^ Perhaps the most frequently quoted study of such issues is 
that of Cockburn (1975) with regard t o housing i n the London 
borough of Lambeth. 
2 
Concentration of capital refers to the tendency for individual 
capitals t o expand i n size whilst centralisation refers t o the 
tendency for some capitals t o subsume the operations of others. 
These dif f e r e n t processes lead t o the same result, the 
progressive elimination of competition and a consequent 
strengthening of common interest among capitals. 
3 
Revelli (1982) has described the temporary resolution of this 
particular problem i n one concrete instance, a five-week s t r i k e 
against large-scale redundancy at the Fiat plant i n Turin during 
October 1980. This collapsed after a counter-demonstration by 
some 20,000 including middle managers and foremen, under the 
slogan 'work i s defended by working'. 
4 
Whilst i n part touching upon the concerns of the following 
Chapter, i t i s possible t o speak also of the nation state as a 
potential place of meaning. Given that the nation state has been 
an integral feature of the development of capitalism (see e.g. 
Giddens, 1981, 182-202) such an eventuality i s of l i t t l e 
surprise. I n particular the advent of claims for the imposition 
of import duties against other nation's steel products or for 
increased national allowances within the supranational state's 
plan, the EEC steel quota regime, represent several of the ways 
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i n which meaning can become apparent at t h i s scale of c a p i t a l i s t 
society: a theme receiving closer examination i n the following 
Chapter. 
5 
Although the analysis of t h i s Chapter has used the terms 
'place' and 'class' to date, they are intended to be p a r a l l e l 
terms with those of 1 society' and 1 space1, although with certain 
reservations. As already indicated, 'place' i s preferred t o 
'space' i n that i t i s a more subjective term (although Soja 
(1980, 210) uses 'space' i n t h i s way also). 'Class' i s preferred 
t o the more generic term 'society' since the societies i n 
question are of a particular kind, i n which i t has been argued 
class relations are the dominant characteristic. 
Soja (1980, 211) associates Harvey with t h i s theme but more 
recent contributions (especially Harvey, 1982, chapters 12 and 
13) do not consider class analysis t o be distinguishable from 
th e i r constitution i n space. 
7 
The significance of the causally-determining power of 
unobservable structures i s a major tenet of the r e a l i s t mode of 
s c i e n t i f i c enquiry (see, for example, Bhaskar, 1975; Keat and 
Urry, 1975). 
g 
In a very real way, however, i t i s necessary to distinguish 
t h i s conception of routinisation from the time-geographic 
approach pioneered by Hagerstrand (see, e.g. T h r i f t , 1977; Pred, 
1982). 
Whilst time-geography emphasises the concepts of path and 
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project, of presence and absence i n space and time, there exists 
no direct correspondence between a certain set of time-space 
intersections and 'routine' a c t i v i t y i n the sense referred to by 
Giddens. Certainly, i t might well be that some projects occur 
more frequently than others, or at more regular intervals; but 
t h i s i s not what i s meant by Giddens' conception of 
routinisation. Rather, th i s l a t t e r can be differentiated i n that 
i t emphasises the significance of unintended consequences of 
human action i n the reproduction of social systems. Similarly, 
t h i s emphasis must be regarded as one part of a more general 
critique of the time-geographic approach, i t s lack of a broader 
conception of the dynamics of societal development. 
CHAPTER I I I 
Theories of the s t a t e i n c a p i t a l i s t : s o c i e t y s form and 
discourse through place 
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111 • 1 Int.roduct.ion 
Throughout our discussion of the character of events situated i n 
time and space one aspect of the context of social development 
has so far gone largely unremarked. I t i s a truism that the 
nature of contemporary c a p i t a l i s t society i s heavily imbued with 
the influence of the state. Nearly a l l aspects of everyday l i f e , 
of routine a c t i v i t y , are i n some way bound up i n the web of 
in s t i t u t i o n s , regulations and resources which characterise the 
contemporary c a p i t a l i s t state. To trace through the individual's 
daily l i f e path i s t o reveal the influence of the state, 
regularly reconstituted with the routine acceptance of authority 
i n that very same daily l i f e path. Just as far reaching i n i t s 
implications i s the a b i l i t y of the state t o organise relations 
with other states, leading on occasion t o ins t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
c o n f l i c t or repression. Hence an important task of our account 
must be an adequate theorisation of the state, an understanding 
of how and why i t i s that i n an ins t i t u t i o n a l i s e d form our 
(daily) lives are, almost but not quite l i t e r a l l y , governed. 
In t h i s context, a number of prefatory remarks concerning the 
character of the state are i n order, even i f t o anticipate the 
discussion. B r i e f l y , we w i l l argue here that the state must be 
understood as a social relation, constituted within the web of 
capital-labour relations as simultaneous pre-condition for and 
result of that very web of relations. As an expression of the 
class relations of c a p i t a l i s t society, the character of the state 
only takes shape i n i t s continued reproduction. The form of the 
state i s largely evident i n the nature of i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
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these representing settings for the ordering of time and space 
broader than those of the daily life-path. This i s not to argue, 
though, that the character of the state can be deduced from i t s 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l form. For just as important i s the way i n which 
t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l form i s related t o the ordering of daily 
a c t i v i t y - a relationship of a reciprocal and constantly-
monitored character. 
I m p l i c i t i n t h i s position i s a cautionary note against a general 
theory of the state. Whilst the nature of the state i n the 
abstract i s realised as a social relation with concrete 
expression i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l form, this realisation i s contingent 
upon the particular balance of class relations. What we are 
concerned with i s not t o produce a theory of the state which can 
account for a l l circumstances. Father, we are engaged i n an 
analysis of the many determinations that are combined i n a series 
of concrete conjunctures, and of how these determinations are 
inter-related i n a contingent structure of causation (see also 
Jessop, 1982, 211-13). By the linear nature of our presentation 
i t might appear that a theory of the state precedes analysis of 
determinate conjunctures. Quite the reverse; and yet not quite 
the reverse. Although the presentation is i n linear form, there 
i s i n r e a l i t y a reciprocating process between different planes of 
analysis. 'The state' i s something to be explained, not a 
principle of explanation. 
The following discussion f a l l s into four sections. We begin by 
considering the relationship between state theory and geography, 
and why geographers should incorporate a greater understanding of 
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the nature of the state. The ways i n which this nature has been 
analysed are then examined, considering the characteristics of 
particular theorisations of the state. We move on to develop 
upon what could be called the ' t e r r i t o r i a l i t y ' of the state and 
the significance of place for the constitution of the state as a 
social relation. Finally, the t e r r i t o r i a l i t y of the state i s 
examined through the development of an embryonic supra-national 
state, the EEC, involving the theoretical issue of the separation 
of state powers between national and supra-national level. 
I I I . 2 State theory and geography 
From time t o time geographers have woken up t o the existence of 
the state and have issued calls for geography as a discipline t o 
take heed of the work of theorists on the nature of the state. 
This awakening, i f such i t can be termed, has been expressed i n 
diff e r e n t ways with divergent conclusions i n i t s implications f o r 
geography. For example, Dear and Clark (1978, 173) have argued 
that a 'major re-appraisal of the state's role i n urban and 
regional geographical process i s long overdue'. I t would be 
inadequate, though, i f t h i s re-appraisal were concerned only with 
the spatial input t o and spatial effects of state policy. The 
state should not be seen as spatially autonomous : t o argue that 
i t exists i n space, but l i k e a black box i t reacts t o and 
influences space without i t s e l f being influenced by space i s 
clearly i n s u f f i c i e n t . 
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This has recently been recognised by, among others, Kirby (1985) 
and Taylor (1982). Taylor seeks to re-locate p o l i t i c a l geography 
away from studies of the state per se and back to the dynamics of 
capital accumulation whilst recognising the relative autonomy of 
the state, as part of a programme of p o l i t i c a l geographic 
research of an h i s t o r i c a l materialist character. I n other words 
he recognises that the state exists i n a complex d i a l e c t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n t o both society and space. In a related fashion Kirby 
(1985, 6) asserts that ' a l l geographers (as a small subset of 
social science) do need a theory of the state'. He goes on to 
suggest that the local state should be accorded greater 
consideration : 
'What i s being suggested here then i s that the local state 
constitutes a locus within which nperific consumption and 
production struggles are manifested. This i s not to argue, 
however, that research based within some notion of local 
states becomes a new orthodoxy within p o l i t i c a l geography 
that, for example, replaces a focus upon the nation-state. 
Quite the reverse. Any emphasis upon p o l i t i c a l struggles at 
the local level i s a welcome counter-balance t o preceding 
national analyses, but cannot stand alone'. 
(13, emphasis i n ori g i n a l ) 
A position which Taylor (1982, 25), drawing on Wallerstein (1979) 
would probably qualify with a c a l l for an international dimension 
at the level of the world economy. 
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I t is the case, then, that at least some geographers have 
accorded p r i o r i t y to an integration with consideration of the 
nature of the state. To this emerging debate a number of 
comments can be added. In the f i r s t place, i t could be argued 
that the obligation to j u s t i f y the conjunction of geographical 
studies with state theory is a spurious one on the grounds that 
the formal academic division of labour, whilst useful for some 
purposes, i s not necessarily the most appropriate way of dividing 
theoretical material. For i f i t is conceded that r e a l i t y is a 
complex structured whole, from which i t is possible to abstract 
in any number of ways provided that the internal logic of the 
whole is respected, then i t is apparent that the p o s s i b i l i t y 
exists of what is currently subsumed under the label or epithet 
'geography' as a disciplinary t i t l e being relevant, indeed v i t a l , 
to other theoretical domains, including in this instance 
theorisations on the nature of the state. The same applies to 
labels within geographical enquiry. ' P o l i t i c a l ' geography holds 
no monopoly to study of the state within geography. 
That said, and accepting for the moment the academic division of 
state theory from geography, i t should be apparent by now that 
geographers are not just in a position to draw on theorisations 
of the state l i k e a child at a bran tub at the village fete, but 
are able substantively to contribute to the abstract theorisation 
of the state. Very b r i e f l y , there are two particular advantages 
i n conjoining a t e r r i t o r i a l perspective with the formulation of 
state theory. In the f i r s t place, the degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
within c a p i t a l i s t society with respect to both place and class, 
as analysed in the previous Chapter, introduces an additional 
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dimension to class-based theories of the state through the idea 
of competing c l a s s / t e r r i t o r i a l interests rather than the 
underdefined notion of class interests per se. Secondly, an 
emphasis on the spatial characteristics of policy formulation 
helps provide a less mechanistic interpretation of development in 
a given society; in other words economic development (and, 
through t h i s , the nature of the state) is not just a social 
process taking place on the even plane of von Thunen and Weber, 
but is rather a process developing through both space and time, 
with particular consequences for the development of states. 
Before we enlarge upon these remarks, however, we must look i n 
greater d e t a i l at the state and at theories of the state. 
I I I . 3 Theories on the nature of the s t a t e 
In an important review of theories on the nature of the state 
Held (1983) identified four traditions of p o l i t i c a l analysis: 
liberalism, l i b e r a l democracy, Marxism and p o l i t i c a l sociology. 
In what follows we consider the main lines of his argument 
concerning these traditions in an attempt to develop an 
h i s t o r i c a l perspective on the development of state theory. We 
then move on to consider the characteristics of various Marxist 
theories on the state, since the internal debate within t h i s 
strand has witnessed a remarkable and l i v e l y resurgence in the 
last f i f t e e n years. Finally we draw the threads of the argument 
together by specifying the bases for a satisfactory theorisation 
of the state. 
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The development of the l i b e r a l i s t strand of analysis was 
associated by Held with the writings of Hobbes (1588-1679) and 
Locke (1632-1704). For Hobbes, i t was the self-seeking nature of 
individuals' behaviour that made the power of the state 
necessary. Only a great 'Leviathan' or sovereign state could 
defend the general or public good for and on behalf of a l l i t s 
citizens. Locke, however, raised a fundamental objection to t h i s 
defence of the sovereignty of the state. He f e l t i t scarcely 
credible that a citizenry which was not able t o t r u s t one another 
should place i t s collective t r u s t i n an all-powerful ruler t o 
look after i t s interests. From t h i s position he f e l t i t more 
important t o emphasise that the power of the state must 
ultimately be subordinate t o the w i l l of the people. The state 
exists t o guide society; society does not exist to uphold the 
state. He was concerned, therefore, to safeguard and uphold the 
rights of the individual through restrictions on the scope of the 
state's power, thereby laying the foundations for the development 
of liberalism, the d e f i n i t i o n of a private sphere independent of 
the state. 
The question of the l i m i t s upon p o l i t i c a l power was taken further 
by two of the f i r s t advocates of l i b e r a l democracy, Bentham 
(1748-1832) and James M i l l (1773-1836), who were concerned with 
the development of a p o l i t i c a l apparatus that would ensure the 
accountability of the governors to the governed. The state was 
t o be accorded the role of umpire whilst individuals pursued 
t h e i r own interest within the rules of economic competition. 
John Stuart M i l l (1806-73) developed t h i s t o advocate the 
s u i t a b i l i t y of representative democracy as the means of making 
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government accountable t o the citizenry. As Held (1983, 19) 
notes, however, M i l l favoured a system of voting whereby the 
wiser and more talented, however th i s could be defined, should 
have more votes than the ignorant or less able. The achievement 
of universal suffrage would not have found favour. 
The emphasis within both l i b e r a l i s t and liberal-democratic 
characterisations of the state, then, was upon the rights of the 
individual i n relation t o the state, and upon the state as an 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l representation of the common interest subject t o 
various democratic checks. Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95) 
consistently c r i t i c i s e d t h i s emphasis upon the individual and 
upon the cannon interest. I n contradistinction, they argued that 
the opposition between public and individual interest was, to a 
large extent, i l l u s o r y . Developing instead from the ce n t r a l i t y 
of class structure for the relationship between individuals, they 
argued that the (false) opposition between public and private 
interest e f f e c t i v e l y depoliticised the key source of power - the 
private ownership of the means of production. Economy and p o l i t y 
were seen as separate spheres by l i b e r a l democrats i n that the 
class division between those who own the means of production and 
those who own only t h e i r labour-power was regarded as the outcome 
of free, private, individual contracts. But, crucially, by 
defending private property, the rights of some individuals to own 
the means of production and hir e labour power, the state has 
already taken a side. Economy and p o l i t y are, and should be seen 
as, inter-linked. The state cannot act i n the public interest as 
there i s no single public interest (see Giddens and Held, 1982, 
12-39; Held, 1983, 23-25; Held and Krieger, 1984, 3; Marx, 
1963, 1977; Marx and Engels, 1962). 
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Within t h i s c r i t i q u e of liberalism and l i b e r a l democracy two 
views of the r e l a t i o n between classes and the state can be 
distinguished from the writings of Marx (see Held, 1983, 25-34; 
Held and Krieger, 1984, 4). The f i r s t stresses that the state 
need not be d i r e c t l y linked t o the interest of the dominant class 
i n the short term; the second, followed by Lenin (1870-1924) and 
dominant i n Marx's own writings, sees the state as a class 
instrument co-ordinated t o dominate society i n the interests of 
the ruli n g class (see especially Lenin, 1971). This ambiguity i s 
central t o the p o l i t i c a l conception of action against state 
power. On the whole, the Leninist vision of the state as a class 
instrument led t o a programme ca l l i n g for destruction of the 
state apparatus; whilst acceptance of the relative autonomy of 
the state can lead t o a view of the state as a potential arena 
for struggle, a force for s o c i a l i s t change. This ambiguity is of 
considerable importance i n the recent revival of Marxist theories 
on the state, t o which we return below. 
The Marxist notion that the state i s essentially parasitic has by 
no means received universal acceptance, however. within the 
t r a d i t i o n which Held (1983) labels p o l i t i c a l sociology, a variety 
of alternative perspectives on the character of the state have 
emerged. Weber (1864-1920) i n particular held that i t was 
misleading t o conflate problems concerning the nature of state 
administration (bureaucracy) with those concerning control of the 
state apparatus. He was concerned instead t o focus upon the 
nature of bureaucratic administration i n the state (see Weber, 
1968). Crucially, however, whilst his concern with the internal 
functioning of the state counterposes usefully the Marxist 
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concern for the relation between state and society, his 
theorisation i s ultimately deficient i n that the relation between 
state and society i s never explicated : the focus i s on the 
internal working of the state i n some kind of societal vacuum 
(see especially Krieger, 1983, 3-36). As Held (1983, 39, 44) and 
Held and Krieger (1984, 8-14) note, though, Weberian 
presuppositions have underpinned many contemporary theorisations 
of the state. These include what may be characterised as 
pluralism (see, for example, Dahl, 1975) and corporatism (see, 
for example, Panitch, 1981). The p l u r a l i s t position holds that 
there are many determinants of the di s t r i b u t i o n of power and that 
state powers are the subject of interest group bargaining. 
Corporatism sees a shared interest i n collective bargaining 
epitomised by the development of t r i - p a r t i t e agreements between 
employers' associations, trade unions and government. 
Ultimately, though, l i k e pluralism i t reduces democracy t o an 
economistic bargaining process and excuses inequality as the 
necessary side-effect of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y (Held and Krieger, 
1984, 11). 
The recent resurgence of interest i n Marxist theories of the 
state was characterised i n i t s i n i t i a l stages by a debate between 
Miliband and Poulantzas (see especially Miliband, 1969; 
Poulantzas, 1972, 1973). As noted above, t h i s debate developed 
from the ambiguity i n Marx's writings concerning the relation 
between classes and the state. Miliband insisted that the state, 
i n order t o be p o l i t i c a l l y effective, must be able to separate 
i t s e l f from the ru l i n g class, whilst at the same time remaining 
an instrument for the domination of society on behalf of the 
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rulin g class. I n his reply Poulantzas c r i t i c i s e d the emphasis 
placed by Miliband upon the instrumentality of the state and upon 
the relationship of individuals t o the state apparatus. More 
important than the acts of individuals, he contended, was the 
functioning of the system. I n particular, the state must 
function t o ensure, on the one hand, the p o l i t i c a l organisation 
of the dominant classes and, on the other, the p o l i t i c a l 
disorganisation of the dominated classes (Poulantzas, 1973, 287-
8). I n so arguing he ultimately returned t o a notion of the 
state as instrument for class domination, one reason why later 
authors have insisted that Miliband and Poulantzas shared 
significant common theoretical ground (see, for example, Held and 
Krieger, 1984, 16). 
To trace the re-emergence of a l i v e l y theoretical debate within 
Marxist theorisations of the state solely t o Miliband and 
Poulantzas, however, would be t e l l i n g only part of the story. 
Prior t o t h i s debate significant attention had been paid to the 
state within what Jessop (1982) has labelled theories of state-
monopoly capitalism. Whilst not theories on the nature of the 
state as such, but rather a focus on the latest stage of 
c a p i t a l i s t development forming a central tenet of Soviet bloc 
p o l i t i c s , i t i s important t o introduce t h i s body of theory as i t 
too l a i d the setting for more recent theoretical advances. 
For the proponents of t h i s approach state monopoly capitalism i s 
treated as a d i s t i n c t stage of capitalism. I t i s assumed that 
the development of c a p i t a l i s t relations of production inevitably 
leads t o a situation where t h i s production i s dominated by large 
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individual or monopoly capitals. The fusion of monopoly capital 
with the state creates a single mechanism of economic 
exploitation and p o l i t i c a l suppression. To counteract the 
general c r i s i s of capitalism, in particular the tendency for the 
rate of profit to f a l l , i t i s argued that monopoly capital has 
established a privileged relationship with the state whereby the 
l a t t e r acts exclusively in the interests of capital to restore 
the rate of accumulation and hence p r o f i t a b i l i t y (see, for 
example, Herzog, 1971? Stalin,1952). However, many of the 
theoretical conclusions of the approach rest on statements with a 
high level of indeterminacy. The tendency for the rate of profit 
to f a l l i s attributed great causal significance yet the concept 
i t s e l f has generated considerable discussion over the extent to 
which countervailing tendencies such as the introduction of new 
technology or the search for new markets could act to maintain or 
increase the rate of profit. A second criticism relates to the 
internal consistency of the theory i t s e l f . For although i t i s 
asserted that the form of the c a p i t a l i s t state i s determined by 
the nature of the economic system, the changes internal to the 
state apparatus are not considered necessary of explanation. 
This i s despite the fact that state monopoly capitalism theories 
are rooted in a revolutionary framework which emphasises the 
poss i b i l i t y of using the form of the c a p i t a l i s t state as the very 
basis for revolutionary strategy within the economic system. 
Thus the form of the state i s seen as being determined by the 
economy yet at the same time capable of being used to transform 
that economy, a logically inconsistent argument (see also Jessop, 
1982, 32-77). 
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In two senses, then, the deficiencies of state monopoly 
capitalism theories p a r a l l e l criticisms levelled at Miliband and 
Poulantzas. F i r s t l y , there i s limited consideration of the 
internal working of the state, that i s of the form of the state. 
In a related fashion, there i s insufficient attention to the ways 
in which the working class, as an integral element of c a p i t a l i s t 
social relations, i s able to influence the state. For Miliband 
and Poulantzas, the problem i s that despite viewing the state as 
a class relation, they tend to collapse social relations to the 
motives of the c a p i t a l i s t class (see also Frankel, 1979). For 
revolutionary state monopoly capitalism theorists the form of the 
state i s at the same time essential to s o c i a l i s t change and yet 
determined by the ( c a p i t a l i s t ) economic system. 
These questions concerning the form of the c a p i t a l i s t state have 
been taken up i n a body of theory labelled by Jessop (1982) as 
form-derivation. This emerged largely through a re-appraisal of 
state theory in West Germany during the 1960's and 1970's (see 
especially Holloway and Picciotto, 1978). I t s original aim was 
carefully to specify the form of the c a p i t a l i s t state whilst 
recognising the hierarchy of necessary and sufficient conditions 
of p o s s i b i l i t y of the state as a theoretical object at a specific 
level of abstraction. The diversity of approaches within this 
broad tradition stems in large part from the choice of what 
exactly i s to be derived; that i s , of what theoretical object i s 
seen as the most necessary point of departure. For example, 
Altvater (1973) began from the distinction between capital i n 
general and individual capitals, whilst Holloway and Picciotto 
(1977) emphasised the significance of commodity exchange for the 
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sphere of c a p i t a l i s t production. More inportantly, although the 
work of Claus Offe i s rarely presented as an e x p l i c i t 
contribution to form-derivation theory, he has demonstrated far 
more clearly than any of the declared adherents of form-
derivation the f u l l extent to which the form of the c a p i t a l i s t 
state c a l l s into question the functionality of the state for 
capital. He analysed the way in which the form of the state 
problematises in i t s e l f the contradictory relations of c a p i t a l i s t 
production by specifying the structural constraints on the extent 
of state intervention in the economy. 
Offe (1975; also 1972, 1973; see also Offe and Ponge, 1975; 
Keane, 1978) distinguished between productive and allocative 
modes of state intervention in the economy. The allocative mode 
produces a suitable environment for accumulation by authoritative 
allocation of resources that are already the property of the 
state. For example certain industries receive protective 
t a r i f f s , i n a method solely determined by resources and powers 
which belong to the state and could be characterised as i t s 
authority. By contrast productive state a c t i v i t y arises out of 
the dynamics of c a p i t a l i s t competition, from every firm 
developing protective mechanisms which in turn pose a threat to 
the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of others. The state responds to such 
situations by producing material conditions which allow the 
continuation of accumulation*. 
The functionalist tone of the i n i t i a l argument i s not sufficient 
to detract t o t a l l y from the more revealing element of t h i s 
analysis, that of the way in which such productive interventions 
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are organised, the way in which in an institutionalised fashion 
the state processes problematic af f a i r s which are held to bring 
forth (or not) such interventions. For i t i s insufficient to 
regard the state as a •problem-solver'; that i s to say, to argue 
problems are recognised, and more or less adequate solutions are 
produced i s not wrong, but rather 'one-sided'. Instead, there i s 
a dual process, whereby "every time the state deals with a 
problem in i t s environment, i t deals with a problem of i t s e l f , 
that i s , i t s internal mode of operation" (Offe, 1975, 135). 
Three possible formal rules are then recognised for this dual 
problem-solving process; bureaucracy, purposive action and 
consensus. Bureaucracy, the application of pre-determined rules 
through a hierarchical structure of "neutral" o f f i c i a l s in a 
c l a s s i c Weberian fashion, i s considered insufficient to cope with 
productive state a c t i v i t y since i t i s unable to answer such 
questions which arise as the nature of the f i n a l product, or 
purpose of state intervention (see Krieger, 1983). In a similar 
fashion purposive action, requiring pre-conceived goals that can 
be achieved by means of technical effectiveness and economic 
efficiency, i s unsuitable since, because the state i s not an 
accumulating c a p i t a l i s t unit in i t s own right (unlike, say, a 
firm) i t alone cannot define i t s own ends or goals which can then 
be followed technocrat!ca1ly, but rather requires to react to the 
changing imperatives of other c a p i t a l i s t units. Hence the f i n a l 
alternative, that of consensus, or the simultaneous determination 
of inputs and outputs by the clients of state adndnistration. In 
this instance, however, the necessity to maintain a short-term 
balance between conflict and consensus, between individual 
elements of society, makes long-term planning impossible; 
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moreover, an excess of responsiveness to the clientele carries 
the risk of the state going beyond the limits of what i t can do 
in a variety of senses, f i s c a l , ideological and material. 
Offe (1975) concluded that a l l three methods of policy formation 
are, in the long term, impossible. Hence the limitations of the 
policy-forming system should be regarded as structural 
constraints on the c a p i t a l i s t state. In r e a l i t y the state 
u t i l i s e s a variety of these options according to the nature of 
the problem, the nature of i t s own internal structure and the 
strength of the imperative necessitating resolution. At the same 
time, i n resolving these problems, the state resolves a problem 
within i t s e l f , that of the operation of i t s own policy-making 
apparatus, in such a way as to determine what potential issues 
are, how they are defined and what solutions are proposed. 
Crucially, however, in so doing, the state sets in motion a new 
set of problems, a new set of imperatives requiring resolution 
since in compensating for the i n i t i a l problem i t runs up against 
at least one of the structural constraints on i t s operation, 
requiring compensatory elements of state intervention from within 
a different method of policy formation mediated through the 
internal structure of the state, which i n turn poses new 
problems, and so on. Hence the a c t i v i t i e s of the state can be 
regarded as those of perpetual crisis-avoidance, operating within 
structurally-determined constraints to prevent a c r i s i s of 
crisis-management. By implication, society i s in more or less 
permanent c r i s i s . 
The central feature of Offe's theorisation, then, i s the way in 
which i t relates the form of the state to the dynamics of capital 
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accumulation. The state must maintain the accumulation process 
(since i t has a self-interest in the ca p i t a l i s t system) and yet 
at the same time avoid undermining private accumulation and a 
belief in market-place mechanisms. The form of the state, 
despite the necessity of the state for continued accumulation, i s 
inherently problematic for that accumulation. What Offe does not 
account for, though, i s the way in which certain demands, despite 
the f i l t e r i n g effect of the state, are able to problematise the 
form of the state so as to question i t s existence; the way in 
which discourse, the soci a l l y and institutionally mediated 
production of meaning within society, i s acted out in and through 
the state. 
In considering this problem a lead i s often taken from the work 
of Gramsci (see, especially, Gramsci, 1971) who, writing i n I t a l y 
i n the 1920's and '30's, was concerned above a l l with the 
conditions and problems of revolutionary strategy, necessitating 
a specification of the complex relations between the broad groups 
or classes within a given society at a particular stage in i t s 
development. The maintenance of power by the state was, for 
Gramsci, conditional upon two modes of class domination; 
hegemony and coercion. Coercion was held to require the use of 
force i n the sense of a repressive apparatus (for example the 
police, the military), along with sanctions on the use of such 
force, able i f necessary to bring the mass of the population into 
conformity with the requirements of accumulation. Py way of 
contrast hegemony symbolises the engineering and maintenance of 
the active consent of dominated groups by the ruling class, 
involving not just indoctrination or false consciousness but 
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rather the shifting nature of "popular" interests and demands, 
the changing network of p o l i t i c a l alliances whereby short-term 
compromises develop within and between elements of ' c i v i l 
society' and the state to secure the long-term interests of the 
dominant classes (see Jessop, 1982, 148; also see Urry, 1981b). 
From this starting-point many analyses consider the discursive 
nature of the development of hegemony and coercion within a given 
society (see, especially, Nairn, 1978). 
Clearly, in thi s context i t i s necessary to consider the question 
of ideology, the relationship of discourse to class relations. 
The extent to which ideology can be considered as autonomous has 
provoked considerable disagreement. For example, Habermas (1976) 
conceived ideology as a rel a t i v e l y separate sphere and indeed 
located the origins of abstract c r i s i s tendencies in the failure 
ideologically to generate and secure p o l i t i c a l support, defined 
as a c r i s i s of 'legitimation' - an i n a b i l i t y to e l i c i t 
generalised motives or diffuse mass loyalty without encouraging 
active participation in the formulation of state a c t i v i t y . By 
contrast Abercrombie et a l (1980) c r i t i c i s e d this emphasis on the 
autonomy of ideology on the grounds that t h i s i s both 
functionalist and instrumentalist. Functionalist, because 
ideology i s seen to exist because the social system in some way 
requires i t ; and instrumentalist because ultimately i t reduces 
ideology to a form of indoctrination generated within a somehow 
dominant class for the subordination of other classes. Perhaps 
the most appropriate conception i s that of Urry (1981b) who 
argued that events have ideological effects rather than 
properties; that meaning can be but i s not necessarily 
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distorted, nor even necessarily intentionally or with the 
intended effect (see also Giddens, 1979, 165-97). 
To summarise the argument so far, then, we have reached a point 
where two particular emphases concerning the character of the 
state are of considerable theoretical significance. Offe's 
concern for the form of the state i s of central importance for an 
understanding of the way in which the state i s related to capital 
accumulation. The state i s both necessary and problematic for 
c a p i t a l i s t society. At the same time, we have recognised the 
indeterminacy of thi s statement and have sought to c l a r i f y the 
ways in which the class relations of c a p i t a l i s t society are acted 
out i n and through the form of the state: i n short, the 
discursive character of state-society relationships. Our 
theorisation must be able to account for the form of and limits 
to state intervention as well as considering how and why certain 
demands are made both on and by the state, whilst recognising the 
f i l t e r i n g effect of the accumulation imperative. In the 
following section we seek to develop upon these remarks by 
considering the significance for state theory of the 
determination of social action within and through place. 
I l l . 4 The s i g n i f i c a n c e of place to s t a t e theory 
In a sense we have already touched upon some of the issues 
relevant to the significance of place to state theory. For when 
geographers issue c a l l s for greater consideration of the state. 
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this i s usually i n p l i c i t l y i n the context of particular spatial 
scales. Kirby (1985), for instance, was concerned to emphasise 
the local aspect of state-society relations' whilst Taylor (1 Q82) 
considered a hierarchy of scales from the world-economy through 
to national and urban in his c a l l for a materialist p o l i t i c a l 
geography of state and society. Our concern here, however, i s to 
emphasise the significance of place for the very constitution of 
the state as a social relation, developing upon some comments in 
an e a r l i e r paper (Sadler, 1984). We distinguished space from 
place i n Chapter I I ; place i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y involved in the 
constitution of social relations through the situated character 
of events. Hence rather than consider space as a neutral body 
over which the state exercises control or as one among a series 
of elements determining the demands placed upon the state form, 
we emphasise here the way in which the state form must take 
character with respect to class relations through place. 
Theories of the state can often be c r i t i c i s e d on the grounds of 
functionality; that i s , the state i s there because of the 
function i t performs for society (see, for example, Giddens, 
1981). By incorporating e x p l i c i t consideration of the 
significance of place for the constitution of state form, 
however, i t i s possible to demonstrate that the state i s 
i n t r i n s i c to c a p i t a l i s t society: that state-society relations 
characterise the form of the state through both their place and 
class situation. The state i s not there because society requires 
i t ; s o c i a l relations i n their place exhibit a d i a l e c t i c a l 
relationship to the form of the state. This emphasis i s of value 
i n countering two specific criticisms levelled at certain state 
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theories. In the f i r s t place, the charge of class-reductionism 
has been levelled at discourse-centred analyses of the state. 
Class reductionism refers to the tendency to consider the class 
struggle as taking place between two clearly-defined classes of 
capital and labour when in r e a l i t y i t i s apparent that there i s a 
far more complex situation entailing a shifting network of 
alliances between various groups around differing points of 
contention or agreement. Crucially, this network of class-based 
conditions of interest typically takes shape around particular 
place-specific considerations; for example the workplace or the 
community. Accordingly, i t i s v i t a l to theorise the class nature 
of this discourse only with respect to place. Hence in the 
analysis of the state the determination of discourse requires to 
be considered in both class and place terms, thereby producing a 
more differentiated (less reductionist) notion of class struggle 
and i t s significance for the state. 
Secondly, the use of a more differentiated theorisation of the 
economy and polity helps counter the criticism of economism or 
economic determinism levelled at some versions of form-derivation 
theory including that of Offe. Economic determinism refers to 
the tendency to assume that the development of social relations, 
including the state, follows inexorably from the laws of 
accumulation. Hence no account i s taken of the changing impact 
of this economic development on particular places; development 
i s seen as occurring i n a place rather than through i t . However, 
this limitation can be overcome by considering the development of 
society as one side of the process of accumulation, neither 
determined by i t nor determining i t but developing with i t in a 
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highly-differentiated manner to produce a complex synthesis at 
any one moment i n time of locations of economic a c t i v i t y in 
place. This degree of differentiation carries over to the state, 
which receives and transmits imperatives in a spatially-selective 
fashion. Thus theorisations of the state require not a 
consideration of social development, but rather of this 
development through both time and place. 
We have already alluded to the fact that in a consideration of 
the significance of space for the state, the local state i s very 
often the focus of attention (see, for example, Cooke, 1983; 
Duncan and Goodwin, 1982). Recognising that the local state 
emphasis i s usually only presented as one expression on a 
continuum of spatial scales, and in part to counterbalance the 
local emphasis, we move on i n the following section to discuss 
the supranationality of state power. The EEC and ECSC represent 
among the clearest expressions of the (admittedly limited) 
transfer of state power from nation states to supranational 
states. This clearly raises interesting theoretical questions 
about the character of the state and the d i v i s i b i l i t y of state 
power. 
I l l . 5 Theorising the supra-national s t a t e : the case 
of the EEC and ECSC 
The characterisation of the EEC and ECSC as state apparatuses in 
their own right might well raise a few eyebrows. Dealing with a 
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budget equivalent to less than one per cent of European Community 
Gross Domestic Product, nearly a l l spent on the Corrmon 
Agricultural Policy, and with no monopoly on the legitimate means 
of violence, i t might well be argued that the ECSC and EEC (for 
the purposes of this argument considered as vi r t u a l l y 
synonymous ) by no means represent a state apparatus. Certainly, 
in practically every area of i t s activity, the EEC/ECSC appears 
subordinate to the goodwill of nation states. However, i t should 
be stressed that the EEC/ECSC does exhibit many (but not a l l ) of 
the characteristics of a state. I t has i t s own institutional 
form, has a (limited) degree of autonomy from nation-states and 
can even impose i t s e l f over and above some member-states under 
certain circumstances. Consequently we seek here to consider 
precisely how the form of the EEC/ECSC as a supranational state 
should be incorporated in our (non-general) theory of the state 
(see also Galtung, 1973). 
As the very name implies, the powers of the EEC/ECSC can be 
traced back to the h i s t o r i c a l development of the coal and steel 
industries. I t i s , i n particular, in the sector of steel 
production that the supra-national state has exhibited the most 
sweeping range of powers. Accordingly, we must trace back to the 
origins of the EEC/ECSC i n our search for a theoretical 
understanding of state power. 
The most crucial feature i n the development and growth of the 
EEC/ECSC was undoubtedly the more general p o l i t i c a l and economic 
situation i n Europe after 1945, i n particular the p o l i t i c a l w i l l 
to bring about a lasting peace between France and West Germany as 
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one part of a move towards the restoration and strengthening of 
European unity (see Blacksell, 1977; Vaughan, 1979, 79-126). An 
essential element of this programme entailed co-operation in the 
sectors of coal and steel production, both sectors requiring 
considerable modernisation and investment after the war. For 
example the 'Schuman declaration' of 9 May 1950 referred 
sp e c i f i c a l l y to these two sectors, and as this declaration went 
on to form a basis for the negotiations leading up to the Treaty 
of Paris, constituting the ECSC in 1952, i t i s worth quoting 
extensively: 
"The rassemblement of the nations of Europe requires the 
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. 
Any action taken must in the f i r s t place concern these two 
countries. With this aim in view, the French Government 
proposes to take action immediately on one limited but 
decisive point. I t proposes to place Franco-German 
production of coal and steel as a whole under a common higher 
authority, within the framework of an organisation open to 
the participation of the other countries of Europe." 
(M. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, quoted in European 
Parliament, 1982, 47). 
Similarly, the Treaty of Rome, inaugurating the EEC in 1958 (and 
subsuming the ECSC) was signed in an atmosphere of continuing 
concern with increasing economic integration largely through the 
reduction of t a r i f f barriers (see Vaughan, 1979, 127-43). 
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In i t s very formation, then, the EEC/ECSC exhibited a key reason 
for the development of this supra-national state. For i t derived 
precisely from the relations between national states : the 
perceived need for an authority capable of arbitration between 
competing member-state interests. Yet, at the same time, the 
member states are unable to cede total authority to the supra-
national state for fear of losing legitimacy : in short, because 
of institutional and personal self-interest. Hence the 
ultimately contradictory character of the relationship between 
state form and society has been translated 'upwards' to a supra-
national state; i t too i s both necessary for and inherently 
problematic to accumulation, with the additional complication 
that i t i s both contingently necessary for and problematic to the 
existence of nation-states. This leads to the interesting 
possibility of different scenarios for the future of supra-
national policy formation; a decreasing element of autonomy from 
nation-states as conflicting interests among member states 
combine to nu l l i f y the supra-national state; a situation of no 
change from the present; or a situation of increasing policy 
formation at supra-national level in the context of continuing 
economic recession and, for example, attempts by the European 
Parliament to increase i t s own legislative powers. 
Clearly, though, the degree to which the form of the supra-
national state and i t s relationship to discourse within supra-
national and national societies are problematic requires greater 
examination. In the following Chapter we seek to enlarge upon 
these remarks by considering the nature of EEC/ECSC intervention 
in the steel industry. 
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I I I . 6 Concluding comments 
We have progressed in this Chapter, then, from consideration of 
the nature of society to an analysis of the relationship between 
society and the state. Geographers have exhibited some concern 
for these issues but there i s a wealth of theoretical material 
concerning the character of the state which has remained largely 
alien to geographers' enquiries. Building from a review of 
theories of the state we have advanced a platform which 
emphasises, f i r s t l y , the significance of the form of the state 
and, secondly, the ways in which this form i s related to society 
through discourse. At this point we introduced the significance 
of place to the state as part of a concern to avoid functionalist 
explanations of the state. Finally, from this we considered the 
theoretical relevance of a supra-national state, the EEC/ECSC. 
In the following Chapter we go on to document the relationship of 
supra-national state policy within one sector, steel production, 
to the discursively-determined relationship between supra-
national state form and society. 
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Footnotes t o Chapter I I I 
^ The ground for distinction between productive and allocative 
a c t i v i t i e s i s d i f f i c u l t to define in practice since they are 
analytic rather than h i s t o r i c a l categories. For this reason the 
distinction could well be c r i t i c i s e d on the grounds of 
functionality. 
2 
Though for a consideration of the effectiveness of the local 
state see Hudson and Plum (1984). 
3 
The Treaty of Brussels, 1965, established a single Council and 
a single Commission of the European Communities, with the 
Commission replacing the ECSC High Authority. 
CHAPTER IV 
The development, of European Community p o l i c i e s f o r the 
s t e e l industry 
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IV -1 Int.roduct.ion 
The development of European Conrnonity policies towards the steel 
industry can be considered under two headings. In the f i r s t 
place there i s a range of measures concerned with the development 
of production i n t h i s sector, i n i t i a l l y aimed t o assist the 
expansion of capacity but more recently i n the context of the 
management of decline. Secondly, i n response t o the deepening 
c r i s i s i n the industry, a c r i s i s i n which the European Community 
was i n t e g r a l l y involved, there has been an increasing emphasis 
upon measures i n the general f i e l d of reproduction, that i s to 
say measures concerned with a l l e v i a t i n g the consequences of 
decline i n steel regions for capital and for labour. We 
therefore consider these measures i n d e t a i l before going on t o 
examine t h e i r broader implications for our theorisation of the 
state and society. 
IV.2 P o l i c i e s towards s t e e l production 
The European Community has h i s t o r i c a l l y been able t o assist the 
investment programmes for reconstruction and modernisation of 
iron, steel and coal operations i n a very real fashion. This 
assistance l i e s i n the way i n which the supra-national state acts 
as an intermediary i n the procurement of low-interest loans on 
the global currency market, a role which the Commission of the 
EEC i s able t o play since individual firms are required to n o t i f y 
t h e i r investment programmes to i t when applying for financial 
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support. Should approval for finance be obtained then the 
Conmission seeks t o raise s u f f i c i e n t finance i n i t s own ri g h t , 
which i s then released to the f i r m when requested. In two i n t e r -
related ways t h i s ultimately benefits the individual firm; i n 
the f i r s t place as the Commission raises loans for firms from a l l 
member-states i n any one year i t i s able t o place a larger t o t a l 
sum and reduce the aggregate interest rate offered; and secondly 
because the credit-worthiness of the EEC as an i n s t i t u t i o n i s far 
higher than that of individual steel firms, lower interest rates 
and sureties are available. I n the words of Francpis-Xavier 
O r t o l i , then Vice-President of the ECSC Commission: 
"The funds made available t o undertakings derive t o a very 
large extent from the United States market and the capital 
markets which of f e r the most advantageous terms. The 
reactions encountered on the capital markets, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
that of the United States, have confirmed the Ins t i t u t i o n ' s 
credit-worthiness ... Most beneficiary undertakings have thus 
obtained borrowed funds on terms, with regard t o interest 
rates, maturities and amounts, which i t would probably have 
been very d i f f i c u l t or impossible for them t o fi n d for 
themselves on the open financial market". 
(ECSC, Annual Financial Report, 1976, 8) 
In the period t o the end of 1983, t o t a l ECSC loans of well over 
11,000 m ECU were raised. Of t h i s sum, more than one-half was 
loaned t o steel producers and over one-quarter to coal producers 
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(table IV. 1), demonstrating the main h i s t o r i c a l thrust of ECSC 
a c t i v i t y . This e f f o r t has been by no means insignificant for 
steel producers, ECSC loans amounting t o 14.8% of t o t a l 
investment i n the period 1974-82 (table IV.2). 
With the onset of the c r i s i s i n steel production since the early 
1970' s, however, the European Community was faced with a new 
problem of policy formation, pa r t i c u l a r l y acute i n that the ECSC 
had i t s e l f played a role i n the development of growing over-
capacity through the financing of investment projects. I n 
response t o the deepening c r i s i s the Community introduced a 
series of measures aimed at f a c i l i t a t i n g a r e l a t i v e l y orderly 
restructuring amongst steel companies. These measures can be 
dated t o December 1976 when the Commission approved a voluntary 
system of suggested minimum prices for certain steel products t o 
be introduced i n 1977^. These were later extended t o become 
compulsory minimum prices for some products facing p a r t i c u l a r l y 
acute over-production problems, for example hot-rolled s t r i p and 
2 
merchant and reinforcing bars . 
During 1980, however, i t became apparent that these measures were 
in s u f f i c i e n t . The Commission was i n practice unable to maintain 
or check upon price levels and a widespread practice of price 
discounting through, for example, the deliberate invocation of 
late-delivery clauses, had developed. During the second and 
t h i r d quarters of 1980 demand f e l l p a r t i c u l a r l y sharply. 
Capacity u t i l i s a t i o n f e l l from 70% i n the f i r s t quarter t o 58% i n 
the second, and July orders were down by 16.3% on the previous 
year. 
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Acx^ordingly on 1 October 1980 the Commission announced i t s 
intention t o implement measures actively to regulate production 
i n the sense of r e s t r i c t i o n on output rather than passively i n 
the sense of price controls. This declaration of intent by the 
Commission presaged a lengthy round of negotiations? for, whilst 
the Commission could impose minimum prices i n i t s own r i g h t under 
the Treaty of Paris, t o impose production quotas on individual 
companies i t required the consent of the Council of Ministers 
(primarily representing member states' interests). In particular 
i t required the Council's consent to invoke a r t i c l e 58 of the 
Treaty of Paris : 
"In case of a decline i n demand, i f the High Authority deems 
that the Community i s faced with a period of manifest c r i s i s 
and that the means of action provided for i n a r t i c l e 57 
(minimum prices) are not suf f i c i e n t t o cope with that 
situation i t shall, after consulting the Consultative 
Committee and with the concurrence of the Council, establish 
a system of production quotas". 
I n i t i a l l y the West German delegation was not prepared t o support 
t h i s declaration of 'manifest c r i s i s ' , and only agreed on 30 
October a f t e r securing an agreement t o exempt certain special 
steels from the production quota regime. Following t h i s , the 
Commission was able t o implement a series of quarterly production 
quotas for each firm, based as a rule ( i n i t i a l l y ) on the highest 
3 
production level i n the period July 1977 - June 1980 • 
The following year, with no signs of a long-term improvement i n 
demand for steel, a further series of measures was introduced, 
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effectiv e l y l i n k i n g Community approval of state aid t o steel 
producers t o CaiTnunity plans for the reduction of production 
capacity, with the ultimate intention of eliminating state aid. 
The Commission secured the Council's approval for th i s system of 
rules i n June 1981. A programme was agreed whereby state aids 
and national restructuring plans were t o be no t i f i e d t o the 
Commission by 30 September 1982 and the Cormdssion was to assess 
i t s satisfaction with the proposals by 1 July 1983. A l l plans 
were t o be phased so as t o eliminate the necessity for state aid 
4 
after 31 December 1985 . 
By July 1983 substantial percentage capacity reductions from the 
1980 level had been made by West Germany, France and the U.K. 
The Commission assessment of that month called for, i n 
particular, greater reduction before 1985 by I t a l y , but also 
substantial further reductions i n most member states (table 
IV. 3). At the same time the Commission re-affirmed i t s 
determination t o see state aid ended after 1985 i n the context of 
specific restructuring plans : 
'In essence, aid may be granted only i f the recipient 
undertaking or group of undertakings i s engaged i n the 
implementation of a systematic and specific restructuring 
programme ... capable of restoring i t s competitiveness and 
making i t fi n a n c i a l l y viable ... under normal market 
5 
conditions.' 
At the s t a r t of 1984 the Commission re-introduced a system of 
minimum price controls as opposed t o recommended prices for 40% 
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of steel products. Moreover, from 1 January 1984 producers were 
obliged to lodge a deposit of 15 European currency units (about 
£8.50) per tonne of steel shipped, which could be forfeited i f 
the producers were found t o be sell i n g below the minimum prices . 
During that month negotiations took place over the extension of 
the quota regime; i t had previously only been agreed as far as 
July 1983, l a t e r extended t o 31 January 1984. On 26 January 
agreement was concluded t o extend the quota regime to the end of 
7 
1985 . On the other hand i t proved impossible for several member 
states including the U.K. t o secure Commission approval before 
the o r i g i n a l deadline of 31 January 1984 for the f i n a l 
restructuring plans. The B r i t i s h Government i n particular argued 
that 380 000 tonnes of the additional 500 000 tonnes cutbacks 
called for i n July 1983 (table IV. 3) should be attributed t o 
earlier cuts . Consequently financial aid t o BSC has only been 
approved by the Commission on a short-term basis; for example on 
2 February £355m of 'transitional' aid was approved u n t i l such 
9 
time as further cuts could be agreed . 
As the deadline for the end of the quota system has approached, 
there has been increasing uncertainty over the success of the 
system and, indeed, over whether the planned cutbacks r e a l l y w i l l 
be s u f f i c i e n t . The cutbacks called for i n July 1983 (table IV.3) 
were based upon the Commission's forecast for the steel industry 
made i n A p r i l 1983, the 'General Objectives Steel 1985' 1 0. The 
following year, however, even these forecasts were called i n t o 
question. I n i t s 'Comments on the General Objectives Steel 
1985' 1 1 the Commission noted that these ea r l i e r forecasts 
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'were based on mcro-economic forecasts of 1982 which were 
based on an upswing of economic a c t i v i t y i n 1982. In r e a l i t y 
the European economy has not shown any growth ( i n terms of 
GDP) u n t i l 1983. In addition, investment as part of GDP has 
shown a decline, and t h i s has been at the cause of the 
slackness i n many steel using sectors ... and thus i n steel 
consumption i t s e l f . As the steel market has deviated from 
the trend forecast by the General Objectives 1985, there are 
grounds for a re-evaluation of i t s development prospects. 
However, instead of making a new forecast for 1985, the 
12 
prospects have been defined for the horizon 1986.' 
The new forecast for 1986 revised the original estimate of ECSC 
steel consumption down from 92.2 m product tonnes (mpt) for 1985 
t o 90.3 for 1986. The foreign trade surplus was revised 
downwards also, from 12.1 mpt for 1985 t o 10.1 for 1986. 
Accordingly production estimates were revised from 104.3 mpt for 
1985 t o the range 100.4 t o 102.4 for 1986, or i n crude steel 
terms from 120 m tonnes t o 116. The revised forecast concluded 
'Capacity u t i l i s a t i o n rates would be unsatisfactory under the 
hypothesis that works closures are limited t o the 26.7 m 
tonnes of capacity which should disappear i n confirmity with 
the decisions which the Commission took on 29 June 1983 i n 
13 
application of the aids code.' 
The EEC Commissioner i n charge of competition policy, Frans 
Andriessen, further heightened uncertainty when he announced i n 
the following May that planned production cuts should t o t a l 30 m 
14 
tonnes by the end of 1985. 
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Hand i n hand with concern over the p o s s i b i l i t y for success of the 
system has been speculation over the p o s s i b i l i t y of renewal of at 
least some of i t s features after 1985. I n December 1984 the 
Commission proposed that operating aids to producers, scheduled 
4 
to cease by the end of 1984 (see ) should be permitted after 
that date due t o the continuing d i f f i c u l t i e s of some producers. 
15 
The proposal was rejected by fi v e member states . I n A p r i l 
1984, however, the French Government announced a FFr 30 000 m 
subsidy t o i t s steel producers through t o 1987. Hence while 
Industry Commissioner Etienne Davignon argued that 
'The deadline i s absolutely indispensable. I f by the end of 
1985 we do not have the closures we are looking for then we 
have a f a i l u r e . '^ 
I t would appear that not a l l member states are as certain of the 
need for or even p o s s i b i l i t y of ending the system i n 1985. 
The continued depressed levels of output have been another factor 
i n the uncertainty i n the period before the end of 1985, one 
reflected i n the t i g h t production quotas enforced by the 
Commission. I n May 1984 markedly lower quotas for the t h i r d 
quarter of 1984 were set, with the Commission indicating that i t 
would be prepared t o change i t s decision depending on the state 
17 
of the market. I n July 1984 the quotas were revised upwards by 
430 000 tonnes when i t was apparent that there was no further 
deterioration i n the steel market.^ I n F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 # hoover, 
production quotas for the second quarter of 1985 were cut for 
some products i n response t o uncertainty about future patterns of 
19 
demand (see also table IV.4). 
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The Commission faces, therefore, a situation where i t has l i t t l e 
room for manoeuvre. On the one hand i t would appear that planned 
capacity cutbacks w i l l be insufficient to restore p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
before 1985; on the other, i t is committed to ending the system 
of supervision of production and restructuring plans by the end 
of 1985, when a l l state aid to the industry must, in theory, end. 
At the same time the steel market has shown no signs of an upturn 
and t i g h t production quotas have been necessary to prevent over-
production i n the very year when the system of production 
controls is supposed to come to an end. The Financial Times has 
commented in an e d i t o r i a l that ' i t is probable that some or a l l 
of the features of the present community regime for steel w i l l be 
extended beyond the turn of the year, despite the doubts about 
20 
the i r effectiveness.' But in such a situation the problem of 
the lack of enforceability of the 'crisis regime' has to be 
faced. Whilst the European Court of Justice has endorsed the 
system of production quotas, member states have been refusing to 
confirm that fines can be levied on steel companies for producing 
over the quota. Klockner of West Germany, for instance, had 
21 
amassed fines of DM 160 m by 1984 for over-production. Under 
these conditions of uncertain enforceability and with certain 
controversy over the continuation of the scheme, i t s future 
v a l i d i t y must be called into question (see also Grabitz and 
Hanlon, 1984). 
IV.3 The European Community^ " s o c i a l conscience"? 
Capacity reductions undertaken within the overall framework of 
the European Community steel c r i s i s regime have had an obvious 
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effect upon employment i n the industry. Total employment i n 
steel has f a l l e n from 796 000 at the end of 1974 to 459 000 i n 
June 1984, a loss of 337 000 jobs i n ten years, just under half 
of the 1974 t o t a l (table IV. 5). Under such conditions the 
European Community has taken a number of measures i n an attempt 
t o ease the consequences of t h i s massive destruction of 
employment opportunities. These measures, specific t o the coal 
and steel industries, have been taken i n the main under A r t i c l e 
56 of the Treaty of Paris. As o r i g i n a l l y drafted i n 1951, t h i s 
provided for the financing of new investment projects or of non-
repayable aid towards redundant workers only i f the introduction 
'of new technical processes or equipment should lead t o an 
exceptionally large reduction i n labour requirements i n the coal 
or the steel industry'. I n 1960, however, i n the midst of 
massive job loss i n the coal industry due chi e f l y not t o 
22 
technical change but t o competition from other fuels , a second 
clause was introduced authorising the payment of loans 'for the 
creation of new and economically sound a c t i v i t i e s or for the 
conversion of existing undertakings capable of re-absorbing the 
redundant workers* (A r t i c l e 56.2 ( a ) ) , and the payment of 
allowances t o workers (Article 56.2 (b)) i f fundamental changes, 
not d i r e c t l y connected with the establishment of the common 
market, i n market conditions for the coal or the steel industry 
should compel some undertakings permanently t o discontinue, 
23 
c u r t a i l or change t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
Loans under A r t i c l e 56.2 (a) for in d u s t r i a l conversion are 
requested by the Government of the member-state concerned. The 
di s t r i b u t i o n of these loans therefore largely reflects the 
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national policies for the redevelopment of coal-mining or steel 
closure areas. From 1981 loans were granted in some instances as 
'global loans' to financial i n s t i t u t i o n s , with the intention that 
they acted as intermediaries for small and medium-sized 
24 
businesses. Over the period 1980-82 loans for industrial 
conversion topped 22% of ECSC loans granted (table IV.6). They 
have therefore become a significant element i n ECSC a c t i v i t i e s . 
Under A r t i c l e 56.2 (b) payment can be made to redundant workers 
in the form of tideover allowances, assistance with resettlement 
costs or help with re-training programmes, and payment can be 
made to employers who continue to pay in f u l l employees on short-
time working. The ECSC contribution is subject to the condition 
that the member state pays at least an equal amount. Payment i s 
within the framework of a series of Bila t e r a l Conventions 
negotiated between member states and the Community, and i s 
financed by a levy charged annually on each steel producer. The 
Bil a t e r a l Conventions have come to extend the range of aids 
payable to include lump-sum redundancy payments and finance for 
early retirement as i t has proved increasingly d i f f i c u l t to 
25 
adhere to the ori g i n a l goal of re-employment. 
With the rapid increase in the number of workers e l i g i b l e f o r 
readaptation benefit payments under A r t i c l e 56,2 (b), there has 
been pressure for the Commission to make available extra 
resources beyond those allocated in the normal ECSC budget. The 
Commission f i r s t put forward proposals to the Council on 31 
October 1978, c a l l i n g for A r t i c l e 95 of the Treaty of Paris to be 
used as the basis for payment for a series of measures to save 
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jobs through, for example, restrictions on overtime. This was 
in d i s t i n c t i o n to the s p i r i t of Ar t i c l e 56 as applied to that 
date, where payment was only permitted in circumstances of 
permanent loss of jobs. In the absence of a decision by the 
Council, the Commission re-submitted i t s proposals i n October 
1980, specifying two types of aid; that for financing early 
retirement measures, and that for financing adjustments to the 
conditions and duration of working hours through, for example, 
overtime r e s t r i c t i o n s , an additional s h i f t or short-time 
27 
working. The legal basis for both types of aid lay in A r t i c l e 
56.2 (b) although the second had rarely been applied to that 
date. The Commission o r i g i n a l l y provided for a t o t a l of 212 m 
ECU to be allocated to these measures (termed the 'social 
v o l e t ' ) , 112 m in 1981 and 50 m each in 1982 and 1983. I t also 
requested the Council to transfer additional finance from the 
ECSC general budget to the operating budget since the t r a d i t i o n a l 
revenue from a levy on producers would be insuff i c i e n t . The 
planned sources of finance envisaged transfers of 62 m ECU i n 
1981 and 50 m each in 1982 and 1983, along with a special 
contribution of 50 m ECU by the member states to the ECSC 
operational budget in 1981. The Council delayed approval of the 
transfers from the general budget, though, u n t i l separate 
decisions of February and September 1982, with the result that 
only 48.6 m ECU were made available in 1981, 113.4 m in 1982 and 
50 m in 1983 2 8 (table IV.7). 
By the end of 1982 the measures for which 'social volet' support 
had been allocated were concluded in a l l but one country (table 
IV.8). Recognising t h i s , the Commission proposed in A p r i l 1983 
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to continue and expand the system through a proposal for a 
'social support scheme' (or 'social volet I I ' ) , t o cover the 
period 1983-86. This proposal called for an additional 330 m ECU 
to be made available t o the ECSC operating budget out of the 
general budget, 110 m i n 1984, 100 m i n 1985 and 120 m i n 1986. 
I t also expanded the range of measures from the 1981 social 
29 
volet. 
With the development, then, of new schemes to support social 
measures i n steel regions, and with the continuing problems of 
the steel industry, the ECSC budgetary contribution under A r t i c l e 
56.2 (b) has assumed major significance. Over the period 1978-83 
179 000 workers have received a t o t a l of 408 m ECU i n 
readaptation benefits under A r t i c l e 56.2 (b) whilst an additional 
212 m ECU has been made available under the 1981 ' social volet'. 
Over the same period 65 000 coal workers have received 150 m ECU 
(table IV.7). As a reflection of growing concern over the 
allocation of ECSC finance of t h i s magnitude, the European Court 
of Auditors examined the system of payments i n 1982. I t 
concluded that 'no operational Community objectives have been 
established and that i t i s therefore impossible t o appraise the 
effectiveness of the Community measures'. Hence, i t argued, ' the 
ECSC aid constitutes no more than a reimbursement of a given 
30 
amount t o the national budgets'. This concern was a l l the more 
pressing i n that i t could not be separated from the question of 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Community budget amongst member states. 
Indeed, one reason for the development of the 'social volet' was 
that the allocation of expenditure could be more closely 
controlled by the Council, that i s by member states. 
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IV, 4 I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a theory of the (supra-
n a t i o n a l ) s t a t e 
We have demonstrated, then, that the European Community is 
actively involved in the organisation of policies for the steel 
industry and for regions i n decline due to the problems of that 
industry. This involvement dates back to the original role of 
the ECSC as an instrument for the planned expansion of production 
capacity and to i t s management of the cutbacks during the la s t 
ten years in the over-capacity which i t had i t s e l f assisted to 
create. At the same time the Community has become heavily 
involved with programmes for the 'reconversion 1 of steel regions, 
essentially offering subsidies to capital and labour there. This 
too has arisen d i r e c t l y out of the perceived need by the (supra-
national) state to be seen to be doing something about the 
problems i t has i t s e l f helped to create, whilst of course denying 
that i t had played such a formative role : 
" I would l i k e to emphasise here that there is one idea that I 
cannot possibly accept : the idea that, in the Community, i t 
i s Brussels which is responsible for the reorganisation, in 
other words the negative, unpopular and d i f f i c u l t side, while 
i t i s the national governments which are responsible for 
improvements and conversions, i n other words the positive 
aspects : loans, social welfare, aid, etc. This is an 
unacceptable division of responsibility." 
(Davignon, 1980, 508) 
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Clearly, then, the supra-national state shares many of the 
characteristics of national states i n c a p i t a l i s t Europe i n that 
i t bears an essentially contradictory relationship to c a p i t a l i s t 
society : i t i s dependent upon c a p i t a l i s t production but cannot 
guarantee the pre-conditions for the reproduction of c a p i t a l i s t 
social relations. 
At the same time, though, the European Community displays an 
additional tension, one which i t shares with member-states but i s 
of over-riding significance for a supra-national state. That i s , 
the EEC/ECSC i s rooted i n the antagonistic relations between 
nation-states; indeed, policy towards the steel industry, as one 
31 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , can only be understood i n t h i s context. From the 
allocation of production quotas through to budgetary control over 
the allocation of readaptation benefits payments and of 'social 
volet' benefits, the fundamental questions concerning policy 
production are those of the implications for member-states. In a 
very real sense the EEC/ECSC exists both because of and despite 
the existence of nation-states. I t i s both a contingent 
reflection of the development of inter-state relations and a 
persistent constraint upon the development of each individual 
member-state. As such i t reproduces the problematic relationship 
t o society of national states whilst i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g the 
problematic nature of relations between member states. 
The significance of the relations between member-states for the 
supra-national state i s apparent i n i t s form. Whilst members of 
the Council represent member states' interests, the Commission i s 
o f f i c i a l l y charged with the functioning of the Community i n the 
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interests of the Ccamunity. The European Parliament, following 
direct elections, has called for a Treaty of European Union, 
32 
ultimately strengthening the supra-national state. Hence the 
form of the supra-national state institutionalises the relations 
between national states in two ways. F i r s t l y , the conflict 
between Council and Commission apparent in, for example, the 
delayed approval of the steel 'social volet' represents an 
expression of supra-national versus national tension - no member 
state was originally keen to increase the ECSC budget but a l l 
eventually agreed under Commission pressure provided they had 
greater control over i t s allocation. Secondly, conflict within 
the Council, evidenced for example in the hesitant West German 
support for the introduction of a steel quota regime in 1980, 
reflects inter-national tensions reproduced within the supra-
national state. At the same time, the supra-national state has a 
complex form of i t s own stretching within and across this tension 
between member states. The organisation of policy production 
into Directorates at the Commission can lead to divergent views 
over policy, for example over the trend towards restriction of 
competition within EEC frontiers inherent in the policy of 
regulation i n the steel industry. For this policy has been 
organised by Directorate-General I I I (internal Market and 
Industrial A f f a i r s ) , whereas Directorate-General IV (Competition) 
has been more interested i n promoting the restructuring of 
production without state assistance or regulation, citin g i n 
33 
favour of this A r t i c l e s 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Pome. 
In this context i t i s of considerable significance that to date 
discourse concerning the rundown of the Cormunity steel industry 
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has scarcely touched upon the question of supra-national state 
policy to the industry, despite the range of policy measures 
within this apparatus. A number of reasons can be offered to 
account for this. In the f i r s t place, many closure decisions 
have been made wholly with reference to the national state with 
Community measures seen as a pa l l i a t i v e response, despite the 
fact that the Commission has been actively involved in the 
regulation of restructuring plans, albeit in a fashion heavily 
filtered by the interests of the member states. Secondly, 
limited mechanisms exist at the European scale for debate to be 
channelled into the institutions of the European Community. 
Questions might be asked in the European Parliament but the 
Commission and s t i l l less the Council are under no obligation to 
act. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even i f discourse 
were to be centred in and around the institutions of the supra-
national state, as things currently stand i t i s certain that 
conflicting member-states' interests would obstruct the path to 
progressive policy formulation. In other words the histo r i c a l 
development of supra-national state policy to the steel industry, 
whilst an esssential framework for consideration of events, i s no 
more and no less than that - background within which and through 
which the formation of national state policy has been carried 
out. 
Equally, i t i s important to remember that whilst the supervisory 
powers allocated to the supra-national state in the steel sector 
are relatively strong, the f i s c a l resources are of very small 
magnitude by comparison with the main instrument of EEC/ECSC 
act i v i t y , the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This reflects 
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the degree of inportance attached t o a g r i c u l t u r e by member-states 
w i t h i n the Community : both within c e r t a i n member states and, 
especially f i n the sense o f trade-patterns between member-states. 
Such problems w i l l be of even greater significance when Spain and 
Portugal j o i n the EEC (Hudson and Lewis, 1982a). The supra-
national system of rules may be strong w i t h regard t o ste e l : the 
resources l i e i n the a g r i c u l t u r e sector. Hence w h i l s t supra-
national state powers w i t h regard t o the s t e e l industry have a 
degree o f independence from nation-state powers, the source o f 
nearly a l l the f i s c a l resources used t o a l l e v i a t e the problems 
w i t h i n t h i s sector l i e s w i t h i n the nation-state? what supra-
national resources there are form but a f r a c t i o n o f the EEC/ECSC 
budget. Accordingly we move on t o consider three p a r t i c u l a r 
n a t i o n a l case-studies w i t h i n the EEC/ECSC : France, West Germany 
and, f i r s t o f a l l , the United Kingdom. 
IV. 5 Concluding comments 
We have demonstrated i n t h i s Chapter, then, some of the p o l i c i e s 
developed by the EEC f o r both the regulation of st e e l production 
and f o r m i t i g a t i n g the consequences of capacity reduction w i t h i n 
p a r t i c u l a r regions. These p o l i c i e s have been si t u a t e d w i t h i n the 
context o f a theory o f the EEC as an embryonic supra-national 
s t a t e , one conditioned by i t s problematic r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
national societies and t o nat i o n a l states. I t i s t o three o f 
these n a t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s t h a t we t u r n i n the fo l l o w i n g chapters. 
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Table IV, 1 T o t a l ECSC loans and guarantees to 31 
December 1983 
m ECU % of t o t a l 
Coal industry 2885.9 25.7 
Steel industry 5765.0 51.3 
Thermal power stat i o n s 522.0 4.6 
I n d u s t r i a l conversion 1382.3 12.3 
Workers' housing 341.4 3.0 
Iron ore mines 233.3 2.1 
Miscellaneous 118.0 1.0 
11247.9 100.0 
Note: ECU - European Currency Unit 
Source: ECSC Annual F i n a n c i a l Report, 1983, 28 
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Table IV, 2 Contribution of ECSC loans to European 
Community investment i n the s t e e l industry, 1974-83 
Capital investment in % contribution of 
steel m ECU1 ECSC loans 
1974 2989.5 8.4 
1975 3316.8 17.1 
1976 3293.3 22.1 
1977 2359.5 20.1 
1978 2043.1 18.1 
1979 2098.0 15.1 
1980 2375.3 17.8 
1981 2600.5 8.6 
1982 2613.7 5.4 
19832 3200 7.0 
Note: ECU - European Currency Unit 
2 
estimates 
Source: d e r i v e d from ECSC Annual F i n a n c i a l Reports, 
1974-83; and Investment i n the Community coalmining 
and i r o n and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s , annual r e p o r t s from 
ECSC Commission, 1974-83. 
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Table IV. 3 J u l y 1983 Commission proposals f o r 
capacity reductions by 1985 
Further Total 
Output Closures closures Total closures 
capacity since c a l l e d f o r closures as % o f 
1980 (mt) 1980 (mt) (mt) (rot) 1980 l e v e l 
West Germany 53.1 4.8 1.2 6.0 11.3 
France 26.9 4.7 0.6 5.3 19.7 
I t a l y 36.3 2.4 3.5 5.8 16.1 
Netherlands 7.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 13.0 
Belgium 16.0 1.7 1.4 3.1 19.4 
Luxembourg 5.2 0.6 0.4 1.0 18.4 
U.K. 22.8 4.0 0.5 4.5 19.7 
Ei r e 0.1 - - - -
Denmark 0.9 0.0 0.0 7.0 
TOTAL 168.6 18.4 8.3 26.7 15.8 
Source s B u l l e t i n of the Commission of the European 
Communities, 6-1983, para 1.1.4 
- 105 -
LO 00 m V£5 o CM O CO CT. co CO ro CM o CM r-o CO ro rH LO rH CO rH rH (N rH CM CM 
LO CO 
CO 
c 
^ 0 
CO "H 
CO 
CO 
CO 
CO 
CMJ 
CO 
CO CO 
no C 
•H 
CP 
•H 
to 
I s 
o o o 
o un CO ro CM r- r- O rH CO o in o o> CO CM o rH CO ro rH rH CM rH CM 
rH CO CO ro rH LO LO ro LO o ON <£> <D CO o\ CO CM o LO CM ro rH rH CM rH CM 
o 
10 rH •H 
8 
rH rH 
s 
£ 
4-> 
1 
"8 
rH 
rH 8 a 5 
o 
i 
"8 
•H 
03 
rH 
g 
•H 
I 
3! PS 
2 
o LO 
ro 
CM CM CO LO CO LO LO CO ro rH CO CO r- CO CO rH O VD o ro CO rH rH CM rH CM 
ro r- LO ro CM rH co O rH r- r- LO ro rH CM CO rH rH r- CO CM ro rH rH CM rH CM 
O o CM r- LO r- CM LO LO CO r* CO ro o LO CO rH rH CO rH ro rH rH CM rH CM 
LO LO CO o rH CM CM vo rH ro r* ro CM rH a> CO CM ro rH CO LO ro rH rH CM CM CM 
w M 03 (fl 
Ln
g 03 -Q 
p 4J 
o Oj ci •5 a; 
> 1 
r J 
03 
3 
X) 0) 
CM 
CM 
CO 
r H 
LO CM 
T3 C 03 
>i (0 
ro 
W 
•H 
EH 
H (0 
•H 
8 03 C •H 
•t 
0) 
o 
0 
w 
- 106 -
Table IV.5 European Community employment: i n the i r o n 
and s t e e l industry, 1974-84 
Total employment, year end 
(x 1000) 
1974 796.1 
1975 767.4 
1976 759.0 
1977 716.9 
1978 685.2 
1979 670.4 
1980 598.0 
1981 548.8 
1982 513.6 
1983 479.2 
1984 (June) 458.7 
Source: E u r o s t a t l r o n and S t e e l Yearbooks, 1974-83 and 
Q u a r t e r l y B u l l e t i n s , 1984 
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Table IV,7 ECSC Appropriations under A r t i c l e 56,2 (b) 
for readaptation a i d and number of workers involved 
Amount made Number of workers 'Social volet 1 mECU 
available, mECU x 1000 
Coal Steel Coal Steel Coal Steel 
1976 21.5 3.7 15.7 5.5 
1977 15.1 10.7 5.4 11.6 
1978 30.8 29.7 20.2 31.0 
1979 13.1 53.9 6.9 27.6 
1980 8.1 58.9 8.2 32.3 
1981 13.9 110.1 3.5 44.3 48.6 
1982 41.1 73.9 11.5 22.1 113.4 
1983 43.3 81.7 15.0 21.9 50.0 
Total 186.8 422.6 86.4 196.4 212.0 
Note: 1. ECU - European Currency Unit. 
2. Appropriations represent budget allocations, not 
actual payments. 
3. Number of workers involved does not include the 
•social volet'. 
Sources: CEC, General Report on the A c t i v i t i e s of the 
European Communities, 1976-83. 
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Table IV.8 Periods of a i d taken i n t o consideration 
under the s t e e l " s o c i a l v o l e t " # 1981 
Programmes of early Programmes of short-time 
retirement working 
West Germany J u l y 1981-December 1984 
Belgium January 1978-December 1982 
France June 1979-June 1981 
I t a l y February 1981-December 1982 January 1981-June 1982 
Luxembourg - January 1980-December 1981 
Netherlands October 1980-June 1982 October 1980-June 1982 
U.K. A p r i l 1979-March 1982 
Source: Com ( 8 3 ) , 158, 13 A p r i l 1983 
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July 1979. See also European Parliament Document 1-215/1980, 9 
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concerning trade between the EEC and other nation-states, an 
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CHAPTER V 
The p o l i c i e s of B r i t i s h S t e e l , the 'Save Consett, 
- 1 1 4 -
V . l Int.roduct.ion 
I n the follo w i n g three chapters we seek t o consider i n d e t a i l the 
implications o f broader changes w i t h i n the sector o f s t e e l 
production f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f national states and societies. 
One fundamental a t t r i b u t e o f the s t e e l industry i s that w h i l s t 
the processes o f change are i n t e r n a t i o n a l , nearly a l l producers 
w i t h i n the European Community are purely national i n terms o f 
loca t i o n o f production f a c i l i t i e s , w i t h very few exceptions.* 
The reasons f o r t h i s l i e i n the h i s t o r i c a l development o f the 
industry, once considered s t r a t e g i c a l l y necessary and s t i l l a 
touchstone o f national economic p o l i c y . More importantly f o r 
present purposes, though, the national nature of steel producers 
means t h a t there i s considerable value i n examining the 
development o f the industry w i t h i n c e r t a i n nation states - most 
o f the implications f o r st a t e and society being r e a d i l y apparent 
w i t h i n national f r o n t i e r s . 
I n broad terms, therefore, the o u t l i n e f o r each of these chapters 
i s rcughly p a r a l l e l . Vfe begin by examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between st a t e and society as captured i n t h i s one p a r t i c u l a r 
sector. From here we go on t o consider the recent h i s t o r y o f 
those companies engaged i n s t e e l production w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
national t e r r i t o r y , recognising t h i s i s contingent upon the 
character o f the state/society r e l a t i o n s h i p i n question. 
F i n a l l y , we consider the way i n which some o f these events have 
been acted out i n and through p a r t i c u l a r places, focusing 
especially on communities dependent upon s t e e l production and 
threatened by the general decline o f t h a t sector throughout the 
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European Comunity. I f necessary, o f course, the material 
relevant t o these themes can be compared by considering the 
appropriate sections across d i f f e r e n t chapters. 
Our p a r t i c u l a r concern i n t h i s Chapter i s the development of the 
B r i t i s h s t e e l industry. I n the post-1945 period t h i s has formed 
one o f the key divides between pu b l i c and p r i v a t e sector, being 
nationalised i n 1951, almost wholly de-nationalised the f o l l o w i n g 
year and p a r t i a l l y re-nationalised i n 1967. Consideration o f the 
reasons f o r t h i s successive series o f attempts a t pub l i c 
ownership, therefore, i s of value i n understanding the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between state and society i n the post-war period. 
This i n t u r n i s o f significance f o r our b r i e f account of the 
development o f the nationalised producer, the B r i t i s h Steel 
Corporation (BSC) a f t e r 1967. F i n a l l y , the major substantive 
content o f the Chapter l i e s i n two case-studies o f the way i n 
which broader national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l trends w i t h i n both state 
and society take expression w i t h regard t o p a r t i c u l a r places. We 
consider here the closure o f the BSC works a t Consett, North West 
Durham, and the unsuccessful attempts t o oppose t h i s closure 
during 1979 and 1980. This can be contrasted w i t h the ( t o date) 
successful defence from threatened closure o f the BSC Ravenscraig 
works i n Scotland. 
V.2 B r i t i s h S t e e l s p u b l i c or p r i v a t e ? 
The period o f o f f i c e o f the f i r s t post-war Labour Government, 
1945-51, saw what Jessop (1980) has termed the ' transformation 1 
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of the B r i t i s h state. Particular characteristics of this 
transformation were the development of the welfare state and of 
the mixed economy. The dispute over steel nationalisation was of 
significance in that i t established limits to the size of the 
publicly-owned sector within the mixed economy which were to 
remain effective for almost two decades. E l e c t r i c i t y , gas, r a i l 
and coal were nationalised by the Labour administration and 
remained in public ownership after the Conservative Party won the 
1951 election. The steel industry, on the other hand, was de-
2 
nationalised along with the road transport industry after 1951. 
Yet by 1967, as part of what Jessop (1980) has labelled the 
'second major transformation' of the B r i t i s h state, the majority 
of steel producers were nationalised and have remained so ever 
since. Why was this, and what does i t t e l l us about the nature 
of B r i t i s h state and society? 
In terms of contemporary debate, the arguments over the 1951 
nationalisation were very similar to those i n 1967. The major 
claim presented by the Labour party before 1951 was centred on 
the notion of monopoly in the steel industry. A booklet produced 
by the Labour Party Research Department (Fienburgh and Evely, 
1948) concentrated on six major combines in the steel industry; 
Dorman Long, Co l v i l l e s , Stewarts and Lloyds, Lancashire Steel, 
United Steel Companies and Richard Thomas and Baldwins. 
These six companies owned seventy-five out of the national total 
of 157 blast-furnaces i n 1946. Further, attention was focused 
upon the individuals i n charge of the industry, with the 
conclusion that 'at the very outside, 100 men dominate the entire 
iron and steel industry and deploy outwards to link i t with the 
rest of industry' (p. 39). 
- 117 -
A further claim was that monopoly had led to high prices and the 
maintenance of inefficient plant. This was clearly stated in the 
two sentences of the Labour Party's f i r s t post-war manifesto 
which referred to iron and steel : 
'private monopoly has maintained high prices and kept 
inefficient high-cost plants in existence. Only i f public 
ownership replaces private monopoly can the industry become 
efficie n t . ' 
(Labour Party, 1945, 7) 
I t was further pointed out that although steel prices rose by 
one-third between 1934 and 1939, coal prices had risen by only 
20% (Fienburgh and Evely, 1948, 59). 
These claims of monopoly and high prices were put forward again 
in the early 1960's. A Labour Party pamphlet of 1959, for 
instance, argued that r e s t r i c t i o n i s t policies pursued by the 
'monopoly' had led to an inadequate expansion of the industry's 
post-war capacity. Further, i t claimed that the Iron and Steel 
Board, set up in 1953 to oversee the industry's pattern and 
course of development, was continually 'frustrated' by a 
recalcitrant industry (Labour Party, 1959). 
The B r i t i s h Iron and Steel Federation (BISF), representing 
private capital in the industry, counter-attacked against the 
claim of monopoly control with a two-headed strategy. This 
consisted of, on the one hand, an argument in favour of private 
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ownership of the industry. The annual report for 1963, for 
instance, contained a presidential address with the following 
message : 'the industry i s certainly providing enough steel 
(and) the industry i s producing that steel efficiently' (BISF, 
1963). On the other hand, an argument evolved aimed at directing 
the terms of debate from nationalisation to greater public 
supervision. This l a t t e r was the major element of the 
Federation's strategy. 
Throughout both nationalisation debates the Federation 
consistently presented a case for greater public supervision, 
rather than outright nationalisation. In 1947, for instance, S i r 
Andrew Duncan, the Chairman of the BISF, negotiated a settlement 
with the Prime Minister, which was eventually rejected by the 
Cabinet i n August of that same year (Ross, 1965). The main 
feature of the proposed settlement was an increased emphasis on 
the powers of the Iron and Steel Board, i t s e l f formed a year 
previously, on the condition that the government would only 
nationalise any particularly inefficient firms - and i t was the 
Federation's case that there were very few of these. Again, in 
1965, the chairmen of twelve major steel companies issued a 
statement which suggested that 'new legislation should establish 
a new Authority, charged with supervisory control of the Industry 
and having the powers necessary to this end'. They further 
believed that 'fully adequate control i s obtainable without the 
need for state shareholdings in the individual companies' (BISF, 
1965). 
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I t i s demonstrably the case, then, that the terrain of debate was 
not significantly different in 1967 to that of 1951. We must 
look elsewhere, therefore, for the reasons for the divergent 
outcomes. In particular, we must consider how the terrain of 
debate relates to deeper tensions between capital and labour over 
the ownership of the means of production of steel. The original 
impetus for steel nationalisation from the side of labour came in 
part from a resolution adopted at the 1934 Trades Union 
Conference and subsequently incorporated in the pre-war Labour 
Party manifesto. This resolution was put forward in the belief 
that nationalisation would help to safeguard employment, a belief 
that underpinned continued Labour Party and trades union support 
for nationalisation right through to 1967. The disjuncture 
between this belief and eventual outcome i s a point of general 
interest; more important for present purposes i s the consistency 
of the support from organised labour for nationalisation. For in 
1951 capital within the steel industry was in a position to 
expect a period of considerable profit. The record levels of 
capacity u t i l i s a t i o n during the war meant that finance existed to 
invest in new plant, whilst demand was l i k e l y to be buoyant 
during the post-war phase of reconstruction. Both for capital in 
general, then, in the sense of av a i l a b i l i t y of sufficient steel, 
and for capital within steel, in the sense of anticipated high 
profits, there existed grounds to support the continued private 
ownership of the steel industry. 
By 1967, however, the position had changed drastically. Profits 
as a percentage of capital employed had declined frcm a c y c l i c a l 
peak of 18.8% in 1960, to a low of 1.9% in 1967. Investment too 
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had declined, in response partly to low profitability, partly to 
the very threat of nationalisation, from an annual average of 
£315 m in the period 1960-62 to an annual average of £135 m over 
1963-67 (table V . l ) . Nationalisation therefore presented long-
term advantages to capital. For capital in general i t would help 
to secure a v a i l a b i l i t y of sufficient steel, s t i l l a crucial 
industrial product for many other industries. For capital 
invested in steel production i t would ensure, via generous 
compensation payments from the state, the opportunity to seek 
more profitable investment opportunities elsewhere (see 
McEachernr1979, 1980), 
The nature of the compromise adopted in 1967 i s revealing in this 
context. Whereas in 1951 the proposals had included every iron 
producer, steel producer and hot steel r o l l e r with a capacity in 
excess of 20 000 tonnes per year, in 1967 the proposals only 
embraced those producers who had an output in excess of 475 000 
tonnes of crude steel in the year to 30th June 1964. This change 
was important because i t signified a recognition that certain 
areas of steel production, typically the low-volume, special 
steels sector, were s t i l l capable of producing sufficient profit 
for them to remain in the ownership of private capital. 
Hence both capital and labour came to agree on the necessity of a 
form of nationalisation, one ultimately to prove in the long-term 
interests of capital but not of labour. This i s a crucial point, 
for i t raises the issues of the intention for labour of 
nationalisation. A conception of p o l i t i c s whereby the state i s 
effectively neutral i s implicated here. The extent to which this 
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i s tenable forms a central theme i n our discussion of the h i s t o r y 
of the B r i t i s h Steel Corporation (BSC) a f t e r 1967. 
V.3 BSC p o l i c i e s a f t e r 1967 
Upon i t s formation i n 1967 w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the 
fourteen l a r g e s t UK producers i n terms of steel tonnage output, 
the B r i t i s h Steel Corporation (BSC) was one of the largest bulk 
ste e l producers i n the western world. The early h i s t o r y of the 
Corporation up to 1970 r e f l e c t e d a period of organisation and 
consolidation, before i t embarked on a strategy s i m i l a r t o t h a t 
recommended by the p r i v a t e sector before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n (BISF, 
1966), one o f concentrating investment on the f i v e "heritage 
s i t e s " o f Llanwern and Port Talbot i n Wales, Scunthorpe and 
Teesside i n England, and Ravenscraig i n Scotland (BSC, 1973). 
This entailed closure or run-down of a number of inland 
f a c i l i t i e s acquired on n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , delayed following the 
"Beswick review" of 1974 but eventually carried through as the 
generalised recession i n demand f o r s t e e l products deepened 
throughout the l a t e 1970's (see especially Bryer et a l , 1982). 
The impact of t h i s declining s t e e l market on BSC's performance 
was dramatic. Crude s t e e l output f e l l from 24.2 m tonnes i n 
1972/73 t o 17.3 m tonnes i n 1978/79, w h i l s t small p r o f i t s i n the 
three years 1972-75 were replaced by cumulative losses o f over 
£1000 m i n the four subsequent years (table V.2). A f u r t h e r 
White Paper i n 1978 (BSC, 1978) f i n a l l y cancelled most of the 
major investment programmes proposed i n 1973, although many of 
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these had been delayed anyway following the uncertain nature of 
the steel market. 
Throughout i t s history even before 1979, then, BSC had displayed 
a willingness to close plants and shed employment. In this the 
Corporation was assisted by the accommodative nature of trades 
union organisation in the industry, one owing much to the 
traditions of the early organisation of labour in iron and steel 
3 
production . The structure of trades union organisation in the 
industry mirrors the divided nature of the class of workers 
employed in i t . Currently there are eighteen unions involved in 
negotiations with BSC. The two numerically dominant unions are 
the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC, formerly BISAKTA : 
Bri t i s h Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association) and the 
National Union of Blastfurnacemen (NUB). Fourteen diverse craft 
unions negotiate jointly under the umbrella of the National 
Craftsmen's Coordinating Committee (NCCC). Finally, the General 
and Municipal Union (GMBU), and the Transport and General 
Workers' Union (TGWU) organise a limited number of employees with 
more general s k i l l s . The eighteen unions meet together in the 
TUC Steel Industry Consultative Committee (TUCSICC, referred to 
hereafter as the Steel Committee), the composition of which is 6 
ISTC, 4 NCCC, 3 NUB, 2 TGWU and 2 GMBU (Upham, 1980). 
As might be expected, such a diverse organisational structure has 
led to some inter-union r i v a l r y . For example, on i t s formation 
in 1967 BSC, on the advice of the TUC, refused to recognise the 
white-collar unions ASTMS (Association of Sc i e n t i f i c , Technical 
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and Managerial Staff) and CAWU (Clerical and Administrative 
Workers Union). The 7,600 members of these two unions engaged in 
BSC took strike action which was only resolved when a Commission 
of Inquiry under Lord Pearson (HMSO, 1968) recommended that BSC 
should recognise the union membership of the striking workers. 
Following the decision leaders of the main manual unions issued a 
directive forbidding their members to take orders from any member 
of the two white-collar unions. The situation was only resolved 
when a complex formula was negotiated giving essentially only 
local recognition to the two white-collar unions (see Owen Smith, 
1971, 42). 
Faced with this disunity, the trades unions came to adopt a 
policy of active co-operation in a series of closures at BSC. 
For instance at i t s annual conference in 1973 the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation, the main steel workers' union, adopted a 
policy of accepting closures provided alternative employment was 
available for the workers made redundant by BSC (Upham, 1980). 
This line soon came to have general acceptance throughout the 
labour movement as shown by the following resolution adopted by 
the Labour Party, Wales, at i t s annual Conference in May 1975: 
'This Conference confirms i t s policy that no redundancies 
arising from the modernisation of the steel industry should 
take place without suitable alternative employment being 
available within reasonable travelling distance of the 
workers' homes.' 
(Nationalised Industries Committee, 1977, I I I , 83) 
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During this period also, members of the multi-union Steel 
Committee were constrained by what came to be an over-riding 
concern not to be seen to favour one plant or works over another. 
This concern was voiced clearly by B i l l S i r s , chairman of both 
the ISTC and the Steel Committee in 1976: 
'Painful change would have to be: this the Committee had to 
accept. But the Committee took a deliberate decision for 
which they were subsequently c r i t i c i s e d in certain quarters, 
not to formulate a development strategy of their own. For 
they knew that i f they did this those of their members at the 
works which any "Steel Committee Strategy" would have to 
propose for closure might have f e l t abandoned by their own 
unions. 1 
( S i r s 1977) 
On the other hand the Steel Committee, which was empowered to 
negotiate on any issue except wages, was essentially useful to 
BSC in that i t provided them with a framework within which the 
questions of job loss and works closures could be put forward 
(see also Bryer et a l , 1982, 243; 252-3). This was recognised 
by the Corporation when in 1975 i t invited the Steel Committee to 
participate in the newly-formed job-creation subsidiary, BSC 
(Industry). These lines of argument were maintained by the 
trades unions u n t i l late in 1977, when, following the negotiation 
of enhanced redundancy pay by the local union o f f i c i a l s at the 
Clyde Iron Works in return for agreement in redundancies the 
Steel Committee was called in to negotiate a slightly better deal 
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at Hartlepool. From this time onwards the Steel Committee placed 
greater emphasis on the negotiation of redundancy payments than 
on the provision of alternative employment (see Upham, 1980, R). 
The s h i f t in emphasis does not disguise the continued active 
acceptance of job loss and works closure. 
Faced, then, with the obvious weaknesses of organised labour 
within the steel industry/ and given both the hi s t o r i c a l debate 
over public ownership of that industry and the start made by the 
previous Labour Government in i t s planned decline, i t was hardly 
surprising that the Conservative Government elected in May 1979 
should seek rapidly to impose i t s monetarist policies upon BSC. 
As Morgan (1983) has demonstrated, the crucial change with regard 
to BSC, inaugurated as part of the overall attempt to reduce the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), was a drastic 
reduction i n BSC's External Financing Limit (EFL), the funds made 
available by central Government to cover the operating losses of 
nationalised industries which cannot be met by internally-
generated funds. The administration's intentions were made 
explicit in a statement by the Secretary of State for Industry i n 
the House of Commons on July 3rd 1979, just two months after the 
General Election: 
'I have set the Corporation the target of operating at a 
profit i n the 1980/1 financial year, after providing for 
depreciation and interest. To reinforce this target the 
Corporation's cash limits for 1980/81 w i l l be set at a level 
intended with internally generated funds, to cover fixed 
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investments and the essential c a p i t a l requirements. The 
Government does not intend t o finance operating losses'. 
(from BSC, December 1979 "The Return of Financial V i a b i l i t y " , 
reproduced i n ISTC (1980), p. 126. Emphasis added). 
The i n i t i a l EFL f o r 1980/81 was set at a l e v e l s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
reduced from that f o r 1979/80, from £700 m to a pro v i s i o n a l £450 
m. For other indu s t r i e s i n a comparable p o s i t i o n marginal 
increases were approved : from £709 m t o £834 m f o r the National 
Coal Board and from £715 m t o £754 m f o r B r i t i s h R a i l (Lever 
Enquiry, 1980, 24). Given such t i g h t external constraints on i t s 
operating budget, the B r i t i s h Steel Corporation was forced i n t o a 
programme of redundancy and capacity reduction. This point was 
recognised as ear l y as November 1979 when a House of Commons 
debate was i n i t i a t e d by the Opposition noting 
"the r e s t r i c t i o n s placed upon the B r i t i s h Steel industry by 
Her Majesty's Government's pu r s u i t of an u n r e a l i s t i c 
f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y " 
(Hansard, v o l 973, 7 November 1979, c o l 435); 
i n which Barry Jones (Lab., F l i n t E) put forward the point t h a t : 
"At the heart of the problem are the r i g i d cash l i m i t s . The 
p o l i c y of not funding BSC losses i n 1980 means that the 
Corporation can move nearer t o solvency only by closures." 
( i b i d , c o l 483) 
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Continuation of these r i g i d financial limits after 1979 (table 
V.3) has meant massive contraction at BSC. Manned production 
capacity was cut from 21.5 m tonnes to 14.4 m tonnes during the 
f i r s t three years of the Government. Cuts in manpower were even 
more severe, from 186 000 to 104 000 by March 1982 and to 71 000 
by March 1985 (table V.2). Through this consistent reduction of 
the scope and extent of the state sector, the Government aims to 
create profitable investment opportunities for private capital. 
The Iron and Steel Act 1981 had three main provisions: these 
allowed for the eventual liquidation of BSC; the sale of assets 
to or joint ventures with private capital by BSC; and an 
exemption from BSC's previous statutory obligation to provide the 
f u l l range of steel products (Morgan, 1982, 7). Hence in 1976 
the then Chairman of BSC, S i r Monty Finniston, could state: 
'Redpath Dorman Long (a BSC-owned engineering and construction 
company - D.S.) I think i s typical of the kind of direction 
in which the Corporation wants to go. I t cannot confine 
i t s e l f purely to iron and steel because there i s profitable 
and gainful employment and advantage to the nation i f we 
develop downstream of iron and steel a c t i v i t i e s . ' 
(evidence to Nationalised Industries Committee, 1976, para. 50) 
But by 1983 the position was such that Industry Secretary Patrick 
Jenkin could declare: 
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'Our aim i s the privatisation of as much as possible of BSC's 
a c t i v i t i e s ' . 
(evidence to Industry and Trade Committee, 1983, para. 270) 
By March 1983 three major joint ventures with the private sector 
had been completed; Allied Steel and Wire, British Bright Bar 
and Sheffield Forgemasters. In the financial year 1983/84 five 
further joint ventures were negotiated. The total book value of 
assets disposed of since 1980 amounted to £274 m (table V.4). 
Organised labour, then, has been faced with a concerted 
Government - led attempt drastically to reduce capacity and 
employment in the steel industry. As part of this process of 
restructuring of class relations within British state and 
society, the trades unions came only gradually to recognise the 
situation. The f i r s t signs of belated action concerned the 
closure of the Corby works of BSC. This came to the fore in 
February 1979 when BSC announced that i t was reviewing the future 
of the works. For nearly eight months after this announcement, 
local union o f f i c i a l s refused to invite the Steel Committee in to 
discuss the case. Fearing that their presence would indicate 
that closure was negotiable, this was symptomatic of a broader 
distrust of the national trades union structure (Baker, 1982). 
In the event, when the Steel Committee f i r s t met BSC at Corby, on 
20 September, the Corporation merely issued formal notice of 
closure of the 'Heavy End' (the steelworks but not the 
tubeworks), with run-down to begin in January 1980. On the 1st 
November the Steel Committee presented BSC with a detailed case 
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arguing against the closure decision (for a shortened version of 
this case, see Bryer et a l , 1982). Significantly, the BSC 
refused to recognise the arguments put forward in the Steel 
Committee case (see Upham, 1980, 10-11). 
This refusal to countenance any discussion over the future of 
Corby produced a sharp reaction from the ISTC. At an Executive 
Council meeting the following day, i t was possible to detect what 
can only be described as a definite hardening of the union's 
attitude. The minutes of the meeting referring e x p l i c i t l y to 
Corby, noted that: 
'despite the well-reasoned documentation that had been 
prepared by th i s union, the Steel Committee and Warwick 
University, the Corporation were not prepared to countenance 
any alteration of their programme of closures regardless of 
the merit of our arguments ... A long discussion ensued ... 
Most of the members who contributed to the debate pressed for 
a more militant policy to be adopted, and that in the future 
discussions with the Corporation the unions should be 
prepared to exercise a greater degree of h o s t i l i t y ' . 
(ISTC Annual Report, 1979, 227) 
Further, one of the resolutions adopted by the meeting was that: 
'All branches i n the Public Sector are instructed to cease 
negotiations on manpower reductions immediately.' 
(ibid) 
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However, the ISTC was unable to find support for i t s new policy 
attitude from the other steel unions. At the November meeting of 
the Steel Committee, the ISTC put proposals for industrial action 
over the closures issue: but only the NCCC supported the ISTC 
proposals (Upham, 1980, 12). 
As recognition of the new policy attitude towards the industry 
deepened, the steel unions were soon drawn into a long strike 
over the issue of wages. The f i r s t national steel strike since 
1926 lasted from January to March 1980. This was of particular 
significance, for two main reasons. In the f i r s t place, despite 
BSC's insistence throughout a four month long series of pay talks 
(table V.5) on an element of the pay increase derived from local 
productivity improvements, the strike remained solely over the 
question of wages, and was never extended to cover the issue of 
job losses. For example when BSC described the local bonus 
scheme, the emphasis was on performance at works level or above: 
'Lump sum payments w i l l be made at local level provided that 
i t has f i r s t been demonstrated that: 
a. the cost of such increases has been funded by improved 
financial performance. 
b. such payments w i l l derive from agreed schemes designed to 
measure financial performance on a Divisional or Works 
basis. 
c. i t i s understood that the schemes described above w i l l be 
applied to units at Works level and above.' 
(Source : BSC Submission to Lever Enquiry, p.5, emphasis added). 
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I n the context of the declared intentions of the BSC t o 
streamline i t s workforce, i t should have been apparent that an 
i m p l i c i t feature of the improved f i n a n c i a l performance i d e n t i f i e d 
above as an essential prerequisite f o r the payment of a lo c a l 
p r o d u c t i v i t y bonus was the reduction of the labour force at the 
p a r t i c u l a r Works or D i v i s i o n a l u n i t . This was even made e x p l i c i t 
when, i n the same submission, BSC i d e n t i f i e d the basis f o r the 
assessment of p r o d u c t i v i t y improvements: 
'Better business r e s u l t s and p r o d u c t i v i t y are shown i n 
improvement i n added value related to employment costs.' 
(Source: BSC Submission t o Lever Enquiry, p.6) See also note 4. 
Despite t h i s inter-connection between the wages issue and the 
jobs issue, the unions never negotiated with BSC over the two 
issues together. Indeed, the terms of reference of the Lever 
Enquiry which f i n a l l y resolved the dispute s p e c i f i c a l l y excluded 
the issue of job losses, confining the enquiry to the settlement 
of the wages issue. 
Secondly, although there i s no d i r e c t evidence f o r the view that 
the pay s t r i k e was d e l i b e r a t e l y engineered and kept separate from 
the jobs issue i n order t o weaken union opposition to a closure 
programme, as put forward by Routledge (1980), there can be no 
doubt t h a t the performance of the main unions involved i n the 
ste e l s t r i k e served only t o emphasise the r e l a t i v e d i s u n i t y o f 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r section o f the class of labour. This point can 
be i l l u s t r a t e d by the h i s t o r y of the negotiations (table V.6). 
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As can be seen, the main unions f a i l e d conspicuously t o develop a 
j o i n t negotiating p o s i t i o n u n t i l r e l a t i v e l y l a t e i n the dispute. 
As the Steel Committee was s p e c i f i c a l l y excluded from discussing 
matters t o do w i t h wages, a temporary su b s t i t u t e t o discuss t h i s 
issue had t o be created: the I r o n and Steel Co-ordinating 
Committee. Even t h i s body had i t s l i m i t a t i o n s ; on the 25th 
March 1980, one day a f t e r the l a s t meeting o f the Co-ordinating 
Committee w i t h BSC, the NCCC withdrew from the Committee t o 
negotiate separately w i t h BSC. 
Following the conclusion of the pay s t r i k e i n March 1980, the 
ISTC produced a strategy o f t h e i r own f o r the s t e e l industry i n 
'New Deal f o r S t e e l 1 (ISTC, J u l y 1980). The reason f o r the 
production o f the strategy was o u t l i n e d i n a foreword by B i l l 
S i r s : 
'My union has a long and proud h i s t o r y o f negotiating i t s 
objectives. Last November, however, we became convinced 
t h a t the Corporation were only going through the motions 
o f l i s t e n i n g t o our views. Meetings were only being used 
t o seek t o e x t r a c t from the trade unions r a t i f i c a t i o n t o 
previously made BSC decisions.' 
(ISTC, 1980, 4) 
C r u c i a l l y , however, the arguments ] x i t forward centred on the 
issue o f corporate strategy a t BSC without any consideration o f 
the wider issue o f the r o l e o f the state apparatus. Thus the 
strategy challenged s i x key points of BSC's argument fo r capacity 
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reduction: the slump i n world demand, the existence of world 
s t e e l overcapacity, the low l e v e l of world s t e e l prices, the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o f i t a b l e exporting, the reliance on the U.K. 
domestic market and the importance of charging the highest prices 
the market would bear (p. 9). The a l t e r n a t i v e strategy contained 
f i v e elements (p. 42-74): 
- a cut i n BSC prices by 10%, costing £500 mpa to be made up 
e i t h e r through operational improvement or an increase i n the 
l e v e l of state subsidies; 
- a new aggressive commercial p o l i c y ; 
- a drive t o increase, rather than decrease, exports; 
- an improvement i n product q u a l i t y , e n t a i l i n g new investment a t 
the f i n i s h i n g stage; and 
- more f l e x i b i l i t y i . e . , a re-assessment of the use of e l e c t r i c 
arcs and more customer choice of where the order i s made w i t h i n 
BSC. 
The issue of the r o l e of the state and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o BSC 
was i m p l i c i t i n a number of these proposals: i n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
use of e l e c t r i c arc furnaces, and the l e v e l of state subsidies. 
The strategy, however, d i d not go on to consider the broader 
implications o f the assessment o f corporate strategy. This 
deficiency seriously l i m i t e d the effectiveness of the ISTC 
campaign. By merely challenging BSC a t the l e v e l of surface 
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appearances, and by f a i l i n g t o analyse the r e l a t i o n s underlying 
5 
the surface appearance , 'New Deal f o r Steel* represented nothing 
more than a technical argument which could be responded t o at 
t h a t l e v e l by BSC: the more so as l a t e r events tended t o favour 
the BSC forecasts rather more than those of the ISTC, notably the 
decline i n demand. 
Despite the adoption of a more aggressive p o l i c y by the ISTC i n 
November 1979, then, the weakness of the labour movement as a 
whole prevented the development o f a common argument and strategy 
f o r the s t e e l industry. This weakness was also evident i n the 
way in which the issues of jobs and wages were separated during 
the 1980 s t r i k e and the ISTC a l t e r n a t i v e strategy f a i l e d t o go 
beyond consideration o f BSC p o l i c y t o examine the nature of state 
involvement despite the significance o f the reduced external 
financing l i m i t . I n t h i s s t e e l i s by no means unique i n post-
1979 B r i t i s h society, f o r i t i s not j u s t i n t h i s industry t h a t 
there has been a d r a s t i c reduction i n employment w i t h no coherent 
counter-proposals from labour. The f a c t t h a t the campaigns 
discussed below a c t u a l l y took place demonstrates th a t there has 
been a degree o f organised opposition t o closure. This protest, 
though, can be categorised as of a short-term nature, aimed at 
p r o t e c t i n g s p e c i f i c l o c a l i t i e s at s p e c i f i c times. A long-term 
strategy f o r the industry must take account o f the collapse o f 
the U.K. s t e e l consuming sectors a f t e r 1979 (see Morgan, 1983), 
and o f the r e l a t i o n between state, c a p i t a l and labour as examined 
above. Without t h i s , short-term protests are inherently 
r e s t r i c t e d and l i m i t e d t o statements which are capable o f being 
accommodated by the state i n i t s various forms. Just how t h i s 
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has taken place h i s t o r i c a l l y i s a question we turn to i n our 
discussion of two sp e c i f i c anti-closure campaigns. 
V.4 The Save Consett Campaign 
I n t h i s section we consider the case of Consett steelworks, which 
was closed i n September 1980 a f t e r a ten-month debate following 
BSC's announcement of closure i n December 1979 . Pr i o r to t h i s , 
however, there had been considerable uncertainty over the future 
o f i r o n and steel-making a t Consett, as can be shown by a b r i e f 
examination o f the events at Consett I r o n Co. Ltd. before 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n 1967, and the fears f o r the works w i t h i n the 
framework of BSC a f t e r 1967. Following t h i s we describe b r i e f l y 
events at Consett i n the ten months leading up to closure before 
i s o l a t i n g three s i g n i f i c a n t problems facing any organised 
opposition t o BSC's closure decision: the early intra-class 
f r i c t i o n generated by the national s t r i k e ; the temptation t o 
in d i v i d u a l workers t o accept enhanced severance pay; and the 
t a c t i c s o f 'disinformation' adopted by BSC. The c r u c i a l section 
of t h i s analysis focuses on the arguments put forward fcy BSC and 
the 'Save Consett Campaign'. I t can be shown that u l t i m a t e l y the 
two sides were arguing d i f f e r e n t cases: the BSC, w h i l s t 
i n i t i a l l y adopting a 'profitability at works level' approach, 
l a t e r argued f o r closure on grounds of sheer over-capacity. The 
Save Consett campaign, on the other hand, continuously argued on 
a 'profitability' c r i t e r i o n thereby ignoring the constraints 
imposed on BSC by the existence o f over-capacity and the pressure 
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exerted on BSC t o reduce t h a t over-capacity. I n t h i s way, 
although the Con s e t t campaign d i d e n t a i l some consideration of 
the future of the Teesside Works of BSC, dependent as i t i s upon 
a single b l a s t furnace, i t was unable t o penetrate the s p a t i a l 
separation o f the labour force encouraged by BSC. This 
separation on geographical grounds was encouraged by one of the 
more unusual features of events a t Consett, the projected take-
over o f the works by p r i v a t e c a p i t a l . Indeed, i t can be shown 
t h a t u l t i m a t e l y the Consett works was completely i s o l a t e d both i n 
class terms and i n regional terms, making the enactment of BSC's 
closure decision i n e v i t a b l e . 
Consett I r o n Co. Ltd. was founded i n 1864 t o take over a works 
established i n 1841 on the basis of l o c a l coal and i r o n ore 
supplies. The company r a p i d l y rose t o prominence among national 
s t e e l producers; by the l a t e 1880's i t was producing up t o 10% 
of n ational s t e e l output, w i t h a labour force of some 6000 (BSC, 
1972). The most s i g n i f i c a n t developments f o r present purposes 
came a f t e r World War Two. From 1943-1950 the company constructed 
three new b l a s t furnaces, and i n 1947 i t took over the l i g h t 
section m i l l o f the New Jarrow Steel Co. Ltd. The company was 
nationalised i n 1951 and sold back t o p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i n 1955. 
By t h i s time, however, the company was dependent upon imported 
rather than l o c a l ores, so t h a t i t s status as an 'island' was 
already established. On the other hand, the company continued t o 
adopt a progressive p o l i c y o f investment; i n e a r l y 1959 work 
s t a r t e d on a new p l a t e m i l l which commenced r o l l i n g i n September 
1960; t o feed the p l a t e m i l l , new steel-making capacity was 
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i n s t a l l e d , commencing operations i n 1963, This new capacity 
consisted of a mix of Kaldo and L.D. oxygen steel converters, 
making Consett I r o n Co. the f i r s t U.K. steel producer to use the 
oxygen steel-making route. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , though, the plate m i l l and steel plant required a 
considerable investment by the company (table V.7). Under these 
conditions operation at close t o f u l l capacity was necessary to 
maintain p r o f i t a b i l i t y , nnfortunately, however, the steel market 
was, throughout t h i s period, considerably depressed. Further, 
the p l a t e market i n p a r t i c u l a r was at a very low l e v e l , 
considerably a f f e c t i n g the l e v e l of operation of Consett's plate 
m i l l . This was a p o i n t emphasised by Roland Cookson, the Acting 
Chairman, at the AGM on 11th August 1964: 
'The completion of the new p l a t e m i l l and construction of the 
new oxygen s t e e l plant coincided w i t h the recession i n heavy 
stee l t o which I have already referred. The r e s u l t was that 
we d i d not earn the expected p r o f i t s t o help finance these 
major p r o j e c t s . Our indebtedness to the Finance Corporation 
f o r Industry and to our Bankers has thus risen to a high 
f i g u r e . ' 
(Consett I r o n Co.,Annual Report, 1964) 
The e f f e c t on the company's finances of t h i s investment i n new 
capacity at a time of stagnant or d e c l i n i n g demand was r e f l e c t e d 
i n the p r o f i t and loss account and i n the dividends paid (tables 
V.8, V.9). On the d e f i n i t i o n adopted by BSC, p r o f i t r a t i o s at 
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Consett I r o n Co. Ltd. were consistently lower than a t the other 
major s t e e l producers i n the North-East of England, and also 
consistently lower than the mean fi g u r e f o r the 14 bulk s t e e l 
producers nationalised i n 1967 to form BSC. This was re f l e c t e d 
i n the dividends paid by the three major North East s t e e l 
producers over the same period. Although no d i r e c t comparison 
can be made between the company fi g u r e s , r e f l e c t i n g as they do a 
v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t company p o l i c i e s , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that f o r 
p r a c t i c a l l y the e n t i r e period, the dividends paid by Consett I r o n 
Co. Ltd. were lower, i n some years markedly lower, than those 
paid by the region's two other major steel producers. Even by 
1967, i r o n and st e e l production at Consett was becoming less of 
an a t t r a c t i v e proposition t o c a p i t a l than at other steel-works 
w i t h i n the North East. 
Before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i n 1967, two fur t h e r events posed serious 
questions over the future of iron and steel-making at Consett. 
I n 1966 the B r i t i s h I r o n and Steel Federation belatedly produced 
i t s own bl u e p r i n t f o r the future of the industry, popularly known 
as the Benson Report (B.I.S.F. 1966). This document foresaw the 
increasing significance of coastal s i t e s f o r i r o n and s t e e l 
production, and consequently saw no great future f o r inland s i t e s 
such as Consett. I n the same year, almost as i f t o back t h i s up, 
t a l k s of a possible merger began between South Durham Steel and 
Iron Co. Ltd. and Dorman Long - a merger which went ahead the 
fol l o w i n g year. I n i t s e l f , coming j u s t before n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
both companies, the merger meant l i t t l e ; more s i g n i f i c a n t i s the 
f a c t t h a t Consett I r o n Co. Ltd. was not considered as a possible 
t h i r d party t o the merger. 
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Hie threat to Consett became more apparent in the early '70 !s, 
prior to the publication of BSC's Ten Year Development Strategy 
in 1973 (BSC, 1973). In a parliamentary debate in 1972, just 
prior to the publication date, the then Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry made the situation clear: 
'Consett w i l l operate as a steelmaking concern certainly until 
late in this decade. I t i s impossible to make a decision 
beyond that. I am advised by the BSC that i t i s considering 
Consett as a possible supplementary source of b i l l e t s 
together with a number of other candidates.' 
(Peter Walker, Hansard Vol. 848, 21 December 1972, col. 1589) 
This view, repeated in the White Paper, drew a swift reply from 
Consett's M.P., David Watkins: 
'A major reassessment of the position at Consett i s required. 
There i s a problem here requiring immediate attention. We 
face a rundown of about six to seven thousand jobs in an area 
tot a l l y dependent upon these jobs.' 
(Hansard, Vol. 849, 25 January 1973, c o l . 717) 
Indeed throughout the late 1970's there was a steady decline in 
the labour force at Consett, from 5700 in 1972 to 4000 in 1979. 
Thus, even before the closure announcement in December 1979, 
there had been a long period of uncertainty over the future of 
iron and steelmaking in the town (Table V.10). 
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However, BSC's announcement t h a t Consett was to close, made on 11 
December 1979, s t i l l came as a tremendous shock to the town. The 
Hownsgill p l a t e m i l l had been shut down two months previously 
w i t h the loss of some 300 jobs and i t was hoped that with t h i s 
loss-making pla n t gone the works had a br i g h t e r f u t u r e . A 
campaign developed to save the works, at f i r s t s l i g h t l y confused 
by the s t a r t of the national steel s t r i k e on 2 January 1980. A 
small r a l l y against closure on 8 February was followed by a 
larger one of some 3000 people on 14 March. 'The Case f o r 
Closure 1 was presented by BSC on 12 June and was met by a f u r t h e r 
protest r a l l y of some 2,500 on 20 June, a demonstration by some 
600 Consett people i n London on 9 July and a trades union 
commissioned document, 'No Case f o r Closure', presented t o BSC on 
23 July with a f u r t h e r protest march of some 2000 two days l a t e r . 
BSC argued, though, th a t the trade union case presented no new 
evidence and on 4 September a meeting of 2000 voted to accept 
closure and begin negotiations on severance terms. Eight days 
l a t e r the l a s t cast of s t e e l was poured at Consett. 
Throughout the campaign three features proved t o be more than 
j u s t minor hindrances. I n the f i r s t place, the national s t e e l 
s t r i k e i n the f i r s t three months of 1980 played a not 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n exacerbating the tension which already 
existed between the various union branches at the works. 
Further, t h i s heightened tension was responsible f o r the delay of 
nearly two months between BSC's announcement of closure and the 
formation of any kind of framework w i t h i n which t o organise 
opposition t o the closure. These d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the workforce 
a t Consett over the s t r i k e issue mirrored s i m i l a r problems at the 
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national union l e v e l . Thus at Consett, on the 27 December 1979 
600 members of c r a f t unions approved the following statement: 
•We believe any s t r i k e a t Consett i n the present circumstances 
would be an act of u t t e r f o l l y which could only r e s u l t i n the 
BSC's closure proposal becoming an immediate c e r t a i n t y . The 
s t r i k e would enable BSC t o escape from t h e i r present 
embarrassing d i f f i c u l t y i n attempting to j u s t i f y closing a 
p r o f i t a b l e works. The Corporation w i l l be able to claim that 
the workers themselves had brought about the closure by 
s t r i k i n g . ' 
(Reported i n Consett Guardian, 3.1.80) 
However, a f t e r the pay claim put forward at national l e v e l by the 
NCCC (National Craftsmen's Co-ordinating Committee) was rejected 
by BSC on the 9th January, 1980, members of the A l l i e d C r a f t 
Committee a t Cdnsett voted t o j o i n the members of the ISTC and 
NUB on s t r i k e from the 15th January. The l o c a l s t r i k e committee 
at Consett, consisting of members of the ISTC and NUB, had 
obviously taken exception to the actions of the c r a f t unions; 
f o r on the 19th January they turned down an o f f e r by c r a f t union 
representatives t o make t h e i r membership available f o r pi c k e t 
duty (Newcastle Chronicle, 19.1.80) 
A f u r t h e r example of d i s u n i t y at the l o c a l l e v e l m i r r o r i n g events 
a t the nation a l l e v e l i s provided by the c r a f t union p o l i c y o f 
negotiating w i t h BSC independently of the ISTC and NUB. On the 
10th February 1980 the c r a f t unions a t national l e v e l 
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p r o v i s i o n a l l y accepted a BSC o f f e r of 10% basic increase plus a 
f u r t h e r 4% conditi o n a l on l o c a l p r o d u c t i v i t y agreements, an o f f e r 
which had already been turned down by the ISTC and NUB. On the 
15th February the c r a f t unions decided instead t o r e j e c t the 
o f f e r : but t h i s d i d not meet w i t h the unaninious approval o f 
t h e i r Consett membership. On the 19th February a meeting of some 
700 members of c r a f t unions at Consett voted t o be informed and 
balloted about any fut u r e pay o f f e r . Further the l o c a l chairman 
of the A l l i e d Crafts Committee, George Wood, revealed tha t : 
' I t h i n k we would have accepted the l a s t o f f e r l o c a l l y , 
because of the i n t e r e s t i n saving the works.' 
(Quoted i n Newcastle Chronicle, 19.2.80) 
This obvious d i s u n i t y among the workforce at Gonsett can only 
have contributed t o the delay i n developing an organisational 
structure w i t h i n which t o develop a campaign against closure. 
Nearly two months elapsed between the closure announcement and 
the formation o f such a structure. Thus i t was not u n t i l the 4th 
February that a 'Draft p o l i c y statement' was issued by the 'Save 
Cbnsett Campaign' a broad statement which e f f e c t i v e l y d i d l i t t l e 
more than declare opposition t o closure. 
A second obstacle to the mounting of an e f f e c t i v e campaign 
against closure, though i n t h i s case an obstacle common to a l l 
previous closures, i s t h a t o f the temptation t o i n d i v i d u a l 
members of the workforce t o accept the r e l a t i v e l y generous 
severance payments offered by BSC. This was a f u r t h e r f a c t o r i n 
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the r e l a t i v e lack of organisation i n the anti-closure campaign, 
f o r i n i t i a l l y several union o f f i c i a l s accepted the closure and 
saw t h e i r task as the negotiation o f the best possible redundancy 
terms f o r t h e i r members. This viewpoint was put forward by, f o r 
example, Aiden Pollard, a convenor f o r the j o i n t c r a f t s unions: 
*We must t r y our best t o gain the greatest amount o f 
compensation f o r our members t o equip them f o r s u r v i v a l and 
mount a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l campaign t o taring r e a l investment t o 
the Consett area. 
(quoted i n Newcastle Chronicle, 15.12.79) 
The dangers of such an argument f o r any anti-closure campaign 
were recognised by B i l l S i r s , chairman o f the ISTC, i n h i s 
address t o the f i r s t major Consett r a l l y on the 14th March: 
'1 challenge you not t o do one t h i n g ... not t o look w i t h any 
s o r t o f greed at severance payments which would absolutely 
destroy t h i s town. 1 
(quoted i n Newcastle Chronicle, 15.3.80) 
Ultimately the d i s t i n c t i o n which was drawn, and generally 
accepted, between a campaign against closure or a campaign f o r 
enhanced redundancy payments proved t o be a fals e one. 
Redundancy terms agreed i n September 1980 en t a i l e d an i n i t i a l 
payment o f 25 weeks' wages a t the normal r a t e , plus 10 weeks1 
holiday pay, plus up t o an extra 12 weeks pay i n l i e u of n o t i c e , 
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dependent upon length of service - one week f o r every year's 
service. I n a d d i t i o n , a f u r t h e r 25 weeks1 pay at the normal rate 
was given as a lump sum one year a f t e r the closure. Thus, f o r 
example, an employee wit h ten years 1 service received a sum of 
£8000. C r u c i a l l y , however, throughout the campaign, the 
d i s t i n c t i o n was accepted creating a f u r t h e r source of 
disagreement between the various unions. 
A t h i r d d i f f i c u l t y i n the way of organising an e f f e c t i v e campaign 
was the strategy adopted by BSC, and i n p a r t i c u l a r two elements 
of t h i s strategy. I n the f i r s t place, throughout A p r i l and May 
of 1980, BSC adopted the t a c t i c o f 'disinformation 1; that i s not 
providing f u r t h e r evidence t o support t h e i r closure decision. 
Thus although BSC promised on the 10th A p r i l t o provide a 
det a i l e d argument t o support t h e i r decision w i t h i n four weeks, 
such an argument was not forthcoming u n t i l the 12th June, w i t h 
the presentation of the document ' The Case f o r Consett Closure'. 
The problems such a delay presented t o the campaign organisers 
were recognised by John Lee, secretary of the 'Save Consett 
Campaign': 
'We have had no p o s i t i v e information from BSC since the 
closure was announced i n December, and we th i n k t h i s has 
been a deliberate t a c t i c on t h e i r p a r t . We think they 
planned not t o give us any information i n order t o demoralise 
and f r u s t r a t e our members t o the point where they would be 
prepared t o accept any decision.' 
(quoted i n Consett Guardian, 12.6.80) 
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The second element of BSC strategy involved bringing forward the 
closure date. Thus although on the 12th August BSC confirmed 
tha t the closure was s t i l l scheduled f o r September 30th, i t had 
already been announced before the annual holiday f o r t n i g h t , the 
f i r s t two weeks i n August, that a f t e r the break one of the works' 
blast-furnaces was to be shut down. On the 29th August, Ian 
MacGregor, BSC Chairman t o l d the national Steel Committee that 
the scheduled closure date had been brought forward to September 
6th. 
I n the end, the l a s t cast of ste e l was made on September 12th. 
This uncertainty over the scheduled closure date served t o break 
any f i n a l opposition t o closure; on September 4th the workforce 
voted t o begin negotiations over severance terms. 
The most fundamental issue about the Save Consett Campaign, 
however, i s the ground on which i t was fought. Even had these 
contingent d i f f i c u l t i e s been overcome, i t had l i t t l e chance of 
success because i t f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y the key issues. That i s t o 
say, although BSC i n i t i a l l y presented the closure of Consett as a 
question of closing an unprofitable works, operational 
improvements at Consett soon made t h i s argument tenuous, so that 
BSC switched t o j u s t i f y the closure as a matter of reducing 
corporate over-capacity. The anti-closure campaign f a i l e d 
conspicuously t o i d e n t i f y t h i s issue or c r i t i c i s e i t as a basis 
f o r closure. 
That the BSC case f o r closure i n i t i a l l y rested upon a c r i t e r i o n 
of ' p r o f i t a b i l i t y ' a t works l e v e l i s evidenced by Consett's own 
M.P., David Watkins: 
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' I took a deputation to meet the chairman and other executives 
of the BSC on 30th October. That deputation comprised 
members and o f f i c i a l s o f Derwentside d i s t r i c t council and 
Durham county council ... We were t o l d that Consett i s not 
safe unless i t i s p r o f i t a b l e and that BSC can guarantee 
absolutely nothing. We were also t o l d that we must t a l k 
about p r o f i t a b i l i t y and not about numbers employed.1 
(Hansard, v o l . 973, 7th November 1979, c o l . 466) 
I n presenting such an argument, BSC could point t o the poor 
operating record of the plant over the past f i v e years (table 
V . l l ) . The cumulative loss amounted to some £54m. Unfortunately 
f o r BSC given t h i s p o s i t i o n , from September t o December 1979 the 
Consett works made a small p r o f i t , a change due mainly to the 
closure of the Hownsgill pl a t e m i l l (table V.12). However, the 
BSC concern wi t h p r o f i t a b i l i t y had only served to leg i t i m a t e the 
closure i n an attempt t o mask the r e a l issue, the need to cut 
capacity i n response t o the reduced external financing l i m i t 
imposed on the Corporation. This was i m p l i c i t l y recognised by 
David Watkins i n an interview about the meeting w i t h Charles 
V i l l i e r s referred t o above: 
'There i s no denying we were quite d e l i b e r a t e l y misled. We 
were t o l d a t t h a t meeting the Consett Works must be made 
p r o f i t a b l e i f i t i s t o survive. That p r o f i t a b i l i t y was 
already i n the process of being achieved, yet i t was only a 
few weeks l a t e r the closure of the whole works was 
announced.' 
(quoted i n Consett Guardian, 13.3.80) 
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Further evidence that the real reason for closing Consett lay i n 
the need to cut capacity is contained in the BSC Corporate Plan 
for 1980/81, written in December 1979 but not publicly available 
u n t i l published in the ISTC alternative strategy 'New Deal for 
Steel 1 in July 1980: 
'The retention of this plant (Consett) and Normanby Park, even 
with some flexing of the Sheffield Arcs, would provide too 
much capacity in the square route. 1 
(ISTC, 1980, 107) 
This was echoed by Charles V i l l i e r s , the chairman of BSC during 
the early part of the closure debate, who later said of Consett: 
fThey did just get a p r o f i t but we had too much capacity 
elsewhere.1 
(Newcastle Journal, 19.5.82) 
Indeed, i n th e i r document outlining the reasons for closing 
Consett, 'The Case f o r Consett Closure 1, presented on June 12th, 
the argument that the Consett works per se was unprofitable was 
abandoned. Rather the document argued that the closure was 
necessary because of the need to cut capacity in the Corporation 
as a whole: 
'The Corporation proposed to close the Consett Works, since 
despite i t s much improved cost performance achieved in 1979, 
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closure of Consett capacity w i l l result in an appropriate 
reduction on the Corporation's overall b i l l e t capacity. 1 
(BSC, June 1980 'The Case for Oonsett Closure' para. 5) 
The document further argued that the Consett order load could 
easily be transferred elsewhere, with a Consett b i l l e t m i l l load 
at 13, 300 tonnes per week absorbed by the Appleby Frodingham 
Bloom and B i l l e t m i l l (approx. 10 000 tpw) and the Normanby Park 
B i l l e t m i l l (approx. 3 000 tpw): 
'There is nothing of a particularly special nature in terms of 
steelmaking quality, surface quality of b i l l e t , standards of 
metallurgical treatment or properties which require 
particular Consett plant capabilities, and is therefore not 
readily transferable. 1 
( i b i d , para. 28) 
The reply to the BSC case, presented by the Joint Trade Unions of 
Consett Steel Works on the 23rd July, followed a completely 
diff e r e n t l i n e of argument. I t argued that Consett as a works 
was profitable and could be profitable in the future, thereby 
over-looking the fact that the BSC case rested on corporate over-
capacity, and not even considering the reasons why that over-
capacity should be reduced. In this way, the trade union case 
attempted to respond to the f i r s t legitiinating principle put 
forward by BSC, that of p r o f i t a b i l i t y ; ignored the second 
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legitimating principle, corporate over-capacity; and failed to 
recognise the real point at issue, the external pressure on BSC 
to reduce steel production capacity. 
Specifically, the trade union brochure 'No Case for Closure' of 
July 23 (hereafter 'No Case') examined three elements of the 
performance characteristics of the Consett Works. The f i r s t 
characteristic, productivity achievements, d i r e c t l y reflected the 
concern of the campaign with p r o f i t a b i l i t y at a works level. I t 
was claimed that actual productivity at Consett during 1979 was 
of the order of 240 tonnes of l i q u i d steel per man per year, 
contrasted with a BSC average of 238 tonnes/man/year (p. 1). The 
report went on to emphasise the production records established 
during 1979 (p. 5-6) before concluding that 
'Analysis of productivity and performance indications clearly 
show that Consett is a highly productive, extremely r e s i l i e n t 
works which has consistently proved capable of out-performing 
the break-even targets announced in August 1979.' 
(p.7) 
The second element of the case b u i l t upon the argument advanced 
about productivity by claiming such achievement made the Consett 
works suited to the implementation of a policy designed to hold 
back import penetration. Thus, the brochure detailed the 
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deliveries of 'semis' (blooms, b i l l e t s and slabs) from Consett 
during 1979. These deliveries amounted to 0.4 m.t. to customers 
within BSC and 0.28 m.t. to private sector re-rollers (p. 10). 
After examining the level of import penetration to the private 
sector, the report concluded that: 
'By virtue of i t s highly productive environment and the 
quality and r e l i a b i l i t y of i t s production the Consett Works 
is ideally suited to implement a policy designed to reverse 
import penetration in the market now served by the Works.' 
(p. 17) 
The t h i r d performance characteristic identified by the report was 
one of quality of finished product. The report quoted from an 
'independent survey' of Consett's customers, but gave no direct 
evidence beyond detailing four anonymous interviews. I t 
concluded that a l l Consett's transfer customers within BSC had 
lower rejection rates from Consett supplies as compared to any 
other BSC source (p. 18) and that 'very few' of Consett's private 
customers were indifferent to the closure decision (p. 19). 
'No Case' went on to outline an alternative future for the 
Consett Works. In the short-term i t argued that Consett should 
be loaded preferentially to other plants producing similar 
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products, by virtue of the works' productivity outlined e a r l i e r 
i n the brochure. In the medium term, i t argued a more 
contentious point. Frcm the premise that steel production by the 
e l e c t r i c arc route was l i k e l y to become increasingly unprofitable 
as the real cost of e l e c t r i c i t y increased, the report maintained 
that Consett was ideally suited to produce steels of special 
quality previously produced in el e c t r i c arc furnaces. In t h i s 
role, the report suggested Consett had two particular advantages 
over other works; r e l a t i v e l y small B.O.S. vessels (p. 35) and 
the a b i l i t y to produce special quality steel by the Basic Oxygen 
route. The report concluded 
'Therefore the medium-term aim of the alternative strategy for 
Consett is to move production up-market drawing on the large 
reservoir of s k i l l s and experience mistakenly ignored by the 
Corporation.' 
(p. 36) 
In an appendix, the report f i n a l l y approached the problem of 
over-capacity. Significantly, however, rather than question the 
need to cut capacity in i t s own r i g h t , the report questioned this 
need by contesting BSC's previous forecasting record, and putting 
forward an alternative forecast of world demand. Such claims 
could easily be undermined by BSC on their own terms. 
The limitations of the l i n e of argument advanced i n 'No Case' 
became apparent in the BSC reply, dated 6 August and presented at 
a meeting of the Consett Campaign, BSC and the national Steel 
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Committee on 12 August. In four significant areas, the BSC 
Report was able to deny, confound or simply refuse to recognise 
the case against closure in terms which did not r i s k raising 
potentially more important questions, such as why BSC was being 
pressured into reducing over-capacity. 
Thus the Corporation was able to transcend the key argument of 
the union case, that of improved productivity at the works, by 
asserting once again that the closure was necessary to reduce 
over-capac i t y . 
'The Corporation does not contest the improved production 
performances of the Consett Works recorded in the Trade Union 
brochure ... the decision to close Consett does not stem from 
any inadequacy in i t s operating performance but is necessary 
despite improved productivity and financial results because 
the b i l l e t order book has f a l l e n to a level below which the 
load on Consett can sustain the improved results.' 
(para. 7.3) 
This claim, backed up by an assertion that Consett's productivity 
compared unfavourably with Normanby Park, a similar b i l l e t 
producer, e f f e c t i v e l y negated the union case for preferential 
loading of Consett to reduce import penetration. 
The second element of the case against closure, an assertion of 
high-quality production at Consett, leading to low customer 
rejection rates, could be denied f l a t l y by BSC. The Corporation 
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claimed to have approached the same customers as the ' independent 
survey' and to have found a markedly different response. 
Consequently, i t claimed 
'In the absence of any positive substantiation of such serious 
allegation the Corporation must entertain doubts about the 
ob j e c t i v i t y of the independent survey.' 
(para. 8.8) 
Much the same approach was taken to the th i r d element of the 
case, the claim that Consett was suited to the production of 
special steels by the BOS route. Pointing out that in 1979 
energy costs did increase for e l e c t r i c arc production, but that 
t h i s increase was offset by a decrease in the price of scrap, and 
asserting that Consett did not possess 'a unique reservoir of 
s k i l l s and experience' BSC denied that the medium-term aim of the 
alternative strategy was a feasible proposition. 
Finally, the BSC reply to the trade union c r i t i c i s m of BSC 
forecasts took the same l i n e , arguing once again on technical 
grounds. Thus the reply rejected the alternative forecasts of an 
upturn in the world demand, describing them as 'essentially 
speculative' (para. 6.1.2) and concluding that 
' in the absence of any alternative, reasoned forecasts from 
the trade unions, or any other source, the Corporation must 
abide by i t s present forecasts.' 
(para. 6.3) 
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Thus, throughout the campaign, there was a noticeable failure t o 
identify the key issues. By concentrating on p r o f i t a b i l i t y at 
the works level, the campaign did not properly address BSC's 
second legitimating principle, corporate over-capacity. Even 
where the issue of capacity was considered, as in the cr i t i c i s m 
of BSC forecasts of world steel demand, the campaign failed to 
transcend t h i s issue to question the key point, the motive or 
reason for capacity cuts. 
This concern with the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of Gonsett's steelworks took 
a further twist i n the f i n a l bizarre episode, simultaneously 
tragedy and farce, of the campaign to save the works. On 2 
September i t was reported that a consortium headed by Mr. John 
O'Keefe (managing director of Chard Hennessy, a Gateshead 
engineering firm) aided by Mr. J. Carney (formerly of the "Save 
Consett" Union Committee and who, i t was announced, was to become 
Derwentside D i s t r i c t ' s f i r s t Industrial Development Officer i n 
October) and Mr. C. Logan (of Logica, a computer consultancy 
company) wanted to take over Consett steelworks. The consortium 
was reportedly named the Northern Industrial Group (borrowing the 
name, accidentally or deliberately, of an earl i e r grouping of 
c a p i t a l i s t interests in the North East : see Carney and Hudson, 
1978) and "exploratory talks" were held between Carney, Logan and 
Department of Industry o f f i c i a l s i n London, (Financial Times, 
2.9.1980) although considerable mystery surrounded the identit y 
of the consortium members : "the search continued yesterday for 
the members of the elusive consortium" (Newcastle Journal, 
2.9.1980). 
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Seemingly no approach was made t o BSC, however, and BSC announced 
that unless a firm approach was made by 12 September, the 
furnaces at Consett would be allowed to die down (Newcastle 
Journal, 11.9.1980). Watkins, Consett's M.P., c r i t i c i s e d the 
consortium for f a i l i n g to identify i t s members, adding "Frankly, 
I w i l l believe i n the consortium when I see the colour of the i r 
money". With no response forthcoming from the consortium, which 
remained as elusive as ever, the last batch of steel was produced 
at Consett on 12 September and i t was just a few days before the 
blast furnaces would cool to the point where, to a l l intents and 
purposes, they could never be re-used. 
Four days l a t e r , the f i r s t details of the consortium and i t s 
plans became public ( i n the Newcastle Journal, 16.9.1980). I t 
allegedly consisted of ten (un-named) B r i t i s h businessmen, with 
£70 m i l l i o n available; nevertheless, they planned to buy Consett 
steelworks f o r £3 m i l l i o n (BSC were asking for £100 m i l l i o n ) , 
restoring i t as a private steelworks with a reduced workforce of 
2,700, Western Europe's highest productivity rate of 320 
tonnes/man/year, and a forecast f i r s t year p r o f i t of £20 m i l l i o n . 
Further details were released two days later at a press 
conference in London (Newcastle Journal, 18.9.1980), where i t was 
revealed that the consortium had eleven (un~named) members with a 
combined annual turnover of £700 m i l l i o n ; the offer price for 
Consett had declined to £1.5 m i l l i o n , however. Further 
signif i c a n t information became available the next day (Financial 
Tines, 19.9.1980), in particular, that the consortium members had 
not committed themselves to putting cash into the business and 
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the significance of the £1.5 m i l l i o n latest offer was that t h i s 
sum was what Logan was able "to lay his hands on", and that 
OfKeefe was described as someone "who runs a scrap business in 
Gateshead". BSC then "handed a tough l i s t of conditions of sale 
to the consortium of north east businessmen hoping to r e v i t a l i s e 
Consett" not least because "BSC i s believed to be privately cool 
towards the takeover bid which, i f successful, could make the 
corporation look inept and lose them business" (Northern Echo, 
20.9.1980). These developments taken together considerably 
further diminished the already low level of c r e d i b i l i t y in the 
consortium as the saviour of Consett steelworks. 
Whatever residual c r e d i b i l i t y the consortium had disappeared the 
next day when i t was revealed t h t i t simply did not exist (Sunday 
Times, 21.9.1980). On the following day BSC turned o f f the gas 
supply to the coke ovens and l e t the furnaces begin to cool and a 
day l a t e r i t was stated that "Any remaining hopes of a private 
takeover of Gonsett steelworks were shattered last night. The 
businessmen said to be interested i n buying the works met for 
four hours and later issued a tersely worded statement severing 
th e i r interests in the plant. A spokesman for the group, ISTC 
o f f i c i a l Keith B i l l , blamed B r i t i s h Steel for the f a i l u r e of the 
takeover bid. Their decision to blow out the plant blast 
furnaces and coke ovens had l e f t ' i n s u f f i c i e nt time' to follow 
through i t s plans ... The names of the companies which made up 
Northern Industrial Group (Holdings) would never be revealed he 
added" (Newcastle Journal, 25.9.1980). 
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In fact, the names were to be revealed a few days la t e r (Sunday 
Times, 28,9.1980) and i t appeared that only two of the companies 
named, Cronite Alloys and B r i t i s h Benzol Carbonising (with a 
combined turnover of £20 million) had showed any serious 
interest, O'Keefe's own company, Chard Hennessy, was revealed to 
have made pre-tax p r o f i t s of less than £3,000 in 1977 and 1978 
and i t s subsidiary, Potts and Sons, losses of over £50,000. More 
revealing s t i l l perhaps, given his prospective role as Chairman 
of the Northern Industrial Group (Holdings) consortium was 
O'Keefe's revelation that "I'm not re a l l y good at running 
companies. That sounds stupid, but I tend to get involved in the 
start of things and leave them to run themselves. I f they don't 
do very well, I close them." 
Even in the f i n a l bizarre act of the campaign, then, the reported 
attempts to s e l l the works to private capital were in the hope of 
maintaining the Cbnsett works yet immediately placing i t into 
competition with other works as (supposedly) the most profitable 
steel plant in the country. At the same time, an anti-closure 
argument on p r o f i t a b i l i t y terms isolated the campaign from 
broader support either within the North East or from workers at 
other plants within BSC. By reinforcing and replicating the 
claim for decisions to be made only within the context of one 
plant, the campaign fai l e d to consider the broader issues in a 
fashion which would have invited support from other sources than 
just steel workers at Consett. 
This active isolation from other works was most apparent with 
regard to the large BSC complex at South Teesside. A new blast 
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furnace commissioned there during 1979 had already featured in 
the campaign at Corby. As part of an attempt to go beyond local 
issues there and consider the broader BSC strategy, documents had 
been prepared which suggested the new furnace at Redcar should 
not be cannissioned, to avoid creating further over-capacity i n 
the industry. This l i n e of argument was deleted on the 
insistence of the national steel unions (Baker, 1982, 52), 
graphically revealing their stance at the time. The Consett 
campaign too touched upon the relationship with the South 
Teesside works. The claim that the Consett Vforks could usefully 
f i l l a support role for the rest of the Teesside Division of BSC 
was made f i r s t in an appendix to fNo Case1. This pointed out 
that frcm October 1979 the entire Division was dependent upon the 
giant no. 1 Redcar blast furnace, and emphasised the 
vulnerability of the Division i f the blast furnace should suffer 
a major breakdown. I t also pointed out that, c r u c i a l l y , after a 
certain operating period, the furnace would need to be taken out 
of action to be re-lined. I t c r i t i c i s e d BSC's two options for 
alternative supplies of hot iron on Teesside; re-building the 
Clay Lane blast furnaces, or building another large furnace, 
Redcar no. 2. The appendix concluded that 
'The light-up of the Redcar blast furnace in October 1979 
immediately posed major questions concerning the security of 
a l l the employment i n the Teesside Division outside of 
Consett.' 
('No Case', p. 39) 
In the appraisal of 'No Case', the BSC found this argument one of 
the most d i f f i c u l t to respond to. They argued that recent 
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evidence from Japan suggested a shorter re-line period than the 
nine months quoted in 'No Case' down to perhaps as l i t t l e as 
three months. However, they were unable to deny the danger of a 
major breakdown, and could only j u s t i f y the alternative of re-
building Clay Lane or erecting a second large furnace on the 
basis of their cost being less than the cost attached to 
maintaining Consett. 
Of course in the short-term, employment could only be secured for 
at least some of the workforce on South Teesside by the 
commissioning of the Redcar blast furnace. The long-term problem 
posed by having a unique configuration of only one blast furnace 
s t i l l remains as a serious threat to the entire complex (Hudson 
and Sadler, 1984). As a further factor in this limited 
consideration of the significance of massive investment on South 
Teesside, national union involvement at Consett was minimal. I t 
is certainly the case that there was surprisingly l i t t l e direct 
involvement on the part of the Steel Committee at Consett. The 
brochure 'No Case' was prepared by the local campaign 
organisation i n Consett with the assistance of a £6000 grant from 
Derwentside D i s t r i c t Council. Material held by the ISTC which 
might have been useful to the case, in particular material on 
molten iron production costs, was not employed. The f i r s t 
o f f i c i a l contact between the Steel Committee and local organisers 
was not u n t i l a meeting in Newcastle on June 24th. The effects 
of t h i s limited involvement can be summarised as one factor i n 
the f a i l u r e to develop a common cause across BSC works, and must 
be considered p a r t i a l l y responsible for the development of a 
campaign against closure concentrating on local issues, 
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noticeably productivity, at the expense of national issues such 
as corporate strategy and the reasons behind that strategy, 
Consett was one of the last major closures (to date) of an 
integrated iron and steel plant by BSC. Continuing pressure on 
the Corporation to further reduce capacity exerted by the 
Conservative Government through t i g h t external financing l i m i t s , 
has since led to speculation about i t s future strategy. In the 
following section we go on to consider the nature of a campaign 
to save the BSC works at Ravenscraig from closure, a campaign 
radically d i f f e r e n t from Consett in both nature and results. 
V.5 Ravenscraigs a p o l i t i c a l reprieve 
Throughout August and September 1982 there was a spate of 
announcements of job losses at BSC, with continuing speculation 
over the future v i a b i l i t y of the so-called 'big-five 1 integrated 
plants of Ravenscraig, Teesside, Scunthorpe, Port Talbot and 
Llanwern. Moreover BSC's trading position had deteriorated 
sharply from the point where in March 1982 i t was losing only 
£0.5m a week to losses of £8.0 m per week in July and £7.2 m a 
week during August (Smday Times, 10 October 1982). This 
speculation was fuelled by an opinion p o l l carried out i n 
September by the Opinion Research Centre for BSC, which asked of 
a sample of steelworkers ' i f BSC did decide i t had to close one 
of the big centres, would you be inclined to accept i t as tragic 
but necessary, or would you be in favour of fighting the 
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management by st r i k i n g ? 1 (Guardian, 3 September 1982), Of the 
fi v e integrated works, i t was believed from the earliest stages 
that Ravenscraig and Teesside were most at ri s k . B i l l Sirs, 
leader of the ISTC, expressed concern over just such a 
p o s s i b i l i t y in an a r t i c l e written for a national newspaper: 
'Just recently, he (BSC Chairman Ian MacGregor) called a press 
briefing to t e l l selected "friendly" journalists (without a word 
to steelworkers) that part of Ravenscraig and Teesside might be 
closed, and that the 14.4m tonne "Alamein l i n e " might have to go' 
(Guardian, 4 October 1982). 
In t h i s context of widespread uncertainty over the future for 
BSC, the main steel unions f i n a l l y took action i n October. On 4 
October the TUC Steel Industry Consultative Committee (TUCSICC) 
met Industry Secretary Patrick Jenkin and, on the following day, 
BSC Chairman Ian MacGregor. The next day a national conference 
of steel union delegates met in Sheffield. This agreed to a 24-
hour national s t r i k e , held on the 22nd of the same month, and to 
the breaking-off of a l l redundancy negotiations with BSC. In 
November the ISTC broadened the scope of union action, 
unsuccessfully picketing Immingham in an attempt to stop two 
ships unloading steel and la t e r suggesting to Patrick Jenkin the 
creation of a central buying agency as part of a policy to l i m i t 
the import of steel. Speculation over the future of the f i v e 
integrated works continued u n t i l 20 December when a three-year 
reprieve was announced by Patrick Jenkin: 
'The Government believe that i t would be wrong to take 
irrevocable decisions on future steel capacity at a time 
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of such major uncertainty, I am therefore asking BSC to 
prepare i t s plan for the next three years on the basis 
that steel making w i l l continue at a l l five major integrated 
sites ... t h i s does not imply that BSC w i l l be required to 
maintain manned capacity at the current level of 14.4m 
tonnes, nor that a l l the f a c i l i t i e s within each of the five 
major integrated sites w i l l necessarily remain in operation. 1 
(Hansard, 20 December 1982, col. 673) 
Behind this simple announcement, however, l i e s the ( i f only 
temporarily) successful conclusion of a campaign against the 
closure of the Ravenscraig works which saw unparalleled p o l i t i c a l 
party and interest group co-operation in Scotland. In early 
September 1982 the Strathclyde Steel Industry Group was recalled. 
This organisation, led by Strathclyde Regional Council and 
including D i s t r i c t Councils, trade unions and the Scottish TUC, 
had been formed early in the l i f e of the Regional Council and had 
previously made a number of representations to Government and 
BSC. To this meeting were also invited a number of local MP's 
and MEP's with steel industry constituencies. 
I h i s f i r s t meeting agreed a course of action with four points. 
F i r s t l y , an early meeting was to be sought with the Secretary of 
State for Scotland. Secondly, Strathclyde Regional Council was 
to co-ordinate the preparation of relevant material and 
p u b l i c i t y . Thirdly, the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs was 
to be asked to prepare a report on the Scottish steel industry. 
Finally, the Group was to be expanded to include the CBI, Chamber 
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of Commerce, a l l Scottish MP's and MEP's, and Regional Councils 
in central Scotland. The larger grouping became known as the 
Standing Committee for the Defence of the Scottish Steel 
Industry. 
Support for the campaign from within the labour movement was 
evident during October. On 7 October representatives of coal, 
r a i l and steel workers in Scotland met in Edinburgh to discuss 
proposals for a common campaign. On 26 October 1000 workers from 
the three industries demonstrated in London against any proposed 
closure. Further, in mid-October Strathclyde Regional Council 
released the results of an impact study which focused on the 
broader significance of the steel industry to the Scottish 
economy. 
EXiring November the Scottish Select Committee heard or received 
evidence from a number of bodies as part of i t s investigation 
into the steel industry in Scotland. I t s report was published on 
1 December (Scottish Affairs Committee, 1982). Four aspects of 
t h i s report are of particular significance. In the f i r s t place 
i t examined the linkage of other industries to the steel industry 
in Scotland. In particular, the output of the Polkemmet Colliery 
in West Lothian i s dedicated completely t o Ravenscraig - i t has 
no other outl e t . At the same time, BSC plants in Scotland were 
held to account for 5% of the output of the South of Scotland 
E l e c t r i c i t y Generating Board. Ravenscraig alone accounted for 4% 
of the t o t a l gas sold by B r i t i s h Gas i n Scotland and for one 
t h i r d of the freight revenue earned in Scotland by B r i t i s h Rail. 
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The report went on to quantify the employment implications of 
these linkages to other industries. Using the earlier figures of 
Strathclyde Regional Council i t suggested that closure of 
Ravenscraig would result in the loss of 6000 jobs there and at 
the other local BSC plants of Hunterston and Gartcosh; 5000 jobs 
i n those companies d i r e c t l y supplying BSC with goods and 
services; and 2600 from the multipli e r effect of reduced local 
income. This t o t a l of 13,600 represented 1.5% of t o t a l 
employment in the region and would increase unemployment rates by 
7%. 
Additionally, the report quoted the view of the Scottish 
Development Agency, that closure of Ravenscraig could result in 
the loss of the steel price basing point of Glasgow Central, and 
commented that 'a note supplied to us by BSC indicates that there 
i s substance in this anxiety' (para. 26). I t was suggested that 
the effect of this would be to increase the price to Scottish 
customers of BSC products by 3-7% depending upon the product. 
Finally, the report recommended in the strongest terms that the 
works should not be closed: 'we have no doubt ... that a further 
major rundown of the steel industry ... would be a disaster for 
Scotland - in in d u s t r i a l , economic and social terms. The iron 
and steel industry i s the centre of the country's industrial 
history and traditions. Large sections of the Scottish-based 
engineering and metal-using industries have already disappeared 
... over the la s t few years, and the process cannot be allowed to 
continue without there being a grave threat to the industrial and 
social structure of Scotland' (para. 37). This even extended to 
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a recognition of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the p a r t i a l closure of the 
works: 'Partial closure of Ravenscraig in response to the 
present f a l l i n demand is a course fraught with p e r i l for the 
long-term future of the complex and therefore of the whole 
Scottish steel industry.' (para. 30). 
The nature and extent of opposition to any proposal to close 
Ravenscraig is of special significance; for i n October 1982 Ian 
MacGregor was obliged, largely by the anti-closure campaign's 
p o l i t i c a l pressure, to inform Patrick Jenkin that any decision 
concerning the fi v e integrated sites would have to be taken by 
the Government. Mr. Jenkin informed the House of Commons on 22 
October: 
'No decision on the closure of a major steelworks would be 
taken by BSC without close consultation and without the 
agreement of Government ... I am not going to shuffle o f f 
responsibilities for t h i s on to Mr. MacGregor's shoulders'. 
(Hansard, 22 October 1982) 
The extent to which the decision not to close Ravenscraig was a 
p o l i t i c a l one, and the way i n which the anti-closure campaign 
forced i t openly to be seen as a p o l i t i c a l issue, was emphasised 
in a subsequent report from the Industry and Trade Committee: 
'In the l i g h t of what we were told about prospects for demand 
and despite the Secretary of State's (Patrick Jenkin) 
argument that there was "great d i f f i c u l t y i n being able to 
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make any confident forecast ...", we take the view that his 
decision to retain the fi v e sites was essentially a p o l i t i c a l 
rather than economic decision 1, (para. 12, Industry and Trade 
Ccnmittee, 1983). 
The same report also c l a r i f i e d that the Ravenscraig complex was 
indeed the most at r i s k , by demonstrating that the £l00m per 
annum savings to BSC that would result from closing Ravenscraig 
was the greatest saving of a l l options under consideration 
(paras. 219, 225). 
The report also went on to emphasise the temporary nature of the 
reprieve granted to a l l five major works; for example in his 
evidence on 26 January 1983 Patrick Jenkin declared: 
'Vfe are not assuming that they w i l l maintain a l l the existing 
plants at the fi v e major sites ... The only decision we 
asked the Corporation to accept from us as the basis for 
their planning was that they should not cease steel-making 
at any one of these five integrated s i t e s . 1 
(para. 188) 
In other words there was a continuing p o s s i b i l i t y that r o l l i n g 
and finishing plant could be closed at any of the five sites: or 
that iron and steel making capacity could be reduced so long as 
i t was not cut to zero. Moreover the stipulation only guaranteed 
steel production at a l l five sites for a period of three years. 
Hence B i l l Sirs, Chairman of the ISTC, was correct in referring 
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to the decision of 20 December 1982 as a 'temporary reprieve 1 
(para. 159); a point made by Patrick Jenkin: 
'However, I must stress one point. The decisions that I have 
announced today do not mean that any particular works or 
plant i s safe. That must depend cm future markets and on 
plants being operated to the highest efficiency.' 
(Hansard, 20 December 1982, col. 673) 
The fact remains, however, that future decisions do not have to 
depend on 'future markets' and plant efficiency; this was not 
the basis for the decision of 20 December and there is no reason 
why the circumstances leading up to that decision cannot be 
repeated in the context of a dif f e r e n t time or, indeed, place. 
A number of important lessons can therefore be drawn out frcm the 
experiences of Ravenscraig. In the f i r s t place, the campaign was 
largely co-ordinated by Strathclyde Regional Council but drew 
upon an extremely broad base of support which cut across normal 
interest groupings. Largely as a consequence, the closure 
proposal was seen to be p o l i t i c a l l y unacceptable (despite 
attempts to j u s t i f y continued operation on the economic grounds 
of the uncertainty of demand forecasts - that had never 
previously been regarded as problematic by BSC). In this way the 
aims and objectives of nationalised industries were the object of 
p o l i t i c a l debate i n a way rarely evident during the preceding 
three years of steel industry run-down and cutbacks. 
These lessens could well be of continued immediate relevance. 
For although the Corporation achieved i t s best operating results 
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during 1983/84 in financial terms since 1976/77, i t continually 
re-affirmed i t s desire to introduce further cutbacks in r o l l i n g 
capacity, in particular at the s t r i p m i l l s of Ravenscraig, Port 
Talbot and Llanwern. To this end negotiations took place with 
United States Steel during 1983 over a proposal to ship semi-
finished slabs from Ravenscraig for r o l l i n g in the States, 
entailing possible closure of the Ravenscraig s t r i p m i l l . These 
negotiations ultimately were unsuccessful. During March 1984 the 
Chief Executive, Bob Scholey, gave evidence to the House of 
Commons Trade and Industry Committee that BSC could not see 
s u f f i c i e n t demand for more than two U.K. s t r i p m i l l s . The 
Committee recommended, however, that 'now is not the time to 
close a s t r i p m i l l 1 (para 33, Trade and Industry Committee, 
1984). BSC Chairman Robert Haslam indicated discontent with this 
recommendation in his review contained in the annual report for 
1983/84; 'The report and recommendations of the Committee, when 
published, were disappointing. ... The importance of the 
Corporation's evidence on key points, including the question of 
future capacity ... went largely unrecognised' (BSC Annual 
Report, 1983/84, p. 5). 
Moreover after March 1984 the Corporation's performance was 
adversely affected by the coal industry dispute. On 26 March, 
for example, production of l i q u i d steel at Scunthorpe was cut by 
half because of a coal shortage, down to around 30 000 tonnes per 
week; by the end of A p r i l i t was down to 20 000 tonnes, the 
lowest level possible before a shutdown of steelmaking. During 
th i s period the South Teesside works produced record tonnages of 
crude steel, as i t s r e l a t i v e l y secure access to imported coal 
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enabled i t t o make up at least part of the d e f i c i t on 
Scunthorpe's los t production; during the last week in March, for 
example, the Lackenby steel plant produced 70 000 tonnes for the 
f i r s t time in i t s history. In late A p r i l the Ravenscraig plant 
was also affected when coal supplies were cut frcm two trainloads 
a day to just one; within a week BSC responded by bringing in 
additional supplies of coal by road. At the same time, despite a 
20% cut in steel production, the Llanwern plant ran seriously low 
on coal supplies and received an emergency delivery of four 
trainloads of coke. The deteriorating situation with regard to 
coal supplies led BSC Chairman Robert Haslam to warn ' I f steel 
plants have to be closed because of the s t r i k e , perhaps some 
might never re-open' (quoted i n Financial Tines, 10 May 1984). 
Even by late May production at Scunthorpe was s t i l l in the 20 000 
- 25 000 tonnes per week range, with just two of the four blast 
furnaces i n operation; throughout this period Teesside was 
r e l a t i v e l y unaffected, although on 1 June the works director 
agreed to cut production by 10% after pressure from the dockers' 
union. During June BSC relied upon convoys of l o r r i e s to 
maintain at least some coal supplies to Llanwern, Ravenscraig and 
Scunthorpe; and indeed ore supplies after the t r a i n drivers' 
union blocked delivery of ore shipments to Ravenscraig after 28 
June. This l a t t e r works became part of a broader development; 
for following the refusal of t r a i n drivers to cross an NUM picket 
li n e at the BSC terminal f o r Scunthorpe at Immingham, local 
dockers claimed BSC used contractors to load iron ore l o r r i e s in 
breach of the National Dock Labour Scheme and walked out; the 
following day, 10 July, a national dock st r i k e began over the 
issue. The national dock strike was resolved within a for t n i g h t 
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but ore supplies at Immingham suffered continued disruption, 
although stocks at Scunthorpe were thought to be suffi c i e n t to 
last u n t i l September. By the end of July, after a month of 
concerted e f f o r t by the miners to blockade the steel plants, 
Ravenscraig and Llanwern remained dependent on lorries for the 
supply of ore and coal, whilst Port Talbot and Teesside continued 
to enjoy f u l l benefit of their deepwater harbours. The scale of 
the supply operation, along with continued increased output from 
Teesside, was such that BSC had restored production to pre-strike 
levels of around 200 000 tonnes per week; the bulk of this from 
Port Talbot and Teesside, along with 50 000 tonnes from 
Scunthorpe, 35 000 tonnes from Llanwern and limited output from 
Ravenscraig due to the annual holiday. 
The significance of the coal dispute for BSCfs operations should 
not be under-estimated. In the f i r s t place, weekly losses at BSC 
had risen to £8m during July of which £5m was attributable to the 
coal supply problems (Financial Tines, 7 July 1984). Secondly, 
the uncertainty generated by the situation necessitated a delay 
in the preparation of BSC's latest Corporate Plan, for the 
Corporation was unlikely to take decisions regarding major plant, 
especially closure decisions, in the context of possible enforced 
closure of other plants. Accordingly, BSC submitted to the 
Government in June a discussion paper on i t s future objectives, 
which comprised a statement of options without specifying i t s 
preferred course of action (Financial Times, 19 June 1984). 
Finally, statements by the Corporation Chairman that plants 
closed as a result of the str i k e might never re-open (quoted 
above) amplify the p o s s i b i l i t y of further wholesale closures 
within BSC under any future Corporate Plan (see also Hudson and 
Sadler, 1984). 
V.6 Conclusions 
The differences between the anti-closure campaigns at Consett and 
at Ravenscraig are neatly encapsulated in their divergent 
outcomes - the loss of a l l 3700 steel jobs at Consett and the 
continued existence of the Ravenscraig works as an integrated 
steel producer. Ultimately the Save Consett Campaign was 
divorced from broader support either within the North East of 
England or from other steelworks due in large part to the choice 
of grounds on which the campaign was fought, in turn a reflection 
of the limited commitment and a b i l i t y of the national steel 
unions and the labour movement i n general to influence policy 
formation. The campaign on the grounds of p r o f i t a b i l i t y , whilst 
perhaps the lowest common denominator upon which the local 
organisers could agree, actually served to place Consett people 
into apparent competition with other steel communities. The 
f i n a l episode at Consett, a projected take-over by private 
ca p i t a l , had thi s as an e x p l i c i t aim. By contrast the 
Ravenscraig campaign focused on broader social issues, i n 
particular the degree of linkage between steel and other 
industries i n Scotland, thereby actively encouraging broader 
support within the region. P r o f i t a b i l i t y was not an issue, 
for e s t a l l i n g l i k e l y active opposition from workers at other steel 
plants in pursuit of their own short-term interests. At the same 
time the degree of support f o r Ravenscraig, drawing on and 
reinforcing a reservoir of longer-term Scottish identity, forced 
the BSC decision to be seen as a purely p o l i t i c a l rather than 
narrowly economic one. As part of the complex series of checks 
and balances within the B r i t i s h state, i n particular the 
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perceived need to maintain a degree of support from a l l regions, 
closure of Ravenscraig was seen to be p o l i t i c a l l y unacceptable by 
Government. 
Conceived as i t is as a reprieve on narrowly p o l i t i c a l grounds, 
though, the Ravenscraig issue is by no means closed. Hence a 
consideration of the long-term indications for B r i t i s h state and 
society of these two campaigns is of interest. Whilst the steel 
industry has h i s t o r i c a l l y featured strongly in the conflicting 
aims of capital and labour, the attitude of organised labour to 
the industry has been par t i c u l a r l y accommodative. 
Nationalisation in 1967 went through on terms extremely 
attractive to private capital whilst as part of the Conservative 
Government's strategy after 1979 the steel industry has been the 
target for massive job loss and cutbacks in the public sector 
with the intention of creating investment space for private 
capital. Yet although trades unions argued in the f i r s t instance 
for nationalisation of the industry to safeguard employment, 
recognition of the fact that the two are not inevitably and 
causally linked has come, i f at a l l , only belatedly. Campaigns 
fought with regard to the defence of particular places can only 
be short-term a f f a i r s in the context of a specific set of 
circumstances, which might or might not be favourable. Even with 
regard just to these places, long-term issues were not considered 
u n t i l too late - for example, the uncertainty over Consett since 
at least the early 1960*s and the a b i l i t y of Consett Iron Company 
to resist the introduction of competition for male labour within 
that area. Nationally, too, underlying relations continue to beg 
questions of labour, with regard to the strategy for B r i t i s h 
steel generally and the role within that of the public sector. 
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Of course, steel is by no means unique in these broader issues. 
The accommodative nature of trades unions generally (with the 
notable recent exception of the National Union of Mineworkers) 
has led to acceptance of Government direction of nationalised 
industries with regard to 'market forces' rather than social 
considerations, whilst the Labour Party has found i t s e l f since 
1979 increasingly marginal to policy formation within the B r i t i s h 
state. Within t h i s context campaigns in defence of jobs and 
communities were from the outset weakened by the absence of any 
long-term counter-proposals. Their occurrence as described here, 
at particular places, was under these conditions a corollary of 
broader social developments, reinforcing social division through 
particular places. Whether this is a necessary or contingent 
condition of t h i s phase of c a p i t a l i s t development can be 
considered with regard to other countries, especially France. 
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Table V»l P r o f i t a b i l i t y and investment i n the s t e e l 
industry, 1958 - 70 
Ratio of p r o f i t s after Investment in the whole U.K. 
depreciation to capital iron and steel industry at 
2 
employed in 14 major 1972 prices 
companies1 % £m 
1958 17.3 ND 
1959 15.7 ND 
1960 18.8 276 
1961 12.4 370 
1962 6.6 299 
1963 4.8 171 
1964 7.3 137 
1965 6.7 123 
1966 3.8 115 
1967 1.9 128 
1968 ND 119 
1969 ND 125 
1970 ND 178 
Sources: BSC Annual Report, 196 7-8. 
2 
BSC Ten Year Development Strategy, Cmnd 
5226, 1973. 
ND : No data 
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Table V»2 B r i t i s h S t e e l Corporation ; key i n d i c a t o r s . 
1967-84 
Capital No. of U.K. 
Turnover P r o f i t Liquid Steel expenditure employees 
ElOOOra Uoss) m.tonnes £m net of x 1000, 
£m3 grants year-end 
67-68 1.1 (22) 22.9 N.D. 254.0 
68-69 1.2 (23) 24.2 N.D. 254.0 
69-701 0.7 12 12.3 N.D. 255.0 
70-71 1.5 (10) 24.7 N.D. 252.4 
71-72 1.3 (68) 20.4 N.D. 229.7 
72-73 1.5 3 24.2 154 226.6 
73-74 1.8 34 23.0 155 220.4 
74-75 2.3 70 20.8 273 228.3 
75-76 2.4 (268) 17.2 462 210.2 
76-77 3.1 (117) 19.7 494 207.9 
77-78 3.2 (513) 17.4 401 196.9 
78-79 3.3 (357) 17.3 267 186.0 
79-802 3.1 (1784) 14.1 261 166.4 
80-81 3.0 (1020) 11.9 148 120.9 
81-82 3.4 (504) 14.1 164 103.7 
82-83 3.2 (869) 11.7 122 81.1 
83-84 3.4 (256) 13.4 164 71.1 
Source: BSC Annual Reports, 1967-84. 
1 Six-month trading period from October 1969 to March 1970. 
2 
Figures affected by str i k e action, January - March 1980. 
3 
The table has been calculated frcm annual reports for 1967-74 
and the ten-year summary table on p.39 of the 1983-84 report. 
The l a t t e r table has restated p r o f i t (loss) figures for the 
1974-83 period i n a fashion which i s not necessarily 
comparable with the 1967-74 period. 
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Table V.3 BSC'S e x t e r n a l financing l i m i t , 1979-84 
Original l i m i t £m Actual allocation £m 
1979- 80 
1980- 81 
1981- 82 
1982- 83 
1983- 84 
700 
4501 
730 
3653 
325 
579 
1,119 
6942 
569 
318 
later in the year, extended to £1,121m, 
excluding £72m in respect of a j o i n t venture with the private 
sector, A l l i e d Steel and Wire Ltd. 
extended in March 1983 to £575m. 
Source: BSC, Annual Reports, 1979-84 
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Table V.4 P r i v a t i s a t i o n of BSC r 1980-84 
Disposals Joint Ventures 
U.K. Wholly Owned 
1980/81 The Unit Inspection Company 
Limited 
Orkot Engineering Industrial 
Plastics Ltd* 
Teesside Galvanising 
U.K. Partly Owned 
The Bamburgh Shipping 
Company Limited 
John Finlan Limited 
Kiveton Park Steel and Wire 
Works Limited 
Overseas Interests 
Tubemakers of Australia 
Limited 
Pacific Steel Limited 
(New Zealand) 
O s t r i l i o n (Argentina) 
*Management/employee buy-out 
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Disposals Joint Ventures 
U.K. Wholly Owned 
1981/82 Redpath Dorman Long Limited A l l i e d Steel and Wire 
Hamilton Foundry* (Holdings) Ltd. 
(Merger with Guest Keen 
and Nettlefolds pic of 
rod, bar and reinforce-
ment engineering activ-
i t i e s . BSC share 50%) 
U.K. Partly Owned 
Lee Bright Bars Limited 
Overseas Interests 
( a l l South Africa) 
Consolidated Metallurgical 
Industries Ltd 
Dorbyl Limited 
International Pipe & Steel 
Investments South Africa 
(Pty) Limited 
Pipe Couplings (Pty) Limited 
Stewarts & Lloyds of South 
Africa Limited 
*Management/employee buy-out 
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Disposals Joint Ventures 
U.K.Wholly Owned 
1982/83 Port Clarenge and Tbtton 
Works 
Fluorspar Mining 
Scunthorpe Open Cast Ore 
mining 
The Victaulic Company 
Limited* 
(Employees 40%, i n s t i t u t i o n s 
30%, BSC 30%) 
U.K. Partly Owned 
Bitmac Limited 
B r i t f l e x Resin Systems Ltd 
Six Hundred Metal Holdings 
Limited 
Colvilles McKinney Limited 
B r i t i s h Bright Bar 
Limited 
(Merger with GKN and 
Brymill of bright 
drawing and bright 
products stockholding. 
BSC share 40%) 
Sheffield Foregmasters 
(Holdings) pic 
(Merger of River Don 
Works with Johnson, 
Fir t h Brown's Atlas 
works and other activ-
i t i e s . BSC share 50%) 
Overseas Interests 
The Indian Tube Company Ltd. 
*Management/employee buy-out 
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Disposals Joint Ventures 
U.K. Wholly Owned 
1983/84 Coated Electrodes Limited* 
(part only) 
The Unit Superheater and 
Pipe Company Limited* 
U.K. Partly Owned 
Sarclad International Ltd.* 
Samuel Groves & Company Ltd. 
Overseas Interests 
Lisco-Stanton Pipe & 
Foundry Co. Ltd. 
(India) 
AB Dalforsan (Sweden) 
Cold Drawn Tubes Limited 
(Merger with TI of Cold 
Drawn business. BSC 
share 25%) 
Seamless Tubes Limited 
(Merger with TI of Hot 
Finished Small Seamless 
business. BSC share 
74.5%) 
Clyde Shaw Limited 
(Merger with W Shaw Ltd. 
of Craiqneuk foundry. 
BSC share 50%) 
Hadfields (Holdings) Ltd 
(With GKN and Lonrho to 
acquire Hadfields Ltd. 
as part of Phoenix I I 
arrangements. BSC share 
37.5%) 
*Managemen t/employee buy-out 
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Disposals Joint Ventures 
Fixborough Wharf Limited 
(Merger with Faber Prest 
Holdings pic. BSC share 
25%) 
Source: BSC, Annual Report 1983/84, p.13 
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Table V.5 BSC o f f e r s i n the pay dispute, December 
1979-March 1980 
Date National element Local element 
3,12.79 2% 10% maximum 
21.12.79 5% 10% maximum 
28.12.79 6% No upper l i m i t 
7. 1.80 8% 4% minimum, no upper l i m i t 
8. 2.80 9% 4% minimum, no upper l i m i t 
10. 2.80 10% 4% minimum, no upper l i m i t 
10. 3.80 10% 4% minimum, plus concessions 
30. 3.80 11% 4^/2% minimum, no upper l i m i t 
(Source: BSC Submission t o Lever Enquiry. Section 4) 
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Table V»6 Union negotiating groupings i n the period 
October 1979 - March 1980 at meetings with BSC 
ISTC 
25/9, 3/12, 21/12 
NUB 
20/11, 4/12 
NCCC 
29/10, 5/12, 9/1 
GMWU 
29/11, 3/1 
TGWU 
22/11 
ISTC/NUB 
28/12, 8/2 
17/2, 22/2 
NCCC/GMWU 
TGWU 
27/1, 10/2 
Iron and Steel 
Co-Ordinating Lever 
Committee Enquiry 
10/12, 21/3, 29-30/3 
24/3 
Source: Lever Enquiry, 1980 
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Table V.7 Net c a p i t a l expenditure, Consett Iron Co 
Ltd. 1951-67 
£m 
1951 1.69* 
1952 5.02 
1953 3.45 
1954 2.06 
1955 0.45 
1956 0.28 
1957 1.38 
1958 2.67 
1959 1.17* 
1960 7.48 
1961 6.81 
1962 5.23 
1963 3.45 
1964 0.82 
1965 0.78 
1966 0.88 
1967 0.79 
Note: * six month accounting periods 
Source: Consett I r o n Co. Annual Reports, 1951-67 
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Table V.8 Comparative r a t i o s of p r o f i t to c a p i t a l 
employment, using d e f i n i t i o n s adopted by BSC 
Mean for 14 
S. Durham companies 
Consett Iron Dorman Long Steel and Iron nationalised 
% Co. Ltd. (a) (b) (c) in 1967 (d) 
1958 9.1 10.1 23.7 17.3 
1959 4.72 8.6 17.8 15.7 
1960 9.5 11.8 12.8 18.8 
1961 9.8 11.0 6.0 12.4 
1962 -0.1 5.9 0.2 6.6 
1963 -1.9 6.4 1.6 4.8 
1964 1.6 7.0 5,7 7.3 
1965 8.4 5.8 6.9 6.7 
1966 4.9 0.2 4.4 3.8 
1967 0.7 1.9 
Notes The company figures were calculated from annual reports 
using the d e f i n i t i o n adopted in. the BSC Annual Report 
1968, to enable comparison with the table presented 
therein, produced here as column d. P r o f i t was defined 
as gross p r o f i t a fter depreciation but before interest 
and taxation, other than interest on bank over-drafts. 
Capital employed comprises share capital, reserves and 
long-term borrowings, and relates to the start of the 
financial year ( i . e . the end of the previous financial 
year). 
A six-month accounting period, but the p r o f i t figure was 
doubled to calculate a comparable p r o f i t r a t i o s t a t i s t i c . 
Sources: a. Consett Iron Co. Ltd.Annual Reports 1958-67 
b. Dorman Long Annual Reports 1958-67 
c. S.Durham Steel and Iron Annual Reports 1958-67 
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Table V.9 Dividends paid on ordinary shares by North 
Ea s t s t e e l producers, 1958-67 
Consett Iron S. Durham 
% Co, Ltd. Dorman Long Steel and Iron 
1958 83/4 12 12 
1959* 43/8 12 12 
1960 83/4 10 12 
1961 91/2 10 10 
1962 2 -
1963 - 9 5 
1964 - 14 12 
1965 10 14 12 
1966 5 8 8 
1967 _ 
* Six-month accounting period f o r Consett Iron Co. 
Sources: a. Consett Iron Co. Ltd. Annual Reports 1958-67 
b. Dorman Long Annual Reports 1958-67 
c. S. Durham Steel and Iron Annual Reports 1958-67 
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Table V.10 Employment i n i r o n and s t e e l at Consett, 
1972-79 
Iron Templeton Manufacturing 
Steelworks foundry Brickworks Division* Total 
1972 5099 90 351 151 5691 
1973 5136 90 368 140 5734 
1974 5106 95 415 151 5767 
1975 4993 91 427 156 5667 
1976 4766 91 413 139 5409 
1977 4805 91 407 127 5430 
1978 4350 89 208 139 4786 
1979 3643 60 202 138 4043 
*Fran 1978, a division of Redpath Engineering Ltd. 
Source: BSC Quarterly Manpower Statistics: f i n a l quarter, 
employment on 31st December 
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Table V . l l s P r o f i t / l o s s performance, BSC Consett 
i n c l u s i v e of the Jarrow m i l l 
P r o f i t (loss) £m 
1975- 6 
1976- 7 
1977- 8 
1978- 9 
1979- 80 
( 7.3) 
( 4.7) 
(17.2) 
(15.2) 
(10.0) 
Source: from additional information supplied t o TUCSICC (steel 
committee) by Derek Saul (Divisional Director, BSC) dated August 
5th 1980. 
-189 -
Table V»12s P r o f i t / l o s s r BSC Consett excl u s i v e of the 
Jarrow m i l l 
P r o f i t (loss) £ 
September 1979 24 000 
October 1979 110 000 
November 1979 300 000 
Ap r i l 1980 ) (5.1 m) 
May 1980 ) 
June 1980 187,000 
Sources: September-November 1979 Consett Guardian 3.1.80 
April-June 1980 Newcastle Chronicle 16.7.80 
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Footnotes to Chapter V 
^ The only major exception to this general rule is the 
Luxembourg-based company Arbed, which has production f a c i l i t i e s 
operated via subsidiaries in West Germany and Belgium. The 
circumstances, especially the size of Luxembourg, are very 
unusual. 
2 
For the steel industry, a holding agency was established to 
s e l l back shares to private capital. See Ross (1965). 
3 
Bowen (1976) identified three features of the early 
organisation of labour in the iron and steel industry, each of 
which played a significant role in the long-term development of 
the labour movement in the industry: 
( i ) The contract system of labour recruitment, essentially a 
social division of labour in which entrepreneurs 
contracted with middlemen, usually s k i l l e d workers, 
who in turn employed the unskilled labour required. 
( i i ) The method of wage regulation by sliding scales, as 
exemplified by that instituted by David Dale at Consett 
Iron Company in the late 19th century (see Carney and 
Hudson, 1978). Under this arrangement, wages were cut by 
agreement at times of slack demand for steel production. 
( i i i ) The role of arbitr a t i o n and conciliation machinery in the 
settlement of industrial disputes, symbolic of an ideology 
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accepted by both labour and c a p i t a l which propounded a 
harmony of i n t e r e s t s between labour and c a p i t a l in the 
industry. This c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery was exemplified by 
the Board of C o n c i l i a t i o n for the Manufactured Iron Trade 
of the North of England, established in 1869 and s t i l l 
a c t ive in the 1920's. 
4 
BSC did i d e n t i f y three other c r i t e r i a ; but these were either 
very vague or v i r t u a l l y synonymous with labour productivity: 
a. 'Expression of o v e r a l l business success in terms of 
improvement in a predominant physical index ( i n d i c e s ) 1 
b. 'The achievement of s p e c i f i e d improvement milestones in 
circumstances of major change.' 
c. Any a l t e r n a t i v e l o c a l l y acceptable to both management and 
unions. 
This acceptance of the l e v e l of surface appearances by the 
s t e e l unions i s a l s o evident in an argument developed by 
Manwaring (1981) concerning the acceptance of the significance of 
labour productivity. He argues that by accepting that labour 
productivity i s a v i t a l issue for corporate p r o f i t a b i l i t y , debate 
i s s h i f t e d away from the r e l a t i o n s underlying the d e f i n i t i o n of 
the same labour productivity figur e s . In t h i s way the s t e e l 
unions are accepting c r u c i a l areas of management prerogative: 
both the a b i l i t y of management to define the bargaining 
parameters of s i g n i f i c a n c e : and, having defined the parameters, 
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to define the way in which the parameters are to be measured. 
Thus in the f i r s t instance labour productivity is seen as the 
crucial feature of corporate p r o f i t a b i l i t y : despite the highly 
capital-intensive nature of the steel industry (a point made by 
Upham, 1980, 16). I n the second instance, having accepted the 
significance of labour productivity, the unions accept the 
conflation of output sold with output produced per man; whereas 
only the former takes account of factors outside the immediate 
process of production such as marketing, corporate planning or 
state involvement (Manwaring 1981, 84). 
^ See also Hudson and Sadler, 1983a. Hie account of events 
at Consett i s based on local interviews and upon newspaper 
references from the Consett Guardian, Newcastle Journal and 
Newcastle Chronicle. Only where specific quotes are drawn from 
the sources is a f u l l reference given. 
CHAPTER VI 
French s t e e l plans and Lorrainer l o c a l and national 
s t a t e and s o c i e t y 
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VI,1 Introduction 
In contrast to B r i t a i n , works closures in the French steel 
industry have been contested at times on a broad base drawing 
upon support from several regions and from workers other than in 
steel production. This has been both contingent upon and 
condition for considerably increased intervention by the French 
state in the operations of steel producers, leading to de facto 
nationalisation in 1978 and de jure nationalisation in 1981. The 
points of inter-connection between local and regional opposition 
to closure proposals and state intervention within the industry 
are of considerable general significance. 
We therefore commence with an examination of some aspects of 
French state and society before going on to outline the 
significance of national steel plans from 1966 onwards. This 
provides the background necessary to a consideration of the 
current situation of dominance by two large nationalised 
concerns, Sacilor and Usinor, and their recent operating records. 
From th i s general setting i t is possible to d e t a i l the events 
which form one part of these developments within the region of 
Lorraine. These can be characterised as a withdrawal of capacity 
and employment opportunities accompanied by the most pronounced 
and violent opposition to such changes of the three countries 
studied here. This opposition reverberates back both at the 
companies concerned and, through the degree of intervention 
within the state. 
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VI.2 C a p i t a l , labour and the s t a t e : French s t e e l to 
1978 
H i s t o r i c a l l y the steel industry in France, as elsewhere in 
western Europe, has often occupied the p o l i t i c a l centre-stage, 
although in a setting different from that of Britain in the sense 
both of formal attitudes on the part of organised labour and of 
the development of relations between capitals within the 
industry. These differences r e f l e c t the character of French 
state and society (see Birnbaum, 1980; Branciard 1982; Dubois 
et a l , 1978; Machin, 1979), Despite these particular 
differences, however, the international pressures of the 
c a p i t a l i s t system of production have constrained the room f or 
manoeuvre of successive Governments with the contingent result, a 
decade la t e r than i n B r i t a i n , of nationalisation of the steel 
industry. We seek here to consider why this was carried out 
through examination of the relations between capital and labour 
to that date. 
I t i s possible to identif y six nationally-important trade unions 
in France: Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), 
Confederation F§d§rale du Travail (CFDT), Confederation 
Federale du Travail Chretien (CFTC), Confederation 
Generale des Cadres (CGC), Federation de 1 B Education 
Nationale (FEN), and Force Ouvri&re (FO). The CGT has nearly two 
mi l l i o n members and is closely a f f i l i a t e d to the Parti Ooranuniste 
(PC), whereas the CFDT, with roughly half this membership, has a 
policy l i n e similar to that of the Parti Socialiste (PS), but 
prefers to assert i t s independence from a l l p o l i t i c a l parties. 
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The CFTC represents a Christian Democratic version of the CFDT, 
though fierc e l y independent from the l a t t e r , which emerged from 
the CFTC in 1964, The CGC and the FEN are two smaller, more 
specific unions, the former organising executive and middle-
management grades, the l a t t e r teaching and educational s t a f f . 
Finally, the FO represents a p o l i t i c a l line well to the right of 
the CFDT. 
Both the CGT and the CFDT are unusual in western Europe, in being 
the largest national trade unions and, at the same time, 
committed to a revolutionary concept of change in society. Both 
are formally opposed to the system of production as i t stands; 
for example: 
"The CFDT has pronounced i t s e l f for a diffe r e n t type of 
development. Against a society founded on productivity, the 
CFDT wants a more egalitarian type of development, giving 
p r i o r i t y to collective consumption and the satisfaction of 
needs founded on an appropriation of power by the workers and 
the people.' 
(CFDT, 1982, 19 1) 
At the same time the difference in p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n between 
the two has often led to intense r i v a l r y . The CFDT, for example, 
although voting in favour of 'democratic socialism* i n 1979, has 
been determined to remain independent of the PS, whilst 
condemning the extent to which the CCT appears to be guided by 
the PC, Thus, for example, i n 1978 the CGT national o f f i c e r s 
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included amongst their number three members of the policy bureau 
of the PC (CFDT, 1980, 19), a situation which led the CFDT t o 
condemn the 'isolation into which the strategy of the 
international Communist movement is leading them' (CFET, 1980, 
2 
3 ). This d i s t r u s t mirrors a similar situation with regard to 
the PC and the PS. In June 1972 the two parties signed an 
agreement on a common programme, but this broke down in 1977. 
The CGT and the CFDT are united, however, in their distrust of 
the other main unions, which are a l l associated with a 
'reformist' view of societal change. Such feelings are, 
moreover, mutual; for example the FO has been known to refer to 
the CGT as 'demagogic and irresponsible' . 
The character of the two main French trade unions is crucial to 
an understanding of the pattern of development of the steel 
industry within broader post-1945 French society. For to a large 
extent u n t i l the events of 1978-79 the CFET and the CGT were 
peripheral to policy formation by a series of right-wing 
Governments before the election of a Socialist administration in 
1981, even under the more l i b e r a l regime of Giscard d'Estaing 
from 1974-81. Whilst state intervention was nothing new in 
France (Louis XIV nationalised the tobacco industry), there was 
up to 1981 no systematic attempt to increase the scale of public 
ownership. Governments had instead attempted to guide the 
economy through a series of National Plans formulated by 
technocrats within the state apparatus (see Green, 1983). In a 
very real sense trade unions, pa r t i c u l a r l y i n heavy industries 
such as coal and steel, operated within a conception of society 
which displayed, via their programme of revolutionary change, 
important disjunctures with this state apparatus. 
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In t h i s context capital within the industry displayed a classic 
process of centralisation, with a series of mergers between 
producers uninterrupted as in Britain by an early post-war 
nationalisation* By 1978 there were two major French steel 
companies which had evolved from a number of merger agreements in 
the post-1945 period. For example i t is possible to discern four 
stages in the formation of Usinor, the largest French steel 
company. The i n i t i a l company was formed in 1948 by the merger of 
La Soci€te* des Forges et des Acieries da Nord et de l'Rst with 
La Soci€te* Denain-Anzain, to form Union Siderurgique du Nord 
de l a France. At t h i s stage, as the name implies, the company 
was concentrated in the Nord region; indeed, a very feature in 
the merger was the desire to expand capacity for f l a t - r o l l e d 
products, accomplished at Denain in the late 1950,s and IXinkerque 
in the early 1960's - both Nord towns. 
Whilst t h i s investment was taking place, further mergers were 
occurring in the Lorraine industry which were la t e r to have 
significance for Usinor. In 1953 the three companies of 
Soci§t§ des Acieries de Longwy (founded 1880), MStallargie de 
Senelle-Maubeuge (1888) and Socie*te" Escaut-Meuse combined to 
form Lorraine-Escaut. This group operated three integrated works 
at Senelle and Mont-St.-Martin (both i n the Longwy basin) and 
Thionville. 
In 1966 the company of Usinor t r u l y ceased to be bound to the 
Nord region of France, when i t merged with the company Lorraine-
Escaut. Symbolic of t h i s broadening of the t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s of 
the company was a change of name, to Union Sid§rurgique da Nord 
et de l'Est de l a France. The broader perspective of the company 
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was apparent in the fourth and f i n a l stage of i t s development, 
the merger with Lorraine-based Chiers-Chatillon in 1978, i t s e l f 
at the time the t h i r d largest French steel producer (see also 
Malezieux, 1980). 
The evolution of the second largest company, Sacilor, i s 
dominated by two features: the over-riding influence of the de 
Wendel group, and an emphasis on investment in Lorraine. To a 
certain extent the two are associated, for the de Wenclel group 
th 
originated i n the Lorraine area in the late 19 century, has 
exercised an enormous influence on the development of the area 
and, as shown below, had a hand in practically a l l the major 
post-war company mergers and common agreements in the region, but 
l i t t l e influence outside i t . 
Thus in 1948 nine Lorraine-based steel companies founded a common 
associate, Soci£t£ Lorraine de Laminage Oontinu, for the 
purpose of producing and selling hot-rolled f l a t products. Two 
years l a t e r , the de Wendel group also took a share in the 
company, perhaps better known by the acronym SOLLAC. In 1964 the 
de Wendel group went into partnership with SidSlor ( i t s e l f 
formed in 1951 by a merger of the Lorraine steel firms Pont-3-
Mousson and Marine-Pirminy) to build and operate a new works at 
Gandrange for the expansion of long product capacity, forming for 
thi s purpose Soci£t£ des Acieries de Lorraine. In 1968 the 
partnership went a stage further when the two companies merged to 
form Wendel-Sideior; the emphasis on Gandrange was again 
apparent i n 1971 when i t was proposed progressively to replace 
several old works of the conpany with the new capacity available 
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after modernisation there. The de Wendel influence was s t i l l 
present, despite the Wendel-Sid$lor group changing i t s name to 
SACIDOR in 1973; for in 1975 agreement was reached to set up a 
holding company, Marine-Wendel, with Marine-Firminy, controlling 
the partners 1 shares i n SOLLAC; not u n t i l 1977 were these shares 
merged with SACILOR, to create the situation where today 90LLAC 
is owned to the extent of 64.3% of i t s capital by SACILOR, and 
4 
the two can be regarded as v i r t u a l l y a single group . 
The process of centralisation was not entirely isolated from 
Government intervention in the industry. Regarded for most of 
the post-war period as a strategic industry, steel was one of the 
six p r i o r i t y sectors of the F i r s t National Plan. EXiring the 
1960's, as part of a broader policy approach to encourage the 
creation of 1 national champions1, steel was singled out in the 
F i f t h National Plan. However, the particular nature of the 
merger process limited i t s effectiveness in achieving these 
goals. Centralisation was achieved by horizontal rather than 
v e r t i c a l integration, leading to larger holding companies rather 
than bigger production units (Green, 1983, 170). 
Partly as a consequence, the state was increasingly involved 
d i r e c t l y in the industry in the period after 1966. In July of 
that year agreement was concluded between the employers1 
association, Chanbre Syndicate de l a Siderurgie Francaise, and 
the state, under which the l a t t e r agreed to make available loans 
of up t o Fr. 2,700 m during the period of the F i f t h National 
Plan, 1966-70. IXiring the early 1970,s this financial assistance 
continued with active assistance i n the construction of two 
modern coastal plants, at Fos and at Dunkerque. 
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Construction at Fos was approved i n 1969, and in 1970 government 
and the second largest French steel company agreed financial 
details, the former providing 31% of the then estimated Fr. 6,000 
m. investment and forming with Wendel-Side*lor a holding company, 
SoLner, to build and operate the plant (Gwynne and Giles, 1980), 
In late 1972, however, Wendel-Sidglor, through i t s subsidiary 
Sollac, appeared unable to continue the project without further 
financial support. The problem was resolved the following year 
when Sollac was joined by the major French steel producer, 
Usinor, in the Solmer project; these two companies took a 47.5% 
share each, whilst the major German steel producer, Tbyssen, took 
a 5% share. At the same time the French government contributed 
an additional Fr. 850 m. in the form of low interest loans on top 
of the Fr. 1,850 m. put forward in 1970 (Bleitrach and Chenu, 
1982, 162-3). During t h i s period also Usinor expanded i t s 
coastal plant at Dunkergue (operational since 1962), increasing 
l i q u i d steel capacity from 3.6 to 8.0 m. tonnes in 1972 and 
adding a new, large capacity blast furnace in 1973 (see Gachelin, 
1980). Crucially, however, these projects came on stream at 
exactly the same time as a drastic f a l l in demand for steel with 
the result that i n 1975 the Fos plant operated at below half 
capacity; by 1978 the output of 2.5 m. tonnes was only 60% of 
capacity, and a planned second phase was postponed soon 
afterwards (Hudson and Lewis, 1982b). Hence in the early 1970's 
the French state played an active role in the development of 
over-capac i t y . 
This over-capacity became increasingly evident throughout the 
1970's. With a developing c r i s i s the companies were forced t o 
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take measures to cut capacity and employment, particularly in the 
i n t e r i o r region of Lorraine and in parts of the Nord. In a 
statement on 21 A p r i l 1977, M. Ferry, then President of the 
Charabre Syndicate de l a Siderurgie Francaise, rationalised a 
series of company announcements in the preceding weeks. The 
essence of the plan was a proposed drop in employment of some 
16,000 (table VI.1). Such measures, however, proved insufficient 
to stem mounting losses. Usinor and Sacilor had accumulated 
losses of Fr. 8,800 m. over the period 1975-77 (tables VI.2, 
VI.3) and the accumulated medium- and long-term debt of the steel 
industry had grown to Fr. 38,000 m. by the st a r t of 1978. With 
losses continuing during 1978 i t appeared that the industry was 
on the verge of bankruptcy. 
The French state reacted to this situation in October 1978 when 
i t set in motion the de facto nationalisation of the industry, 
though denying i t was doing so. By means of a major financial 
restructuring the state took a direct 15% stake in the three main 
steel groups; but in addition to t h i s , i t s holdings via the 
banks and major financial i n s t i t u t i o n s effectively amounted to 
control over some two-thirds of the share capital of the three 
companies. Essentially, the restructuring centred on a scheme to 
convert the companies1 debts to the Government (Fr. 9,000 m.) and 
major banks, both private and state owned (Fr. 9,400 m.) into 
"participatory" loans - that i s , loans on which a nominal 1% 
interest would be paid for f i v e years, in practice converting 
them from debts into assets t o be added to the companies1 
capital. In return for t h i s , three holding companies were set up 
to control the production a c t i v i t i e s of the three groups (though 
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in fact Chiers-Chatillon was merged with Usinor) which to a l l 
intents and purposes were under Government control "\ 
In return for t h i s rescue frcm the verge of bankruptcy, the steel 
companies had to agree to draw up and implement, rapidly, an 
enlarged round of employment reductions and plant closures. In 
anticipation of, and in an attempt to defuse, reaction to these 
cuts, the French Government announced i n September 1978 the 
creation of a special industrial adaptation fund, the FSAI, with 
a budget of Fr. 3,000 m. I t was intended to help create 
alternative employment in areas to be h i t by steel closures; 
from i t , companies could obtain grants of 25% of their investment 
costs plus low interest loans for another 25%. The Government 
claimed that i t would create 12,000 new jobs; unimpressed by 
promises of possible new jobs but certain of job losses, the 
response of the steel unions i n Lorraine was to c a l l a 24-hour 
str i k e on 29 September. Their fears were confirmed in December 
1978 when details of the new closure plans were announced, 
including 24,000 redundancies in Lorraine and the Nord (table 
VI.4). 
VI.3 S t e e l p o l i c i e s and s t e e l regions s i n c e 1978 
For a number of reasons th i s particular threat to steel 
employment i n Lorraine and the Nord was greeted with massive 
protest which ultimately had national implications. Lorraine had 
faced economic decline before, with the rundown of the iron ore 
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mining industry during the 1960's and 1970's. The workforce in 
this sector had fallen to a quarter of i t s 1962 t o t a l of 23,000 
by 1978 with output dropping from 60 to 32 m. tonnes (table VT.5J 
see also Husson and Ibulon, 1968; Martin, 1957), Further, the 
national significance of the region's steel industry had fallen 
from 63% of output and 60% of employment in 1966 to 43% and 47% 
respectively in 1978, as a consequence of the expansion of Fos 
and Dunkerque (tables VT.6, VI . 7 ) . This decline had not 
progressed unopposed within the region; for example mounting 
dissatisfaction with the industry's uncertain future led to a 
month-long strike in the region's steel industry from 11 A p r i l to 
4 May 1967. This resulted i n the signature of the f i r s t 
significant Convention Sociale between employers and unions, 
guaranteeing redundancy terms for those workers l a i d o f f by 
restructuring proposals (Rognant et a l 1977, 29). Wendel-
SidSlor's plans had provoked a 24-hour strike in the region's 
steel works on 16 December 1971 and a demonstration by 16,000 at 
Hayange. Moreover the proposed closure of Usinor's Thionville 
works was accompanied by protest demonstrations of 5,000 at Metz 
on 21 December 1976, 3,000 at Thionville on 8 January 1977, and a 
further 15,000 at Thionville on 14 A p r i l 1977 (see also Rognant 
et a l , 1977). 
By 1978, though, circumstances were diffe r e n t in a number of 
important respects. F i r s t l y , the sheer scale of proposed 
redundancies, and the exceptionally localised and concentrated 
nature of th e i r effect on specific l o c a l i t i e s , were of quite a 
new order. A shop-steward in the industry at the time was in no 
doubt: 
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'In early 1979 the conditions were ri g h t for a reply by the 
workers ... [because] at t h i s time the threat of massive 
redundancy appeared1. 
(Baptiste, 1982, 120) 6 
Ihe redundancies were concentrated most notably in three valleys. 
To the north near the border with Luxembourg and in the valley of 
the Chiers lay a group of Usinor works centred on the town of 
Longwy. Farther south, in the valley of the Fensch, flowing 
eastwards into the Moselle, lay most of the works of Sollac; 
further south s t i l l the works of Sacilor were concentrated in the 
valley of the Ome. The two southern valleys in particular had 
posed extraordinary problems in terms of physical limitations on 
development p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the individual works during the 
preceding years. Put simply, the works further up the valleys 
were heavily constrained by a shortage of f l a t ground? a problem 
evidenced once again by those within the industry, referring to 
the works of Moyeuvre in the Orne valley: 
fThe narrowness of the valley had never permitted the 
extension of the works 1. 
(Baptiste, 1982, 70) 7 
Consequently, throughout the 1960fs and 1970's, investment had 
been preferentially concentrated in the lower part of the two 
valleys ( i . e . i n the east), resulting i n particular in the 
concentration of crude steel production at three locations in the 
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plain where the two valleys joined the Moselle. Crucially, the 
1978 plan affected a l l three, with drastic de-manning at two 
(Gandrange and Seremange/Hayange) along with the complete closure 
of the t h i r d at Hagondange. In much the same way the 1978 plan 
raised the question of the very future of steel production in the 
Chiers valley, especially at Longwy. The four works here 
d i r e c t l y employed 15,000 people in 1975 when the area had a 
population of 105,000 and a workforce of 40,000 (table VI.8; 
N o i r i e l , 1980, 20). 
Secondly, the timing of the announcement of the 1978 steel plan 
provided the ideal platform for the left-wing p o l i t i c a l parties 
to attempt to demonstrate their particular policy line after the 
s p l i t between Communist and Socialist Parties a year ear l i e r . 
The Communist Party, and hence the CCT, favoured a policy which 
included an increase rather than a rundown in steel capacity. In 
January 1979, for example, four objectives for the steel industry 
were put forward, calling for no redundancies; an improvement in 
working conditions through a reduction in the working week, early 
retirement and further paid holiday; a 're-alignment' of imports 
and exports to and from the EEC, leading to an extra 2,6 m.t of 
production i n France; and investment in steel consuming sectors 
to raise steel consumption per head of population to the EEC 
average (see Gauche-Cazalis, 1979, 33). Hence throughout 1979 
the PCF and the CGT emphasised i t s opposition to any redundancy 
or capacity cutback in the French steel industry. 
In contrast the CFDT preferred to accept the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 
sane closures in steel, instead proclaiming the necessity of the 
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in s t a l l a t i o n of alternative employment in the affected regions 
(see also Durand and Kourchid, 1982, 90). With particular 
reference to Lorraine, i t declared: 
'The steel industry has i t s grand modernisation projects, but 
no local enterprise can respond to the demand for the r o l l i n g 
m i l l s and continuous casting machines which are made instead 
either by Thyssen, Demag or Danieli'. 
(CFDT, 1981, 40) 8 
In response to t h i s , the CFOT proposed a massive diversification 
programme for the region i n order to use 30% of the steel 
produced there in further processing. I b i s emphasis on 
diver s i f i c a t i o n was, moreover, broadly consistent with the 
Socialist l i n e , which emphasised the ri g h t to l i v e and work in 
the region; the measures taken by the party in power after 1981 
to decentralise government functions should be seen as part-
fulfilment of thi s p r i o r i t y (see Ashford, 1983; Meny, 1983). 
Thirdly, the increasing extent of state involvement within the 
industry l e f t Governments d i r e c t l y open to cr i t i c i s m of steel 
company operations within particular regions. Successive 
Governments had not just participated in the development of 
chronic over-capacity but by 1978 were in overall control of the 
industry and therefore v i s i b l y responsible f o r i t s operation. 
Under these circumstances the incentive for opposition p o l i t i c a l 
parties and trade unions to attempt to discredit Government 
policy on i t s own terms was par t i c u l a r l y strong. 
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'There were, therefore, a number of reasons why the p o s s i b i l i t y 
existed of opposition to the 1978 steel plan within Lorraine. I t 
i s to how t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y was actualised that we now turn, 
through an examination of the events of the period after December 
1978. The days immediately following the announcement saw 
considerable a c t i v i t y in the town of Longwy. An inter-union co-
ordinating committee, the Intersyndicale, was set up to fight the 
closures and l i n k the actions of individual unions ( N o i r i e l , 
1980, 32; Durand, 1981, 83). Tb some extent, the announcement 
had been expected and prepared for; i n particular, a huge SOS 
sign had been constructed, and was placed on the giant slag-heap 
dominating the town after the announcement was made. Further, 
the very day after the announcement, a clandestine radio station 
began broadcasting in the area, with i t s t i t l e - "SOS Bnploi* -
reflecting the concern of i t s operator, the local CFET. Shortly 
afterwards, on 19 December, some 20,000 demonstrated in Longwy 
against the plan. 
In t h i s early stage i t is possible to identify a f a i r l y broad 
base of support against the closure proposals. For example, as 
early as March 1978 the local bourgeoisie had formed an 
organisation, Avenir du Pays Haut, with the specific aim of 
protecting the region's economy ( N o i r i e l , 1980, 34). Moreover, 
the leading local newspaper, ha Republics in Iorrain, an 
i n s t i t u t i o n of considerable significance within Lorraine (see 
Ardagh, 1982, 59), very scon became actively involved in the 
protests, with banner headlines such as "La defense de notre 
region: l"a££aire de tous" (28 December 1978) accompanying a 
p e t i t i o n published each day a f t e r 23 December, cal l i n g on the 
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President of the Republic to guarantee the future of Lorraine; a 
pe t i t i o n which was sent to President Giscard d'Estaing on 17 
January 1979 with 40,000 signatures. 
Further, 12 January saw a demonstration of concern within many 
parts of the region over the proposals. A 24-hour strike called 
by the iron ore mining and steel unions was extensively 
supported. A major demonstration was held i n Metz, significantly 
not i t s e l f d i r e c t l y affected by the plan, but seat of the 
region's prefecture. Sixty thousand people attended in Metz, 
whilst many similar snaller protest meetings were held in other 
towns. Transport and communications were also disrupted; trains 
between Paris and Luxembourg were stopped as well as a l l t r a f f i c 
into and out of Hayange and Rombas. The following day the 
newspaper Ie Republicain Lorrain, in an e d i t o r i a l , described the 
day of action as going beyond class barriers; i t did not 
represent 
'a simple manifestation of s o l i d a r i t y at the level of one 
category of workers' 
but rather expressed 
'the desire to struggle in order to continue to l i v e and work 
Q 
in t h e i r region of b i r t h or of adoption.' 
Pour days after this regional day of action, and in the fear of 
future protests, the Government announced a plan to create 11,525 
new jobs by 1982, mostly i n Lorraine and the Nord. While the 
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redundancies were certain, though, new jobs for steel workers were 
not. I n addition, for reasons that are not wholly evident, only 
925 jobs were allocated to Lorraine (though there have 
subsequently been suggestions that the French Government almost 
persuaded Ford to locate a car plant in the region, providing 
perhaps 8,000 jobs, and accordingly allocated l i t t l e new 
employment there in the published plan? see Ardagh, 1982, 60; 
Le Monde, 24 January 1979). Perhaps predictably, the reaction in 
Lorraine was to regard the offer as a derisory one; indeed, the 
Intersyndicale at Longwy regarded the measures as a 'provocation' 
(Ie Monde, 20 January 1979). As a consequence, the steel unions 
called for a further s t r i k e within the region for 16 February. 
Before these planned strikes could take place, however, protests 
erupted again in Longwy with direct action and c i v i l disobedience 
growing i n scale, often i n the form of "coupe de poing1 
( l i t e r a l l y , 'blows of force 1) such as the occupation of 
factories, banks and offices connected with the steel companies. 
This extension of the protests into c i v i l disobedience and 
physical violence, challenging the state's authority in these 
ways, saw the Avenir da Fays Haut begin increasingly to distance 
i t s e l f from the campaign. The emphasis on these means of protest 
reached new heights during the night of 29/30 January, when 
police forced entry to the Chiers works i n Longwy to free local 
management who had been held there against t h e i r w i l l by a group 
of protestors. The violence associated with the action drew a 
variety of responses; some condemning the police, others 
cautioning against violence and i n the process distancing 
themselves from the campaign. The secretary-general of Force 
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(Xivridre, for example, referring d i r e c t l y to these events, 
warned: 
'One never knows where violence w i l l lead, and I ask a l l the 
mili t a n t s within Faroe Ouvri&re to be very careful in th i s 
respect. 1 
(Le Monde, 2 February, 1979) 1 0 
Nevertheless, the second round of general strikes in Lorraine 
went ahead on 16 February, accompanied by major demonstrations, a 
marked escalation in direct action, blocking transport routes and 
disrupting trade and tra v e l ; and a national steel strike which 
received more or less t o t a l support. I t appeared that the French 
Government was losing control of the situation in the steel 
region, while the steel workers were becoming increasingly 
confident of the i r own strength and capability to paralyse the 
region's economy. In an attempt to retrieve the situation, the 
Government announced that i t would stand firm on i t s plan f o r 
steel - not to do so would lead to an internationally 
uncompetitive industry and endanger the performance of the entire 
French economy. At the same time, protests intensified, most 
notably en the evening of 23 February and early 24 February when 
police moved in to halt the occupation of a local T.V. station by 
protestors against the closures : those occupying i t were 
objecting to the station's coverage of the campaign. This led to 
2,000 more protestors besieging the local police commissariat, 
together with a bulldozer. 
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In March the most serious outbreak of c i v i l disorder to date 
broke out, with r i o t i n g following the involvement of the CRS at a 
demonstration in the town of Denainr in the Nord; seven 
policemen were wounded by r i f l e - f i r e , 30 demonstrators by tear-
gas. Later in the month, on the 23rd, a major demonstration in 
Paris of some 120,000 culminated in violent clashes between 
demonstrators and police in the Place de lfOpe*ra. Five days 
later the government and the steel firms agreed to review the 
closure programmes. 
The events of March 1979 were the most serious break-down in 
public order in France since May 1968 although seen 
retrospectively, they formed the peak of the protest. Moreover, 
i t seemed for a time that the French state was caught in the gr i p 
of forces which meant i t was unable to resolve the problems 
facing i t . For i t could neither abandon the steel plan nor 
increase the resources available for reconversion programmes in 
steel areas to appease opposition to this plan; hence the only 
way i n which i t could contain opposition to the plan was by 
physical violence and represssion, which in turn only served to 
heighten resistance to the planned closures. Moreover, and 
perhaps even more seriously for the French Government, opposition 
to the steel closures was becoming generalised into widespread 
protest against the whole deflationary tenor of i t s economic 
policies, and in particular against the continued rise in 
unemployment to which this led. This situation seemed to pose a 
threat at least to the authority of the French national 
Government, i f not the French state. 
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Yet only six months l a t e r , while protests against continuing 
steel cuts rumbled on, t h i s major threat had disappeared. In 
part, t h i s came about because the coherence of the protest 
movement i t s e l f began to break up. For example, national strike 
action in steel began on 11 A p r i l , but at Fos and Dunkerque the 
issue was presented as one of wages rather than job losses or 
capacity cutbacks; the strike ended in b i t t e r defeat early in 
May. The resu l t of t h i s was to further heighten the divisions 
between the various steel plants and steel unions over whether to 
f i g h t the closures or campaign for alternative jobs. 
Thus increasing divisions between the steel unions opened the 
door for the French state to further defuse the threats posed by 
opposition to the steel closures, although at considerable cost: 
" b i t by b i t , during the f i v e months of exhausting negotiations, 
the protestors were bought o f f u n t i l only a few isolated pockets 
of dissent remain" (Financial Times, 13 March 1980). 
Essentially, the French Government stitched together a package of 
measures over a period of more than two years which eventually 
helped divide the steel unions and bought-off mass protests 
against closures. There were two major elements in t h i s . F i r s t , 
a long-term programme to create new employment, the main, but by 
no means sole element of which was the FSAI. Second, and much 
more p o l i t i c a l l y important in the short-term, were the measures 
taken to cushion the effects of job losses on steel workers. 
These f e l l into three main categories. The f i r s t of these was 
the special grant of 50,000 FFr. for any steel-worker agreeing 
permanently to leave the industry, which was in addition to the 
usual redundancy payments which guaranteed workers sliding scale 
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payments starting at 75% of th e i r last pay during their f i r s t 
year out of work. In addition, for migrant workers (of whom 
there were many in Lorraine - some 16% of the population being 
immigrants : Danset, 1979) agreeing to leave a further 10,000 
FFr. was added. In a l l , about 6,500 workers accepted voluntary 
redundancy on these terms (Ardagh, 1982, 61) - and i t is not 
without significance that these grants were announced on 8 March 
1979 in the middle of the Denain r i o t s , by the Minister of 
Labour, M. Boulin. The second set of measures was concerned with 
compulsory early retirement : a l l those aged over 55 in the steel 
industry were retired on 70% of their previous salary, while a 
large percentage of those aged 50-55 (particularly those in 
physically demanding jobs) were retired on 79% of previous 
salary; i n addition, a monthly minimum payment of 2,400 FFr. was 
set. Some 12,000 men f e l l in these two retirement categories 
(Ardagh, 1982, 61). The t h i r d set of measures dealt with re-
training : the 4,000 workers to whcm they applied had the r i g h t 
to refuse two alternative job offers but on the third refusal 
t h e i r case was examined by a special committee and they could be 
made redundant. I f they took a new job that paid less than their 
job in the steel industry, their former employer had to make up 
60-80% of the difference, while i f the difference was 15% or 
more, the person had the right to a grant of an extra 10,000 FFr. 
This clearly appeared a generous package to many French steel 
workers for by March 1980 over 50% of the workers that the 
closure programme wished to get r i d of had l e f t the steel 
industry and the programme s t i l l had 15 months to run, u n t i l 
June, 1981. In these terms, then, the tactics of the French 
Government were successful. 
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In another sense, though, t h i s very success was leading to other 
problems for the massive costs of the restructuring programme 
were seriously exacerbating the very macro-economic problems 
which the closure programme was supposedly helping to solve. 
These costs arose in three main ways : Fr. 3,000 m. for the 
FSAJ, Fr. 10,000 m. over the period 1980-85 for restructuring the 
financial position of the steel companies; and some Fr. 7,000 m. 
on the various short-term, ameliorative social programmes. In 
a l l , t h i s Fr. 20,000 m. associated with the closure programme 
amounted to about 50% of the t o t a l French annual budget d e f i c i t 
for 1980. 
Nor was the reorganisation obviously successful; continuing 
losses at Usinor and Sacilor mounted after 1978 (tables VI.2, 
V I # 3 ) . With the election of Mitterand as President and of a 
Socialist Government i n May 1981, even the then chairman of 
Usinor, M. Etchegarry, though a 'fervent advocate of private 
enterprise 1 had to admit that nationalisation was the only way of 
meeting the companies1 financial needs (Financial Times, 28 
October 1981). Indeed, the widespread disenchantment with the 
previous Barre government was in no small part due to the effects 
of the e a r l i e r opposition to steel closures becoming translated 
into more general opposition to Government policies. Under these 
circumstances, the steel workers might have reasonably expected a 
better deal under the new administration : i n fact they did not 
get one and the discrepancy between outcomes and expectations was 
important i n reviving violent opposition to plans for further 
employment losses in steel. I n February 1982 i t was announced 
that while the Government would turn i t s back on market forces as 
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a way of rationalising the steel industry, nevertheless Usinor 
and Sacilor would have to consider ways of achieving this goal. 
At the same time the Government undertook a clean sweep of the 
top-level administration of the two companies, i n s t a l l i n g M. 
Raymond Levy as President of Usinor and M. Claude Dolle* at 
Sacilor, I n July 1982 the two companies announced plans for the 
period 1982-86, entailing some Fr.20,000 m. investment but, at 
the same time, a further 6-7,000 job losses, concentrated in 
Lorraine (table VI.9). These plans provoked further outbreaks 
of d i r e c t action; the headquarters of Usinor's special steels 
division was burned down. 
Partly in an attempt to prevent such demonstrations of concern 
the Government made available a further Fr. 500 m. towards the 
end of July, through the creation by the two steel companies of 
•reconversion companies1 in the steel regions. Usinor, f o r 
example, created three such companies on 30 July s 90DIL0R, based 
on Longwy, with Fr. 100 m. capital', SODICAR, based on Vireux-
Molhain, with Fr. 50 m.; and SODINOR, based on Denain, with Fr. 
100 m.; a l l intended to operate, i n i t i a l l y at least, for the 
subsequent three years. 
Such off e r s , however, when seen from the point of view of the 
steel communities, missed the point and had not been the reason 
for helping elect a socialist Government : the situation as seen 
by them was neatly summarised by M. Jules Jean, the f i r s t 
Communist mayor of Longwy, when he wrote to Mitterand "these 
plans are quite contrary to your thinking and your wishes" 
(quoted in the Financial Times, 14 July 1982). Even i f th i s was 
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an accurate analysis of Mitterand's views (see also Ardagh, 1982, 
117-8), i t was becoming clear that the new Socialist government 
was no more capable of halting the decline of steelmaking in 
Lorraine than i t s predecessor, nor of delivering the alternative 
jobs which i t promised. 
In June 1983 even the output targets of the July 1982 plan for 
1982-6 were called into question at the A.G.M. of Sacilor. The 
President, M. Claude Doll§, openly rejected the capacity level 
for 1986 contained in the plan of 24 m.t. (1982 output was only 
18 m.t.), cautioning that: 
' I t appears more reasonable to me to plan for the years to 
come on an annual production of 17-20 m.t. ... This w i l l 
e n t a i l some modification of the plans which we have made.1 
(quoted in Le Republicain Lorrain, 1 July 1983) 1 1 
As a result, disillusionment with Mitterand and his Government 
deepened; as M. Galey-Berdier, Communist Mayor of Morfontaine, a 
small dormitory town near Longwy put i t , " I voted Mitterand and I 
cannot hide the fact that I am t o t a l l y disillusioned. Not only 
did the l e f t promise to save what remains of the French steel 
industry. I t promised to improve i t . But i t is applying the 
same policies as the ri g h t " (Sunday Tiroes, 30 October 1982). 
While the steel communities had ultimately been w i l l i n g to set t l e 
for increased resources to counter steel closures from a r i g h t -
wing Government, from a left-wing Government the demand switched 
to the preservation of the industry but this over-estimated the 
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roam for manoeuvre open to the in-coming Government and the 
capacity of a change of Government to effect a dramatic change of 
policies within the context of a c a p i t a l i s t state. Far from 
nationalisation solving the problems of the French steel 
industry, i t constituted simply one moment in a continuing 
process of restructuring and rationalisation which threatened 
work and l i f e for particular steel making l o c a l i t i e s . As 
realisation of this deepened within the steel communities, 
protest against further cuts emerged with a demonstration in 
longwy in September 1983 and a series of disruptions to 
production. I n February 1984 trains were stopped by barricades 
near Longwy and the local PS offices attacked by steelworkers. 
On 29 March revisions to the ori g i n a l 1982-86 plan were 
announced, based on maintaining steel production at 18-19 m. 
tonnes per year rather than increasing i t to 24 m.t. A further 
20,000 job losses were proposed, mostly in Lorraine. 
The new proposals met with an instant response. The following 
day steelworkers clashed with police during a series of 
demonstrations in Lorraine with a wave of fresh c i v i l 
disobedience, blocking road and r a i l t r a f f i c and ransacking the 
PS offices i n Longwy. The future of the PC within the rul i n g 
French Government coalition appeared to be in doubt as the wave 
of m i l i t a n t action intensified, with the Communist general 
secretary, M. Marchais, ca l l i n g the revised steel plan a 'tragic 
error' (quoted i n Financial Times, 3 A p r i l 1984). On 4 A p r i l 
Lorraine was brought to a v i r t u a l halt by a general strike called 
by local parties of both l e f t and r i g h t and by a l l trade unions, 
whilst the Bishop of Metz and Nancy added the symbolic support of 
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the church by allowing church bells to ring. Marches took place 
throughout most c i t i e s , involving 15,000 at Longwy. Care was 
taken to ensure protest passed peacefully but by the evening 
sporadic clashes had broken out between demonstrators and the 
CRS. Echoing the protest of 1979, 35,000 steelworkers and 
supporters marched through Paris on 13 A p r i l , with the strongest 
support from the CGT. The atmosphere was summed up by a banner 
with the slogan 'Mitterand, your electors are on the streets' 
(Financial Times, 14 A p r i l 1984). The PC continued i t s 
opposition whilst speculation raged over i t s future in the 
coali t i o n Government. On 19 July i t refused to j o i n the 
Government formed by the new Prime Minister, M. Fabius, on the 
grounds of opposition to industrial policy. Thus f i n a l l y the 
steel plan had the consequence of separating the coal i t i o n 
partners, the PC preferring to condemn the cutbacks over 
continued participation in Goverment. 
Under the revised terms of the plan 2,500 jobs were to be lost at 
Longwy, bringing the workforce there down to 2,400; 1,600 jobs 
were to be shed at Neuves-Maisons; and the entire Gandrange 
complex is probably to be closed with the loss of a l l 9,000 jobs. 
The words of M. Etchegaray, then President of Usinor, at a press 
conference on 27 July 1979, are beginning to ring a l i t t l e 
hollcw: 
"The plan which we are following (of December 1978) allows us 
to think that the Longwy basin, once restructured, w i l l be 
f u l l y competitive ... I t i s the best guarantee that one can 
give to the people of the Longwy basin to assure them that 
12 
the steel industry w i l l remain in that basin.' 
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VI•4 Concluding comments 
Events in the French steel regions between 1978 and 1984 
represented expressions of opposition to closure with dramatic 
national implications. Drawing upon a reservoir of regionalist 
sentiment in Lorraine the steel plan of December 1978 was greeted 
with action co-ordinated across a variety of usual interest 
groupings, supported by many tens of thousands of workers within 
the region and even drawing support from locally-bound capitals 
i n the form of a temporary regional cross-class alliance. At the 
same time similar violent protests i n the other major steel 
region, the Nord, meant that the issue was raised in a cross-
regional fashion, extending ultimately to massive demonstration 
in the national capital symbolic of the wider significance of the 
steel plan. I n the face of these circumstances the Government 
was forced to delay the programme of closures and make available 
massive extra resources for the steel areas, but the increasingly 
apparent inadequacy of these policy measures had the effect of 
translating opposition to steel plans into general opposition to 
Government policies. A left-wing Government coalition of 
Socialists and Communists was elected in 1981 on the basis of 
this dissatisfaction, which scon proved as unable as i t s 
predecessors to solve the steel regions' problems within the 
context of a c a p i t a l i s t state. Disenchantment within these areas 
grew upon announcement of further employment reduction in 1982 
and reached c r i s i s point i n 1984 when local opposition to further 
downward revision of planned steel employment was translated into 
general Communisty Party opposition to the tenor of policy, 
reaffirmation of opposition to the mode of policy formation and 
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eventual resignation from the coal i t i o n Government. In a similar 
fashion the trade unions too signalled their increasing 
disillusionment with the Government. 
These connections between broad-based local opposition to steel 
plans and national p o l i t i c s are of particular significance both 
because of and through the character of relations between state 
and society i n France. For much of the post-war period major 
trade unions operated within a c i v i l society t o t a l l y disjunct 
from the state apparatus whilst capital within the industry 
developed in a process of increasing centralisation. Attempts to 
increase the scale of individual production units (rather than 
the size of capitals, although the two were linked) were 
selectively promoted at f i r s t by the state but the increasing 
pressures of c a p i t a l i s t competition drew in direct state 
assistance in the form of funding for major expansion programmes 
at Fos and Dunkerque. This i t s e l f proved to be a further burden 
on steel company finances already troubled by a dramatic f a l l i n 
demand after 1973, with the state f i n a l l y being drawn in to b a i l 
out the industry i n response to a c r i s i s of p r o f i t a b i l i t y i n 
1978. Under these circumstances though the state rapidly became 
v i s i b l y involved in the undermining of the very future of steel 
regions with the result that local protest against closures, 
within the context of national p o l i t i c s favouring the promotion 
of t h i s issue by both Communist and Socialist Parties, had the 
effect of reconnecting parts of c i v i l society with the state 
apparatus. Generalised trade union/political party opposition 
influenced national p o l i t i c s at the 1981 election. In o f f i c e 
a f t e r 1981 elements of the left-wing Government found the 
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pressures of operating within a c a p i t a l i s t society d i f f i c u l t to 
equate with opposition to the system of ca p i t a l i s t production, 
and as successive further cuts were announced opposition within 
the steel regions grew. Under these conditions some trades 
unions gradually withdrew from active participation in the state 
apparatus, once again voicing t h e i r opposition to that state as 
the de jure nationalisation of 1981 proved only one moment in a 
continuing process of restructuring of c a p i t a l i s t social 
relations. 
In t h i s way events in the steel regions i l l u s t r a t e several 
fundamental features of the contemporary French state. By 
challenging the legitimacy of the monopoly upon the means of 
violence, through c i v i l disobedience, the steel regions exposed 
the essentially repressive nature of the state. This also had 
the effect of breaking up the coalition of support as some groups 
withdrew from generalised opposition to the system of production. 
Equally, these events emphasised the structural constraints 
imposed upon the state by c a p i t a l i s t social relations, for even 
under a broadly left-wing Government the competitive pressure of 
the international market place was translated into further 
closures, raising fresh questions about the connections between 
c i v i l society and the c a p i t a l i s t state. Hence over this period 
both hegemony and coercion became exposed as simultaneously 
necesary f o r and problematic to the reproduction of relations 
within French society. 
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Table VI-1 Proposed redundancies under the Ferry 
plan, 1977 
Lorraine 
Sacilor - Sollac 
Usinor - Thionville 
CICC - Neuves-Maisons 
SNAP Pompey 
CICC - Longwy 
8,700 
2,620 
90 
600 
1,170 13,180 
Nord 
Usinor - Louvroil 
Usinor - Valenciennes 
CICC - Isbergues 
Creusot - Loire - Dunes 
720 
1,200 
65 
150 2,135 
Other 
Blagny - Vireux 
Mondeville 
250 
600 850 
Total 16,165 
Source: Rognant e t a l , 1977 
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Table VI«2 Key operating f i g u r e s , Usinor 
Crude steel Product output, m.p.t. Workforce, Profit 
output, m.t. Long Flat 31.12 (loss) 
(x 1000) m. Fr. 
1970 8.0 38.0 
1971 7.4 39.3 
1972 8.1 39.3 
1973 9.1 40.9 164 
1974 10.9 42.4 160 
1975 7.9 41.5 (1,224) 
1976 8.8 41.7 (1,245) 
1977 8.3 48.0 (3,000) 
1978 9.8 43.0 (24921) 
1979 10.8 2.8 6.3 40.2 (933 2) 
1980 10.8 2.6 6.4 34.2 (1,229) 
1981 10.6 2.0 5.9 31.6 (3,918) 
1982 8.8 1.8 4.0 30.6 (4987) 
1983 8.5 29.3 (5,333) 
Sources: Freyssenet and Omnes, 1982, 78; Usinor 
annual reports, 1981, 1982, 1983 
1 period 1.1.78 - 30. 4.79 
2 period 1.5.79 - 31.12.79 
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Table VI»3 Key operating f i g u r e s , S a c i l o r 
Crude steel Product output, m.p.t. Workforce, P r o f i t 
output, m.t. Long Flat 31.12 (loss) 
(x 1000) m. Fr. 
1970 7.1 60.5 
1971 8.1 57.3 
1972 8.4 54.1 
1973 8.2 4.1 2.5 51.8 
1974 8.4 4.3 2.5 50.5 
1975 6.0 3.2 1.8 49.4 
1976 6.6 3.2 2.1 48.2 
1977 6.4 2.7 2.5 44.7 (2283) 
1978 6.4 2.7 2.7 34.8 (1014) 
1979 6.5 2.7 2.5 29.9 (1367) 
1980 6.3 2.6 2.5 24.4 (1940) 
1981 5.6 2.3 2.5 22.5 (2786) 
1982 5.0 2.2 2.3 (3690) 
1983 4.7 1.8 2.1 (5276) 
Sources Freyssenet and Omnes, 1982, 78; 
annual reports, 1981,1983 
S a c i l o r 
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Table VI ,4 Proposed redundancies under the 1978 plan 
for the French s t e e l industry, to 1982 
Usinor/Chiers Chatillon 
Denain 
Valenciennes 
Sedan 
Billemont 
Longwy 
Anzin 
Blagny 
5,600 
500 
100 
95 
7,200 
400 
460 
Sacilor 
Gandrange-Rombas 
Hagondange 
St. Jacques-Hayange 
Joeuf-Homecourt 
Hayange 
2,000 
2,200 
800 
1,050 
170 
Sollac 
Seremange 
Ebange 
Florange 
Fensch 
1,100 
1,100 
1,100 
250 
Total 24,125 
Source: Le Figaro, 6 February 1979, p.9 
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Table VI,5 Decline of the Lorraine iron-ore mining 
industry 
Workforce, x 1000 Output, m.t. 
1962 22.8 60.5 
1964 19.3 57.0 
1966 15.5 51.6 
1968 11.8 52.1 
1970 10.7 54.0 
1972 9.6 52.9 
1974 8.9 51.9 
1975 8.6 47.5 
1976 8.0 43.5 
1977 7.1 35.1 
1978 5.7 31.9 
1979 4.9 30.3 
1980 4.4 27.6 
1981 3.6 20.7 
Source: CFDT, 1981, 8-9 
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Table VI,6 Output of the Lorraine s t e e l industry 
Lorraine French Lorraine Nord Other 
steel steel as % of as % of as % of 
output m.t. output m.t. t o t a l t o t a l t o t a l 
1966 12.3 19.6 
1967 12.0 19.7 
1968 12.8 20.4 
1969 13.4 22.5 
1970 14.0 23.8 
1971 13.5 22.8 
1972 13.5 24.0 
1973 14.0 25.3 
1974 14.3 27.0 
1975 10.2 21.5 
1976 10.9 23.2 
1977 9.8 22.1 
1978 9.8 22.8 
1979 10.2 23.4 
1980 9.4 23.2 
1981 8.1 21.3 
1982 7.4 18.4 
63 
61 
63 
60 
59 30 11 
59 30 11 
56 31 13 
55 34 11 
53 33 14 
47 33 20 
47 34 19 
44 33 23 
43 33 24 
44 35 21 
41 36 23 
38 38 24 
40 34 26 
Sources: CFDT, 1981, 6; annual reports o f the 
Chambre Syndicale de l a Side'rurgie Francaise 
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Table VI.7 Employent i n the Lorraine s t e e l industry 
Lorraine French Lorraine Nord Other 
steel jobs steel jobs as % of as % of as % of 
x 1000 xlOOO t o t a l t o t a l t o t a l 
1966 91.1 152.1 
1967 86.0 144.6 
1968 83.4 141.5 
1969 86.9 147.1 
1970 87.2 146.1 
1971 84.8 144.7 
1972 80.6 144.0 
1973 80.5 151.5 
1974 80.6 157.6 
1975 79.6 155.6 
1976 78.2 153.7 
1977 70.5 142.7 
1978 62.8 131.2 
1979 56.4 120.4 
1980 45.8 104.9 
1981 41.8 97.2 
60 
60 
59 
59 
59 
56 
53 
51 
51 26 23 
51 26 23 
49 26 25 
48 26 26 
47 27 26 
47 27 26 
44 27 29 
43 28 29 
Source: CFDT, 1981, 6 
Figures as f o r year-end 
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Table V I . 8 S t e e l employment a t the works of La 
S e n e l l e r La C h i e r s r Mont-St.-Martin and Rehon, Longwy 
31,12.74 15,414 
31.12.75 15,308 
31.12.76 14,834 
31.12.77 13,576 
31.12.78 12,756 
31.12.79 10,523 
31.12.80 9,520 
30. 4.81 9,252 
31. 5.83 6,298 
Source: Usinor-Longwy 
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Table VI,9 Closures i n Lo r r a i n e under the 1982-6 
plans of J u l y 1982 
Location Plant 
Sacilor 
Fontoy Sinter 
Hayange Rail and beam mi l l s 
Joeuf Wire m i l l 
Rombas Beam m i l l 
Usinor 
Longlaville Coke ovens 
Longwy-Mont-St.-Martin Plate m i l l 
Longwy-Rehon Hot rolled s t r i p m i l l 
Source: Le Republicain L o r r a i n , 1 J u l y 1983 
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Footnotes to Chapter VI 
1 "La CFDT s'est prononcee pour un autre type de 
developpement. Face a" une society productiviste, la CFDT veut 
impulser un type de developpement plus egalitaire dormant la 
p r i o r i t y £ l a consommation collective et £ la satisfaction des 
besoins fondes sur une appropriation du pouvoir par les 
travailleurs et le peuple." 
2 
"L1 isolement auquel l a strategic du mouvement communiste 
international les conduit." 
3 
From the handbook for the tenth national steel conference, 4-5 
June 1981, Dunkerque, of Force Ouvriere de la Metallurgie, p. 
63. 
4 The material on the development of the companies of Usinor and 
Sacilor draws heavily on various unpublished company documents 
and brochures; also Gehring and Saint-Dizier, 1971. 
5 Financial Times, 22 September 1978; see also Hudson and 
Sadler, 1983b. 
^ "Au pr in temps 1979, les conditions sont r§unies pour une 
riposte des travailleurs ... En ces jours l a menace de 
licenciements massifs se precise." 
^ "L'^troitesse de cette vallee n'avait jamais permis son 
extension." 
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"tes siderurgistes ont de grand projets de modernisation, 
mais bient6t aucune entreprise locale ne pourra repondre a la 
demande et les trains de laminoir et les coulees continues 
seront construites s o i t par Thyssen ou Demag, soit par Danieli." 
9 
" I I ne s'agissait pas d'une simple manifestation de 
so l i d a r i t y a l'egard d'une cat£gorie de salaries ... la 
volonte" de se battre pour continuer a vivre et a" t r a v a i l l e r dans 
leur region natale ou d fadoption." 
^ "On ne s a i t jamais oQ peut mener l a violence, et je demande 
aux militants F.O. d'etre tr£s prudents a cet egard." 
^ " I I me parait plus raisonnable de miser pour les annees & 
venir sur une production annuelle de 17 a 20 m. de tonnes ... 
Ceci entralne des modifications de plans que nous faisons." 
12 
"Le plan que nous mettons en place permet de penser que le 
Bassin de Longwy, une fois restructure, sera pleinement 
competitif ... C'est l a meilleure garantie que l'on puisse 
dormer aux gens du Bassin de Longwy pour leur assurer que l a 
sid§rurgie restera dans le bassin." Source : Usinor press 
release, N.D. 
CHAPTER V I I 
West German s t e e l c a p i t a l , the Ruhr and Dortmund 
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V I I . 1 Introduction 
The character of West German state and society presents a 
revealing contrast in many respects to that of France or the 
United Kingdom, A corollary of the high degree of formalised 
regulation of the social relations of production is that 
connections between state and society are structured around the 
concept of apparently harmonious development of capital and 
labour. The state is seen, superficially at least, as playing no 
formal part in the system of production so that, for example, in 
steel, nationalisation and financial assistance to private 
capital have u n t i l recently been regarded as inappropriate policy 
options. As part of this system of formally unrestricted 
c a p i t a l i s t production, capital has displayed a tendency both to 
massive concentration and, in some cases at least, 
centralisation, as the West German steel industry has evolved to 
the position of largest tonnage producer in the European 
Community. This sheer size, however, has exposed the industry to 
acute problems of over-capacity in the context of a global over-
production c r i s i s . One result is that the apparent harmony 
between capital and labour, regulated by formalised connection 
between state and society but with minimal apparent direct 
contact, has come under increasing scrutiny. I t is the 
implications of the development of these connections between 
state and society which we seek to explore here. 
We commence with an examination of the system of formalised 
regulation of social relations of production since this is in 
many respects the key to contemporary West Germany. The 
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industrial heartland of this society is in the Ruhr area, where 
the structures of organised p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t the character of the 
social relations in which they are grounded. A further 
characteristic of post-war West German society has been the 
development of large capitals, most particularly in steel 
production. We therefore consider here both the organisation and 
development of Ruhr p o l i t i c s and of capital within the steel 
industry. 
These general developments have taken expression very clearly in 
the town of Dortmund, in the east of the Ruhr, a settlement of 
some 800,000. The town's main steel capital, Hoesch, has adopted 
a continuing series of strategies in an attempt to combat 
problems of over-capacity made a l l the more acute by the location 
of the company's plant remote from the main ore terminals on the 
Rhine. These have involved, f i r s t l y , a unique development, 
merger with another European Community country's main steel 
producer, Hooghovens of the Netherlands, to form Estel. This 
transnational isat ion of capital was later opposed by both 
employer and employed in Dortmund, with eventual dissolution of 
the merger resulting. Continuing uncertainty over the company's 
future after this has been associated with sustained pressure 
from labour, which has been accommodated u n t i l recently by the 
formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l connections between state and society, 
although continuing pressure common to a l l capitals in steel has 
recently made the degree to which state and society are seen as 
isolated increasingly problematic. 
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V I I .2 West German s t a t e , s o c i e t y and the " s o c i a l 
p a r t n e r s h i p 1 i n s t e e l 
The over-riding feature of the West German state during the post-
war period has been the significance attached to the notion of 
"social partnership" between capital and labour - an attitude 
that economic development mediated by the highly structured 
organisations and in s t i t u t i o n s of capital and labour, with 
minimal government interference, is in the ultimate interest of 
a l l . IXiring the period of the 'economic miracle 1 of economic 
expansion during the 1950's and 1960,s th i s conception could be 
presented with considerable v a l i d i t y , not least because of the 
r e l a t i v e l y strong position of labour at a time of labour 
shortage, as evidenced by the immigration of large numbers of 
foreign workers, pr i n c i p a l l y from Turkey. With retrenchment i n 
the 197O's, however, there are signs that the conception holds 
increasingly less v a l i d i t y . 
Three features of th i s system are worthy of special attention; 
the notion of wage regulation, the question of workforce 
participation in management, and the issue of works-based 
employee representation. Wage regulation has been s t r i c t l y 
controlled by the highly structured union organisation. There 
are today seventeen main unions, organised on the c r i t e r i o n of 
industrial grouping - for example I.G. Metall organises in the 
engineering and metal production sector. These unions are 
a f f i l i a t e d to an umbrella organisation, the Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (D.G.B.); wage regulation, however, i s 
confined to the individual unions and hence industrial sectors 
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(see also Cullingford, 1976). The regulation of wages is carried 
out within the framework of the Tarifvertragsgesetz, or wages 
contract law, by associations representing, respectively, the 
unions and the employers. Both sides are strongly opposed to 
state interference in this system of collective bargaining. The 
t r a d i t i o n a l weapon of the union in these nego tat ions is the 
Warnstreik, or warning s t r i k e , often lasting one or two hours and 
confined to a small number of employees at works selected by the 
union. Longer strikes are not so common. They may not be 
declared u n t i l the p o s s i b i l i t y of further negotiations has been 
exhausted and before a secret ballot has been held with at least 
75% voting in favour. 
The second significant feature of t h i s notion of social 
partnership i s that of Mitbestimmong, l i t e r a l l y co-determination, 
implying workers' participation in management. Ihe unions have 
actively supported t h i s conception, resulting in the passing of 
le g i s l a t i o n in 1951/2 which provided for i t s introduction in a l l 
j o i n t stock companies in the iron and steel industry with over 
1,000 employees. Further legislation, extending the scope of 
application, was passed in 1976 (see Childs and Johnson, 1982, 
72; further, f or a consideration of the significance of co-
determination and documentation on the struggle for i t s 
introduction i n the 1945-51 period, see Peters and Pfromm, 
1979a). I t i s necessary to distinguish, however, 
MontaimLtbestifflmung from Mitbestimmung. The former requires 
employers to form a supervisory board, Aufsichtsrat, of equal 
numbers of employees' and shareholders representatives, with a 
"neutral" president. Further, on the main board, there is an 
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Arbeitsdirektor or workers 1 director with the same powers and 
rights as a l l other directors. In the l a t t e r conception there is 
no provision for a workers 1 director on the main board and the 
supervisory board only has one-third of i t s number elected by the 
employees. 
The t h i r d feature is that encompassing relations between 
management and employees at individual works, as organised by the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, or works' constitution law. This 
provides for the election of a Betriebsrat or works council every 
three years, which effectively structures communication between 
management and employees at the works level. Although the works 
council is supported by the appropriate union, i t is not allowed 
to act in the name of union policy: rather i t is obliged to act 
i n the interests of the firm as a whole. 
The significance of the formalised i n s t i t u t i o n a l strength of this 
social partnership should not be underestimated. The points of 
contact between state and society are regulated in a r i g i d 
fashion by a set of structures involving wage bargaining and 
employee representation, labour actively co-operating with 
capital in the management of industry. In other words the social 
relations of production are structured around apparently 
harmonious co-development in the pursuit of high p r o f i t s and high 
wages. This e f f e c t i v e l y ties trades unions and employers to each 
other within the state apparatus whilst minimising the 
requirement for direct state intervention in industry. Clearly, 
however, high p r o f i t s and high wages are not mutually compatible 
goals, even under conditions of economic growth but especially 
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under recessionary conditions such as the post-1974 period. I t 
i s scarcely surprising, therefore, that the social partnership 
should have been placed under increasing strain during this 
l a t t e r period. This has been especially true in the steel 
industry, where the conception had already developed to the 
strongest advantage of labour and where the impact of recession 
has been f e l t most dramatically. In t h i s the position of the 
union I.G. Metal 1 has been of considerable significance. In 
point of tact the I.G, Metall is not j u s t an iron and steel 
workers' union - i t also organises in the engineering sector and 
in other metals production works. The significance of iron and 
steel within the union is symbolised, however, by the existence 
of a separate headquarters specifically for t h i s industry i n 
Diisseldorf: the main headquarters is in Frankfurt. Further, 
there i s a separate t a r i f f bargaining process for the iron and 
steel sector. The main central body from the point of view of 
permanent constitution is that of the executive committee (table 
VII. 1). More si g n i f i c a n t l y , however, i t is possible to identify 
a considerable degree of decentralisation within the union's 
structure, arising at least i n part from i t s claim to be a 
'democratic organisation'. This decentralisation i s most obvious 
at the level of administrative authorities, the smallest areal 
unit (for example the town of Dortmund), but with i t s own 
permanent administration. Below t h i s , too, there exists the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of even more decentralised action arising from the 
organisation of shop stewards at individual works level. Given a 
membership of some 80-90% within the iron and steel sector t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y of what must be termed r e l a t i v e l y autonomous action 
i s of considerable significance. 
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For example, i n September 1969 there was a short sharp series of 
strikes in the Ruhr and the Saar regions, independent of the 
usual wage regulation structure. About 140,000 workers from 70 
workplaces participated (see Muller-Jensch and Sperling, 1978). 
Further, throughout the period 1970-4 there were a number of 
locally-organised strikes; for example at the Opel works in 
Bochum in 1973 (see Kirchlechner, 1978). Such strikes were 
generally discouraged by the appropriate union, representing as 
they did a threat to the usual structure. During the 1970's, 
however, the position of the union at national level hardened, 
undoubtedly pa r t l y in response to growing militancy arising from 
the deepening recession in steel. Ihe f i r s t true signs of alarm 
came at a conference i n Dortmund in 1977, where much was made of 
the 20,000 jobs lost in the industry in the previous three years 
(see ImGm Me t a l l , 1977). A more active response, however, came 
the following year with the 1978/9 steel s t r i k e . 
The national steel strike represented a definite hardening of the 
position of I.G.Metal1 (for details see Gehrcke, 1979; Dzielak 
1980). At the st a r t of the negotiations in the annual t a r i f f 
round in August 1978 the union made clear that i t wanted a 
reduction to a 35-hour week with no loss in earnings, with the 
specific aim of safeguarding jobs in the industry. By November 
no agreement had been reached; on the 17th of that month the 
union members were asked 'Are you prepared to strike in defence 
of the principles of a 35-hour week and a 5 per cent pay 
increase?' (Gehrcke, 1979, 143). With an 87% vote in favour, the 
s t r i k e began on 28 November, i n i t i a l l y with just 37,000 members 
called out by the union (Dzielak, 1980, 28). The employers 
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responded with a lock-out of 29,000 workers from 8 works on 1 
December. The strike gradually hardened, however; by 3 January 
1979 some 100,000 members had been ordered out by the union. A 
compromise was f i n a l l y agreed on 7 January, involving a 4% 
increase for 15 months from 1 November 1978, and the promise of 6 
weeks holiday by 1982. The st r i k e ended on 11 January, after a 
ballot in favour of the proposal the previous day (Gehrcke, 1979, 
156). 
The significance of the 44-day national steel strike l i e s in the 
attempt of the union to broaden the t a r i f f bargaining process to 
encompass issues not specifically tied to the question of wages. 
The conception of the 35-hour week with no reduction in earnings 
was intended to safeguard the volume of employment i n the 
industry. This broadening of the t a r i f f bargaining process was 
resisted by the employers, who preferred to see their concessions 
as extra holiday, a quali t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t conception (though 
with similar effects) t o that of a reduction in the working week. 
In t h i s sense the phrasing of the f i n a l t a r i f f agreement in terms 
of 'extra holiday' should be seen as a victory for the employers. 
The developing c r i s i s in the social relations of production has 
been f e l t most acutely in the Ruhr region, which contains, even 
today, a concentration of so-called ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' , heavy industry 
(see Dege, 1980; Landwehrmann, 1980; for an English language 
account see Hall, 1966). The dominance of coal, steel and 
related industries i s subsumed under the term Nontanindustrie, 
signifying the close inter-relationship between these sectors. 
- 243 -
The region has not escaped, though, from the decline o f these 
i n d u s t r i a l branches which has been evident throughout most of 
Western Europe. I n coal, f o r example, there was a continuing 
c r i s i s a f t e r 1957 l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of the switch to o i l , a 
s i t u a t i o n p a r a l l e l e d i n , f o r example, North East England (see 
Hudson, 1983). The extent of the decline i n employment and 
output has been dramatic. Fran a s i t u a t i o n where coal employed 
470,000 i n 1920 (Wegener and Vannahme, 1981), to the post-war 
boom of 1957 w i t h a workforce of 496,000, there was a decline t o 
141,000 i n 1980 (Table V I I . 2 ) . This s i t u a t i o n r e f l e c t e d a c r i s i s 
of p r o f i t a b i l i t y i n the industry during the 1960's, p a r t i a l l y 
resolved when i t was r a t i o n a l i s e d w i t h the formation of Ruhrkohle 
A.G. i n 1968, from 24 former companies wi t h 94% of the annual 
national output. 
A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n has arisen i n the s t e e l industry f o l l o w i n g 
the advent of c r i s i s conditions i n 1974. For example, i n the 
period 1977-80 the region l o s t 14,000 jobs i n i r o n and s t e e l 
lowering absolute employment to 140,000 (Kcranunalverband 
Ruhrgebiet, 1982c). At a broader l e v e l , employment i n metals 
production, which i s dominated by the iron and s t e e l sector, f e l l 
by some 50,000 i n the period 1970-79, t o a t o t a l of 200,000 
(Table V I I . 3 ) . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, the i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e 
of the region s t i l l r e f l e c t s i t s h i s t o r i c a l dependence on the 
'montan' sector (Table V I I . 4 ) . The i r o n , s t e e l and coal mining 
sector provided nearly 40% o f t o t a l employment and 32% of output 
i n terms o f turnover i n 1980. The sub-total of these and the 
r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i e s o f , f o r example, chemicals and engineering, at 
76% of both t o t a l turnover and t o t a l employment emphasises the 
continuing nature of the remaining i n d u s t r i a l base of the region. 
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Faced with these problems o f decline i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
i n d u s t r i a l base, l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of organised c a p i t a l have 
expressed concern over the f u t u r e , l a r g e l y i n the form of demands 
f o r a l t e r n a t i v e employment t o replace jobs l o s t i n the coal and 
ste e l i n d u s t r i e s . These have been translated i n t o p o l i t i c a l 
i n i t i a t i v e s , notably w i t h i n the Land government of Nordrhein-
Westfalen (NEW). The 'action programme f o r the Ruhr 1 and the 
'Ruhr-conference' both date from 1979. They are of considerable 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , representing a classic p o l i t i c a l response to acute 
regional problems - a broad-based i n j e c t i o n of investment i n t o 
the region from the st a t e , and an attempt t o pub l i c i s e the 
problem and future p o t e n t i a l of the region w i t h i n the national 
economy. Thus on the 8th-9th May 1979 some 150 representatives 
o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , employers' organisations, unions and 
churches met i n Castrop-Rauxel a t the i n i t i a t i v e o f NOT Minister-
president Rau t o discuss the problems o f the Ruhrgebiet ( f o r 
documentation, see NRW, 1979 b). I n his int r o d u c t i o n Rau made 
clear the i n t e n t i o n of the conference: 
'Decisive f o r t h i s p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e , which t h i s Ruhr 
conference c e r t a i n l y i s , were the pressing levels of 
unemployment i n the Ruhrgebiet and the special s t r u c t u r a l 
problems of the economy.' 
(NRW, 1979 b, 6 1) 
The c l a s s i c nature o f Rau's p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e was made more 
apparent l a t e r i n the year wi t h the announcement of a seven p o i n t 
'action programme' f o r the Ruhr (see NRW, 1979c). This programme 
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entailed a sizeable a l l o c a t i o n of state expenditure f o r the 
region over the period 1980-4: 5,400 m. D.M. from the NRW land, 
1,500 m. D.M. from the Bund ( f o r d e t a i l s , see Tables V I I . 5 , 
V I I . 6 ) . Ihe seven main parts of the programme i l l u s t r a t e the 
broad nature of the i n j e c t i o n o f state funds: improvement of 
t r a i n i n g and education, encouragement of regional innovation 
p o t e n t i a l , improvement of housing conditions, environmental 
p r o t e c t i o n , encouragement of c a p i t a l investment, improvement of 
c u l t u r a l l i f e , and an emphasis on the continued energy-production 
function of the Ruhr. Thus the whole programme should be seen as 
an attempt a c t i v e l y t o encourage p r i v a t e c a p i t a l investment i n 
the Ruhrgebiet, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , through an attempt 
t o b o l s t e r the popular 'image' o f the region. I n t h i s respect 
the programme must be regarded as a p o l i t i c a l response to 
regional problems, encouraging a l t e r n a t i v e investment w i t h the 
aim of ' a l t e r n a t i v e employment'. 
This programme met wit h the active approval of the region's 
Indusixie-und-Handelskammern (chambers of commerce, IHK). There 
are f i v e such w i t h i n the Ruhr, based on Bochum, Dortmund, 
Duisburg, Essen and Miinster. They are p a r t i c u l a r l y wealthy and 
powerful organisations (see also Kunzmann, 1982), f o r whom the 
problem i s one of s t r u c t u r a l change t o which the answer i s to co-
operate w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l apparatus t o secure new, p r i v a t e 
investment f o r the region: 
'The successful accomplishment of s t r u c t u r a l change i n the 
Ruhrgebiet i s not conceivable without h e l p f u l support from 
p o l i t i c a l and administrative bodies ... The I.H.K's of the 
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Ruhrgebiet are ready to work a c t i v e l y with them to f u r t h e r 
these processes. 1 
(I.H.K., 1982, 34? 2) 
Clearly, however, the s o c i a l partnership i s r e q u i r i n g increased 
support frcm government. Rat i o n a l i s a t i o n of the coal industry i n 
1968 was one dramatic expression of the f a i l u r e of e x i s t i n g 
arrangements w i t h i n the general r e l a t i o n s of production. I n t h i s 
the state was heavily implicated. Under the conditions f o r the 
formation of Ruhrkohle, the payment of the debts of the twenty 
four former companies was guaranteed by the s t a t e , although the 
3 
reconstituted company was e f f e c t i v e l y owned by the s t e e l 
producers - 60% o f i t s c a p i t a l was held by them i n 1971 
(Jablonowski and Offermans, 1974). 
There i s a precedent, then, f o r active state f i n a n c i a l support to 
p r i v a t e c a p i t a l . There has also been increasing pressure f o r 
s i m i l a r assistance to the s t e e l industry, casting f u r t h e r doubts 
upon the l i m i t e d r o l e of government in the s o c i a l partnership. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y the conception of a c t i v e state disinvolvement has 
held sane credence ( i n the post-war period, a t l e a s t ) i n s t e e l . 
For example i n response t o a drop i n demand i n 1967 four 
regionally-based Walzstahlkcntore, or s t e e l sales groups, were 
established by p r i v a t e c a p i t a l , i n an attempt t o maintain 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y (Bomer, 1977, 81) # More recently the West German 
government has argued t h a t the problem of over-capacity i s one 
f o r c a p i t a l t o work out alone, a l l i e d t o the argument t h a t the 
current depth o f the c r i s i s i n the European ste e l industry i s 
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caused by the extent of state support i n other European countries 
f o r t h e i r national s t e e l industries which has had the e f f e c t of 
'unbalancing' the 'normal' r e s t r u c t u r i n g mechanism of the market. 
Typical of t h i s l a t t e r concern was the German pos i t i o n at the EEC 
Council meeting i n June 1981, where an agreement was reached t o 
extend state subsidies u n t i l the end of 1985 only a f t e r 
considerable opposition from the German delegation (see Chapter 
I V ) . 
Even i n s t e e l , however, the government has recently given 
f i n a n c i a l assistance t o c a p i t a l . I n the l a t e 1970's considerable 
payments were made to the steel companies i n the Saar and to the 
company of S a l z g i t t e r (see Kdmrrunalverhand RArgebiet, 1981). 
Having done t h i s , the government was placed i n a p o s i t i o n where 
i t could scarcely refuse t o consider s i m i l a r assistance f o r the 
Ruhr-based s t e e l producers. For managers of Krupp Stahl, f o r 
example, could argue t h a t 'the Ruhr i s no less German than the 
4 
Saar' or more s p e c i f i c a l l y 'We cannot accept that the Federal 
Government can see f i t t o act i n the case of Arbed-Saarstahl but 
5 
not i n the case of the Ruhr' . I n 1981 the government therefore 
announced 1,700 m. D.M. state aid f o r the s t e e l industry, 
including f o r example finance f o r payment of 4,000-6,000 D.M. f o r 
ea r l y retirement of steelworkers (Table VTI.7). 
I t i s apparent, then, that the soc i a l partnership i s coming under 
increasing s t r a i n . Reorganisation o f the coal industry i n 1968 
and assistance t o the Saar ste e l companies during the l a t e 1970's 
created precedents f o r state f i n a n c i a l assistance t o s t e e l 
c a p i t a l i n the Ruhr. The s t e e l union, I.G. Me t a l l , and i t s 
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members, have developed t h e i r e a r l i e r concern wi t h g e t t i n g the 
best out of the s o c i a l partnership t o the point of national 
s t r i k e action i n 1978/79. Organisations of c a p i t a l i n the Ruhr 
have became concerned about the precipitous decline of the 
region's t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l base. Their desire t o see 
a l t e r n a t i v e investment by p r i v a t e c a p i t a l w i t h i n the region has 
been mirrored i n the regional government's support f o r a 
programme of a l t e r n a t i v e employment creation. I n other words 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o f l o c a l and national p o l i t i c s are increasingly 
playing a d i r e c t , unmediated r o l e i n the system of production 
which was once exclusively organised around a conception of co-
determination by c a p i t a l and labour with the state merely playing 
a f a c i l i t a t i v e r o l e i n creating the conditions f o r continued 
accumulation. For j u s t as coal i s a v i t a l resource f o r the rest 
of industry, so tco i s s t e e l . And i t i s to the development o f 
s t e e l c a p i t a l s during t h i s period t h a t we turn i n the following 
section. 
V I I . 3 The development of s t e e l c a p i t a l i n the Ruhr 
Within the Ruhr region i t has been possible t o discern two trends 
i n the l o c a t i o n o f the dominant sectors o f coal and s t e e l . Coal 
production has h i s t o r i c a l l y moved fran the southern zone of the 
Ruhr t o the north, as the shallower p i t s i n the south have been 
gradually exhausted. The significance o f t h i s trend was 
recognised i n the 1960 regional plan which employed a three-fold 
north-south d i v i s i o n l a r g e l y r e f l e c t i n g the trend i n coal 
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production location (see Hall, 1966). On the other hand the 
dominant aggregate trend in steel production location has been 
away from the east towards the west, so that the overall 
percentage of the east in t o t a l output has gradually fallen. The 
extent of t h i s general trend is such that the output of the 
Dortmund/Hagen region has declined from 40% of t o t a l Ruhr 
production in 1948 to 20% in 1982 (Table VII.8). These trends 
are reflections of the development of individual steel capitals. 
We therefore consider these developments in d e t a i l . 
The development of Klockner's steel production f a c i l i t i e s is of 
considerable interest because i t shows the f i r s t example in 
recent times of the rundown of steel production in the east of 
the Ruhr. The company owns three main production sites and has 
an interest i n a fourth; Bremen, Georgsmarienhutte (near 
Osnabriick) and Maxhiitte (North of Munich), with a share in 
Hanfcurger Stahlwerke. Emphasis is placed here, however, on the 
Bremen works, for the development of this s i t e has had 
considerable repercussions in the Ruhrgebiet. 
The development of the Bremen works in the 1950's has to be seen 
in the context of contemporary ECSC forecasts of an increasing 
world demand for f l a t steel products. To meet this demand 
Klockner decided in 1952 to build a new, integrated works in a 
coastal location, in a bid to increase exports. In January 1954 
Bremen emerged as the f i n a l location. Significant features in 
t h i s choice were the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a large f l a t area of cheap 
land and the decision of the Bremen authorities to s t a r t 
canalising the Weser to enable ships of 25-30,000 d.w.t. to be 
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unloaded at the works. The f i r s t steel was produced at the s i t e 
in 1957 (on the technical development of the works, see Asbeck 
and Heemeyer, 1960). During the 1960,s the most economical 
tonnage of ship for transport consideration increased rapidly. 
In response, Klockner purchased an area of land at Bremerhaven, 
60km. downstream, and developed ore handling f a c i l i t i e s there. 
Even thi s harbour, however, could only handle ships of up to 
85,000 d.w.t. This, and the necessity to trans-ship the ore to 
r a i l wagons, si g n i f i c a n t l y reduced any locational cost advantage 
gained by Bremen. 
Nevertheless, during the 1970fs a considerable modernisation 
programme was undertaken at Bremen, aimed at updating the f l a t 
steel production f a c i l i t i e s . Following the introduction of 
oxygen steel converters in 1968, there was the construction of a 
new large blast furnace, with a hearth diameter of 12.0m. in 
1973, and a new wide s t r i p m i l l in 1974. This l a t t e r is capable 
of r o l l i n g the widest f l a t steel of any m i l l in the world, up to 
2.1m. Significantly, in the current recession, demand for such 
wide steel products from, for example, American automobile 
concerns, has seen one of the greatest percentage declines. 
More importantly for present purposes, however, the development 
of the Bremen works had considerable consequences for the (now 
closed) Hagen works south of Dortmund. In the early 1950's 
before Bremen was b u i l t , Klockner specialised in p r o f i l e s , r a i l s 
and sections in particular at the Georgsmarienhutte and Hagen-
Haspe works. Hence the development of f l a t steel production at a 
semi-coastal s i t e meant that Hagen-Haspe would be starved of 
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investment f o r two reasons - i n the f i r s t place because i t 
specialised i n what was considered t o be a marginally less 
p r o f i t a b l e product area ( i . e . p r o f i l e s rather than f l a t s ) and i n 
the second place because inherent i n the move to the coast was a 
recognition of the r e l a t i v e l y unprofitable location of Hagen even 
w i t h i n the Ruhr region. 
Consequently, from a peak year i n 1964/5 when i t produced 963,000 
t . of crude s t e e l w i t h a workforce of some 8,000, the Hagen works 
saw a gradual rundown (see Hartmann, 1981). I n 1967 one of the 
three s t e e l shops was closed wi t h 1,500 redundancies? i n 1972 
s t e e l production f i n i s h e d completely, w i t h the closure of the 
remaining two s t e e l shops and the loss of 2,200 jobs. The 
fo l l o w i n g year Klockner bought a share i n the Hamburger 
Stahlwerke to supply Hagen with s t e e l ; f o r example 300,000 t . of 
semis were received i n that f i r s t year (1973). The Bremen works 
was unable to supply the correct dimension of semi-finished 
product, being orientated t o f l a t f inished products. Throughout 
the 1970*s Hagen continued to produce a range of r o l l e d sections, 
but w i t h an ever-decreasing workforce, down to 270 i n November 
1980. The ultimate closure of the works i n December 1982 was by 
then no surprise. 
I t would appear, however, that the emphasis on wide f l a t s t e e l 
has been a considerable handicap t o the company i n the current 
recession. Klockner has consistently refused to adhere to the 
production quotas of the E.E.C., i n an e f f o r t t o r e t u r n t o 
p r o f i t a b l e operation (see Table V I I . 9 ) . This has not proved to 
be s u f f i c i e n t t o stem the losses, however, so that at the AGM i n 
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EXjisburg on 3 May 1983 the chairman conceded that the company was 
to reduce capacity by 40%, the greatest percentage reduction of 
a l l West German steel firms. This situation was specifically 
blamed on the E.E.C. production quotas which ( i f they had been 
adhered to) would have restricted u t i l i s a t i o n of the hot wide 
s t r i p m i l l at Bremen to 43% of capacity, compared to quotas of 
57.7% for the other five similar West German m i l l s (quoted in 
Ruhr Nachrichten, 4 May 1983). 
I t i s possible to discern a number of similar features in the 
strategy of Krupp Stahl. In particular, Krupp have also 
developed an interest in f l a t steel during the post-war period. 
The or i g i n a l works of the Krupp concern was founded in 1896 at 
Rheinhausen. Following the second world war, in 1953, Hutten-
und -Bergwerke Rheinhausen A.G. was established to encompass the 
former Krupp iron and coal assets. In 1965 the name of th i s 
ccmpany was changed to Fried Krupp Huttenuerke A.G. and i t 
acquired Bochumer Verein A.G. Ihe significance of this take-over 
l i e s in the fact that the Bochum company specialised in f l a t 
steel products, whereas the Rheinhausen si t e had u n t i l then 
specialised in sections. Consequently the merger must be seen i n 
the context of the desire of the Krupp concern to diversify i t s 
range of steel products, with increased emphasis on f l a t 
products. By the late 1970's f l a t steel products were produced 
in roughly twice the tonnage of sections. 
There was a very early recognition within the enlarged company of 
the additional cost of the Bochum location over Rheinhausen for 
iron-making. Consequently, from 1966 when there were five blast 
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furnaces at Bochum, there was a rapid programme of closure so 
t h a t by 1968 there were none remaining. Steel production 
continued at Bochum however i n L.D., open hearth and e l e c t r i c arc 
furnaces: the f i r s t two necessitating the transport of hot ir o n 
i n 'torpedo 1 r a i l c a r r i e r s from the blast furnaces a t Rheinhausen 
u n t i l the closure of the l a s t such converter i n 1982. Hence 
w i t h i n the enlarged Krupp concern a f t e r 1965 there has been a 
gradual rundown of f i r s t crude iron and l a t e r crude s t e e l 
capacity a t the r e l a t i v e l y unfavourable location of Bochum. 
A f u r t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t feature o f the company's strategy, which 
distinguishes i t from t h a t of Klockner, has been the emphasis on 
increasing the q u a l i t y of s t e e l produced. Hence i n the period 
1974-8 Krupp merged w i t h Stahlwerke Sudwestfalen A.G., one o f 
Europe's most important producers of special s t e e l . I n the 1977-
81 period special st e e l accounted f o r approximately 45% of the 
value o f a l l sales o f s t e e l , a s i g n i f i c a n t l y high proportion 
(Table VI1.10). Further, Krupp have continued t o invest i n new, 
high q u a l i t y s t e e l f a c i l i t i e s . For example i n 1982 a new ' u l t r a -
high power' e l e c t r i c arc furnace was commissioned a t Bochum, w i t h 
the claim t h a t at the time i t was the most advanced production 
f a c i l i t y o f i t s kind i n the world. With an investment o f 100 m. 
D.M. Krupp replaced an older e l e c t r i c furnace and a number of 
converters, w i t h a t o t a l capacity of 105,000 t . monthly, w i t h a 
120-tonne capacity furnace with a monthly capacity o f 50,000 t . 
of higher-grade s t e e l . As a consequence the steelworks labour 
force has f a l l e n from 700 t o 400. Thus the strategy o f 
concentrating on higher q u a l i t y steels has also had the e f f e c t o f 
reducing manpower requirements. 
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By contrast Maimesnam has a l l i t s steel production f a c i l i t i e s 
located on the Rhine. This company has consistently argued that 
i t i s not a s t e e l producer. I t s organisation i s such that i t has 
no s p e c i f i c daughter company which can be i d e n t i f i e d as a steel 
ccmpany. This i s i n large part a r e s u l t of a conscious attempt 
t o break away from the stronger provisions of Mcntarnritbestinnung 
(see Chapter V I I . 2 ) , which only applies t o i r o n , steel and coal 
companies. For example, the company does not report to the iron 
and s t e e l employers' association, the Wirtschaftsvereinigung 
Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, i n Dusseldorf; nor was i t included i n 
the so-called 'moderators 1 r e p o r t 1 of 1983 (see Chapter V I I . 5 ) . 
The two main production companies are Mannesmann Rohrenwerke A.G. 
and Maimesmam Demag A.G. The former was created i n 1973 as a 
r e s u l t of an agreement wi t h Thyssen, whereby the share c a p i t a l 
was held two-thirds by Mannesmann, one-third by Hryssen. Frcm a 
large plant a t Huckingen on the Rhine i t produces exclusively 
pipes and tubes: 3.3 m.t. i n 1982, with 7,900 employees (IHK 
IXiisburg, 1983). C r u c i a l l y , the ECSC d e f i n i t i o n of ir o n and 
st e e l a c t i v i t i e s s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes the production of tubes 
and pipes. Hence, although the company had four blast furnaces 
and f i v e oxygen converters i n 1982, i t was able t o claim that i t 
was not a s t e e l company. The second main production company, 
Mannesmann Demag, i s an engineering company (formerly Demag) i n t o 
which Mannesmann bought during the period 1972-9. This has no 
s t e e l production plant as such but rather makes such p l a n t , along 
w i t h a range of compressors, construction and materials handling 
equipment. Consequently the strategy o f Mannesmann i s of 
considerable significance i n th a t i t i l l u s t r a t e s another response 
t o the c r i s i s i n i r o n and s t e e l - d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t o other 
branches, espec i a l l y engineering. 
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Much the same is true of Tftyssen, the Ruhr's largest steel 
producer and a major trading company ( i n which steel is only one 
branch), with a turnover of 28,000 m. D.M. in 1983 (Table 
V I I . 11). The steel division incorporates Hiyssen A.G., Uiyssen 
Henrichshutte and Ttryssen Niederrhein located in the 
Duisburg/Oberhausen area, and a number of smaller concerns. In 
1983 the Duisburg producers employed 47,000 (Table VII.12) from 
plant which i n 1982 included sixteen blast furnaces, eleven 
oxygen converters and four el e c t r i c arc furnaces (Tbyssen A.G., 
1982). Total crude steel output of the Thyssen group, including 
that of the special steels division, stood at 9.4 m.t. in 1983, 
down from 13.1 m.t. in 1980 (Table VII.13). As part of t h i s 
decline the steel division has seen mounting losses since 1981 
whilst even special steels made a loss in 1983 (Table VII.14). 
Clearly, then, four of the major steel producers in the Ruhr have 
followed a number of strategies. Klockner closed plant in the 
east of the Ruhr at an early date, as part of i t s expansion at 
Bremen, whilst Krupp acquired by take-over works at Bochum in 
mid-Ruhr and closed t h e i r iron-making capacity as part of a 
recognition of the more profitable location of the Rhine for this 
purpose. The two other major steel producers, Hryssen and 
Mannesmann, are heavily concentrated at the junction of the Ruhr 
with the Rhine and at the same time have diversified out of steel 
into other sectors, pri n c i p a l l y engineering, to a considerable 
extent. This raises interesting questions about how Hoescfa, 
located in Dortmund to the east of the Ruhr, has been able to 
adapt to the changing conditions of the steel industry. 
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V I I . 4 Hoesch and Dortmund : from t r a n s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
t o n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ? 
The p o s i t i o n of Hoesch today cannot be understood without 
consideration of the development of the company in the l a t e '60's 
and e a r l y '70's. I n 1966 Hoesch merged wit h Dortniinder-fiorder 
Huttenunion A.G. (DHHU) combining the Westfalen s i t e o f the 
former w i t h the Union and Phoenix s i t e s of the l a t t e r . The basis 
of the Dortmund merger was the development by DHHU of a new stee l 
p l a n t i n 1963, and a new large b l a s t furnace i n 1965, both at the 
Phoenix works. Hoesch a t t h i s time had also considered the 
construction o f a new st e e l p l a n t . However a merger appeared an 
a t t r a c t i v e proposition t o both par t i e s since the investment costs 
proved t o be a considerable f i n a n c i a l burden to EHHU. Following 
t h i s f i r s t merger the 42.7% share o f the Dutch steel company 
Hooghovens i n EHHU was converted to a 15% share i n the enlarged 
Hoesch (see Fleming and Krumme, 1968). 
Within the enlarged Hoesch there developed considerable 
discussion over future p o l i c y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , F. Harders, 
president of DHHU u n t i l 1966, vice-president of Hoesch t i l l 1968, 
president from 1969 t i l l h i s death i n 1973, favoured competing on 
the bulk s t e e l market, and hence favoured a coastal development. 
This p o l i c y was not popular w i t h a l l w i t h i n the company 
administration, as epitomised by the resignation of the chairman 
of the Aufsichtsrat, W. Ochel i n 1970. Formerly president of the 
old Hoesch company, he was president o f the enlarged company 
u n t i l 1969 when he was moved t o the supervisory board. He had 
wanted t o b u i l d a second s t e e l p l a n t i n Dortmund: h i s successor, 
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however, H.J. Abs, president of the Deutsche Bank, became a 
strong supporter of the coastal plant strategy (see Schroter, 
1982, 13). 
With Hoesch unable to secure s u f f i c i e n t finance to build a new 
coastal plant of t h e i r own, a t o t a l merger with Hooghovens 
developed as the most attractive alternative. There was some 
opposition to t h i s from the Dortmund workforce, fearing that the 
coastal Ijmuiden plant threatened their employment. Partly to 
appease th i s opposition, the Hoesch management proposed to 
construct a new steel plant at Dortmund in 1971; at the same 
time the Hooghovens management proposed a new steel plant at 
Rotterdam. Whether these were in fact t a c t i c a l manoeuvres (as 
suggested by Jager, 1981, 133; Schroter, 1982, 14), and i f so, 
with what aim ( fappeasing 1 the relative workforces, or as a 
jousting for position p r i o r to a merger) cannot be clearly 
ascertained. What is certain is that the reason for not building 
at Rotterdam, as given by both Hoesch and Hooghovens after 1972 -
environmental problems - must be treated with considerable 
scepticism in view of the concentration of, in particular, 
petrochemical refinery capacity at Rotterdam. 
Hoesch merged with Hooghovens on 1 January 1972, to form Estel, 
agreeing to take 300,000 t . p.a. of semis from the Dutch concern. 
The following year Estel put forward a new strategy which 
entailed no new steel plant for Dortmund, rather modernisation of 
the existing open-hearth works for use u n t i l 1990, along with the 
closure of the Phoenix works, with the oxygen steel converters, 
after 1990. Despite speculation i n 1974-5 over the p o s s i b i l i t y 
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of a t o t a l l y new plant on a new site in Dortmund, the strategy 
was confirmed in May 1979 by Estel. The steel production 
function of Dortmund was to be allowed to stagnate. Production 
costs of steel were quoted as being 38 D.M./t. greater than at 
Ijmuiden: hence the Hoesch concern was to concentrate on steel 
processing (see Jager, 1981, 135; Schroter, 1982, 17), as part 
of an attempt to stop Estel's mounting losses (Table V I I . 15). 
With hindsight i t would appear that t h i s marked a definite 
turning point in the development of Estel. For not only was such 
a strategy unacceptable to the workforce in Dortmund, i t was also 
unacceptable to the management on the Hoesch side of the Estel 
concern (although a head o f f i c e of Estel was established at 
Nimwegen, the two partners maintained separate production 
management organisations). Consequently, in the autumn of 1979 
the idea of a new steelworks for Dortmund re-emerged at f i r s t 
largely in the form of speculation. On 23 January 1980, however, 
a concrete plan was announced i n Dusseldorf for the construction 
of a new oxygen steel plant at Westfalen to replace Hoesch's 
three open hearth works, dependent on 240 m. D.M. of state aid 
from Bund and Land governments. The place and timing of t h i s 
announcement are crucial, for i t was not u n t i l 30 January, one 
week la t e r , that the supervisory board of the whole Estel concern 
gave i t s approval to the proposal. 
Although a concrete plan had now emerged, l i t t l e specific action 
was taken, save f o r Hoesch applying for planning permission for 
the new works in September 1980. This lack of action encouraged 
the development of further speculation in the autumn of 1980. 
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Following a board meeting of the Estel directors on 29 October, 
from which no decision was announced at the time, 1,500 employees 
on two r o l l i n g m i l l s of Hoesch stopped work on 31 October at 
short notice, to demonstrate in protest against the continuing 
uncertainty. The following day 800 Vertrauensl eute (shop 
stewards) demonstrated in front of the company head o f f i c e , 
voicing similar complaints. Their worst fears were realised when 
on 4 November Hoesch chief Pohwedder informed the Rat (town 
council) of Dortmund that the plan had, in fact, been shelved. 
In the opinion of the Estel directors 'the present situation and 
the great uncertainty over future developments do not allow, at 
the present moment, major strategic investments to take place.'^ 
Certainly, the announcement followed the worsening of the steel 
c r i s i s and the introduction of compulsory E.E.C. production 
quotas during the course of 1980. Just as significant, however, 
given the l a t e r break-up of Estel, is the fact that a plan 
announced with the benefit of West German state aid should be 
cancelled by a j o i n t West German/Dutch board of directors. This 
was l i k e l y to be unacceptable to both Hoesch workforce and Hoesch 
management. 
The month of November saw considerable discussion over the 
implications of t h i s cancellation, originating in particular from 
a nebulous group, the Burger initiative Stahlwerk Jetzt! (the 
citizens' i n i t i a t i v e for a steelworks now!). Perhaps best 
described as a cause rather than an organisation i t represents a 
broadening of the protest from ju s t steel workers to include 
other fractions of the class of labour. I t was certainly of 
considerable significance in the single most important event of 
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th i s period, a demonstration of 70,000 people on 28 November in 
the town centre in support of the slogan Stahlwerk Jetzt! The 
size of the demonstration demonstrates clearly the extent to 
which concern had spread to include a variety of occupations 
other than steelworkers, being some four times greater than the 
t o t a l Hoesch Dortmund workforce of the time. 
This expression of popular concern was followed by a Dortmund 
1 Stahlloonferenz1 on 18 December, attended by some 150 
po l i t i c i a n s , representatives of Hoesch and union leaders. This 
met again on 30 January 1981; both times with no practical 
result. However, both conferences did serve to defuse the 
popular protest of late November for the majority of the 
p o l i t i c a l representatives stressed the provision of alternative 
employment rather than the construction of a new steelworks (see 
also Bomer, 1982, 44). Such an emphasis has already been 
described as a t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l response, t y p i f i e d by the 
five-point programme put forward at the f i r s t conference by the 
IHK Dortmund, which stressed the need to improve the 
infrastructure of the eastern Ruhrgebiet. Although perhaps 
unwittingly, the participants i n these conferences seemed to 
side-track the issue from construction of a steelworks to 
provision of alternative employment. That this served to defuse 
popular protest i s evidenced by the lack of broad-based action 
further to the demonstration of 28 November. 
Thus i t was not u n t i l February of 1981 that significant protest 
action returned, now however largely confined to those d i r e c t l y 
engaged i n steel production. I n t h i s context though i t i s 
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important to emphasise the p o s s i b i l i t y of 'fragmentation 1 of 
protest action, arising largely from the presence of two 
conflicting works-based employee representation systems: the 
Betriebsrat (works council) and the Vertrauensleute (shop 
stewards). The works council, by i t s very constitution (see 
Chapter VII . 2 ) , cannot act in the name of union policy yet 
relations between Hoesch and the employees of Hoesch at a works 
level are effectively structured through this body. The shop 
stewards, on the other hand, represent direct union interests, 
and are t r a d i t i o n a l l y the most m i l i t a n t of union members. Hence 
the most active union members are denied access to the formal 
meetings with management unless they are elected to the works 
council, where they can no longer actively promote anything 
recognised as union policy. This tension can be i l l u s t r a t e d in 
the period a f t e r February 1981. 
On 5 February 1981 a l l 1,000 shop-stewards of the Hoesch works 
met to discuss future action: the most immediate consequence was 
a series of short strikes similar to the Warnstreiks of t a r i f f 
negotiation policy, on February 9th and 13th. Hoesch management 
responded with a new proposal, entailing the construction of a 
new steelworks not as a replacement for the open-hearth works but 
rather as a replacement of the Phoenix works. The decision over 
t h i s new plan i s dated by Bcmer (1982, 53) to a meeting of the 
Hoesch directors on 18 March 1981, and of the Hoesch Aufsichtsrat 
of 9 A p r i l . Further details emerged on 7 May, when Rohwedder 
disclosed that the plant was intended to replace not only the 
Phoenix works, but would also bring about the entire closure of 
the Union and Phoenix sites: as a result the Hoesch Dortmund 
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workforce would f a l l from 21,000 to 13,000. The f u l l plan was 
tentatively agreed by the Estel supervisory board on 29 May. 
A feature of the new plan was the fact that, unlike the previous 
plan, i t entailed the complete closure of two out of the three 
works of Hoesch, presenting further p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
fragmentation within any organised campaign on the grounds of one 
works against another. This p o s s i b i l i t y was actualised when on 7 
A p r i l the Betriebsrat of the Westfalen works, which was to remain 
operational in the slimmed-down company, voted in favour of the 
new company 'Sozialplan', dealing with conditions for early 
retirement, but the respective Betriebsrate of the other two main 
works voted against. Two days later as the Aufsichtsrat sat to 
consider the main plan, 7,000 workers from the Westfalen s i t e 
demonstrated in front of the main company offices: separate 
similar protests were raised by the Phoenix and Union works. I t 
would seem f a i r to suggest that both events should be seen as 
indicative of a works-based division of the labour force (see 
also Jager, 1981, 148). 
This plan also marked a new phase in the development of the 
Hoesch company, for i t was dependent upon a large degree of state 
aid. The extent of the required support only gradually became 
obvious: on 11 June 1981 the Dortmund Rat considered a proposal 
that Estel could only afford to finance 1,100 m. D.M. of the 
t o t a l 2,700 m. D.M. investment requirements of the plan. Largely 
in response to this request for aid, Bund and Land p o l i t i c i a n s 
openly encouraged Hoesch to consider instead the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
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co-operation with Krupp: for example on 9 August 1982 NRW 
Landes—Prasident Rau declared the steel industry must show 'self-
help 1, encouraging in particular co-operation between Hoesch and 
Krupp7. 
This l i n e of argument was l i k e l y to find favour with the Hoesch 
workforce, who f e l t that as a consequence of the 
transnational isat ion of c a p i t a l , Dortmund was in danger of 
complete closure. In March 1981 for example, the Hoesch 
Betriebsrat had argued that 'The next reduction plan is a proof 
that the Dutch in the Estel concern have not given up their old 
plan, to push the Dortmund works under water and to furnish 
o 
Ijmuiden with the Hoesch orders. 1 This l i n e was taken up again 
by the Betriebsrat of the Phoenix works, which voted on 8 May 
1981 for a 'divorce' from Hooghovens - and by the 
Burgerinitiative in June, which claimed that Hoesch should leave 
Estel as the Dutch company had invested in Ijmuiden at the 
expense of Dortmund (B.S.J., 1981, point 6). Such a move was 
l i k e l y to be acceptable to the Hoesch management, especially 
after the cancellation of the o r i g i n a l plan by the Estel board 
despite the allocation of a considerable amount of German state 
assistance. 
Moreover, talks between Hoesch and Krupp had been going on for 
9 
some time, since at least July 1980 . These talks should be seen 
in the context of Hoesch's i n a b i l i t y to raise funds for a new 
steel plant within Estel. The particular emphasis given to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y i n late 1981 should be seen in the l i g h t of two 
factors: a desire of Bund and Land p o l i t i c i a n s to l i m i t the 
amount of financial aid given to steel; and a desire to ensure 
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such aid was given to a wholly German company. Thus, for 
example, although the two companies informed Bund Economics 
Minister Lambsdorff that they would require 1,000 m. D.M. of 
state aid for a merger on 8 October 1981, this sum was less than 
that requested for the plan within the Estel concern and involved 
two wholly German companies. Further, i t soon became obvious 
that a Krupp/Hoesch merger would have no room for Hooghovens. 
For example in January 1982 the president of the Dutch company 
Dr. Hooglandt, was quoted as saying that they might be looking 
f o r a 'divorce 1 from Hoesch"^. This was confirmed when a 
corporate merger between the two German concerns was agreed by 
the respective supervisory boards on 4 February 1982. The new 
company, to be named 'Rdbrstahl', would not include Hooghovens. 
I t gradually became apparent,though, that the conditions created 
for Hoesch by a merger with Krupp were unlikely to be acceptable. 
The Krupp annual report for 1981, dated by the supervisory board 
as 25 March 1982, confirmed that the two companies had 'examined 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of opening up more potential for rationalisation 
through inter-company co-operation.' I t went on to suggest that 
the two boards had agreed a 'restructuring concept in the steel 
sector, from which significant advantages w i l l derive for us 
( i . e . Krupp) ... through the better u t i l i s a t i o n of pig iron and 
raw steel capacities in Rheinhausen for supplying steel to 
Dortmund and through savings i n investment in the f l a t steel 
sector' 1 1 • I n other words the 'potential f o r rationalisation' 
envisaged by Krupp for Ruhrstahl involved Krupp supplying steel 
t o Hoesch for r o l l i n g a t Dortmund. The degree of over-capacity 
i n steel at Krupp meant that the development of a new steelworks 
at Dortmund was unlikely, to say the least. 
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Hence although Hoesch formally separated from Hooghovens in 
November 1982, a merger with Krupp was no longer l i k e l y . In this 
context the West German government commissioned three 
'moderators1 to prepare a report upon the future potential for 
rationalisation in the steel industry. This drew an immediate 
response in Dortmund, which originated from a meeting of 190 
representatives at the I.G. Metal 1 (Dortmund administrative 
authority) quarterly 'assembly of representatives' on 13 December 
1982 (for details of I.G. Metall structure see Table VII.1). 
t h i s meeting must be viewed in the l i g h t of two specific prior 
developments. In the f i r s t place, i t followed the commencement 
of the talks between the moderators and the steel companies on 16 
November (Bierich et a l , 1983, 1), and hence was concomitant with 
contemporary concern over the reorganisation of the entire steel 
industry. Secondly, i t followed a series of announcements of 
redundancies in Duisburg, pri n c i p a l l y by Krupp, which brought a 
response of demonstrations organised by the Duisburg 
administrative authority of I.G, Metall, supported by 4,000 on 3 
December and 15,000 on 10 December. 
The Dortmund assembly took what can only be described as the 
highly significant step of voting in favour of the 
nationalisation of the entire steel industry. After focusing on 
the massive job losses which were l i k e l y to follow a private 
market solution the resolution of the meeting argued that "Ihe 
destructive strategy of capital must on this account be opposed 
by nationalisation' (I.G.M. Dortmund, 1982a). 1 2 This resolution 
was further c l a r i f i e d by a briefing paper, prepared on 30 
December (I.G.M. Dortmund 1982b). This took as i t s starting 
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point the concern of the moderators with a 'private market 
solution' (p.l) but contended that 'Any private solution with 
maximum capital realisation is against the interests of the 
workforce and the steel towns'.^ Consequently i t went on to 
favour a nationalisation of the steel industry, with security of 
regional steel sites being secured through 'democratic structure 
planning 1 and the creation of parity Mitbestimmung (pp. 2, 3). 
The significance of th i s local i n i t i a t i v e cannot be over-
emphasised, for the national I.G. Metall structure had 
consistently argued against nationalisation, for example at a 
conference in Miilheim on 15 October 1981. On the other hand 
nationalisation represented a firm policy line for the German 
Communist Party, within the context of counter-acting the a b i l i t y 
of capital to play o f f workforces against each other. Equally 
significant, however, i s the way in which, to date, this local 
i n i t i a t i v e has been successfully accommodated by a sl i g h t 
s h i f t i n g of the position of the national I.G. Metall structure. 
Thus on 7 January 1983 a meeting of a l l 1,000 shop stewards of 
the three Hoesch works voted i n favour of the nationalisation 
strategy, despite the fact that the very previous day Eugen 
Loderer, the ultimate head of I.G. Metall nationally had spoken 
out against nationalisation. Having fa i l e d to dissuade the 
Dortmund shop-stewards, national I.G, Metall policy adopted 
instead a compromise measure. Thus a document of 8 February 1983 
(I.G.M. Frankfurt, 1983), a f t e r disavowing a single national 
steel company, argued that 'any government financial help must 
not be seen as a lost subsidy or interest-free loan, but rather 
as a form of direct capital subscription.' 1 4 In other words 
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rather than complete nationalisation, the giving of any 
government financial help to steel companies was to be regarded 
as taking a share in the capital of such companies, 
I h i s s h i f t i n g of position is of even greater importance in the 
l i g h t of the 'moderators' report' of 23 January 1983 (Bierich et 
a l , 1983), which had the twin aims of examining the prospects for 
inter-firm co-operation and market s t a b i l i s a t i o n ( p . l ) . In other 
words, i t adhered to the conception that co-operation at the 
level of capital was the way to solve the problem of over-
capacity. It) this end, i t looked at the following main c r i t e r i a : 
the maximisation of the rationalisation of the German industry; 
optimisation of future investments; preservation of the most 
possible secure jobs; and a minimi sat ion of the required help 
from public sources (p.3). The main feature of the proposed 
solution was the formation of two regional groups for the 
production of f l a t products and heavy profiles (pp. 22, 26): a 
Ruhr group incorporating Hoesch, Klockner and Salzgitter on the 
one hand, and a Rhine group incorporating Thyssen and Krupp on 
the other. Considerable c r i t i c i s m followed these proposals, 
focusing pa r t i c u l a r l y on the inter-group transport cost 
disadvantage of the Ruhr group, and the apparent advantages t o 
Thyssen of co-operation with Krupp. More significant, however, 
is the nature of the proposed solution: a reorganisation at the 
level of capital with the intention of f a c i l i t a t i n g 
r ationalisation. 
Just as the planned Hoesch/Krupp merger broke down, so too have 
the moderators' proposals. Hoesch almost immediately refused to 
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countenance merger with Klockner whilst the Thyssen/Krupp merger 
was aborted in November 1983 when Thyssen demanded a further 
1,200 m. D.M. from the state as a condition for taking over 
Krupp, on top of the 500 m. D.M. already offered. Thyssen 
planned instead to cut i t s own capacity under a project 'Concept 
900', by which capacity was to be reduced by 900,000 tonnes per 
month and the workforce by 8,000 by 1985. Even a more recent 
proposed merger, that between Krupp and Klockner, announced in 
October 1984, ran into trouble the following December when the 
government refused to provide assistance of 500 m. D.M. Any kind 
of solution in terms of rationalisation between capitals i s 
facing continuing problems. 
V I I . 5 Concluding remarks 
In t h i s sense Hoesch is i l l u s t r a t i v e of a number of problems 
facing the West German steel industry - the need for state 
financial assistance before capitals are prepared to merge, given 
the debts accrued by almost a l l steel producers and the 
continuing over-capacity i n the industry. The problem is 
pa r t i c u l a r l y acute in Dortmund where finance for a proposed new 
steel plant has not been realised either in the framework of 
Ruhrstahl or the moderators' proposed merger with Klockner. 
Hence the depth of the c r i s i s facing steel producers, coupled 
with precedents set i n the coal-mining and Saarland steel 
industries, i s drawing into question crucial features of West 
German society, notably the limited role of direct state 
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assistance to capital. As part of th i s developing c r i s i s in 
social relations, steelworkers in Dortmund have called for 
nationalisation of the industry, a drastic step accommodated to 
date by a sh i f t i n g of position by the national union structure. 
Calls for nationalisation are of even greater significance in 
Dortmund given the ear l i e r transnationalisation of capital by 
Hoesch and Hooghovens. Conceived in a time of economic growth, 
the merger rapidly experienced conflicting pressures within 
respective national societies for the maintenance of employment. 
In the words of Hoesch chairman Dr. Rohwedder: 
'People used to ask why I had l e f t Bonn to run a lousy company 
in Dortmund, but they were missing the point : the real p u l l 
was the idea of European co-operation. But then I saw the 
r e a l i t y was something else, a huge financial burden, 
15 
frustrations, national r i v a l r i e s . ' 
Sentiments shared by Mr. Hooglandt, Hooghovens chairman: 
' I think that the basis of the merger, as i t was seen at the 
time, was sound. But the whole plan was drawn up in the 
context of growth. I t ' s much easier to grow together than 
to shrink together ... and the r e a l i t y turned out very 
diff e r e n t to what we had hoped for.' 1* 5 
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Table V I I . 1 The o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of I.G. 
Metall 
1. Gewerkschaftstag 
2. Beirat 
3. Vbrstand 4. Kontxoll-Ausschuss 
5. Bezirke 
6. Verwaltungsstellen 
7. VertTCterversanmlung 8. Ortsverwaltung 
9. Vertrauensleute 
1. Gewerkschaftstag - 'union parliament' - meets every 3 years 
- 5,000 delegates - highest authority. 
2. Beirat - 'advisory board' - meets 3 times a year. 
3. Vbrstand - 'executive committee' - 30 members. 
4. Rmtroll-Ausschuss - 'supervisors board'. 
5. Bezirke - ' d i s t r i c t authorities' : consist of (no. of 
Verwaltungsstellen in brackets): 
Essen (15) Koln (12) 
Frankfurt (28) Munchen (21) 
Hagen (17) Munster ( I D 
Hamburg (16) Stuttgart (30) 
Hannover (15) Berlin ( 1) 
6. Verwaltungsstellen - 'administrative authorities' - smallest 
area un i t . 
7. Vertretervereammlung - 'assembly of representatives' - meets 
four times a year, elects delegates f o r (1) and (5). 
8. Ortsverwaltung - 'permanent administration' - at the level 
of (6). 
9. Vertrauensleute - 'shop stewards'. 
Source: I.G. Metall 
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Table V I I . 2 Coal mining i n the Ruhrgebiet 
Output (m.t.) Workforce (x 1000) 
1957 123.2 496 
1960 115.4 398 
1965 110.9 307 
1970 91.1 202 
1975 75.9 160 
1978 67.1 143 
1980 ND 141 
Sources: Nordrhein-Westfalen (1979a) 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (1982c) 
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Table V I I ,3 Employment i n metals production i n the 
Ruhr 
1970 1979 Change, 1970-79 
Bochum 22,580 16,300 - 6,280 
Bottrop 180 400 + 220 
Dortmund 31,770 28,600 - 3,170 
Duisburg 69,000 58,500 -10,500 
Essen 9,120 5,700 - 3,420 
Gelsenkirchen 10,210 7,100 - 3,110 
Hagen 29,160 18,350 -10,810 
Hamm 4,050 5,450 + 1,400 
Heme 1,020 1,110 + 80 
Mulheim 14,390 11,250 - 3,140 
Oberhausen 10,950 7,550 - 3,400 
Ennepe-Ruhr 35,440 26,200 - 9,240 
Recklinghausen 2,920 3,400 + 480 
Unna 13,040 10,700 - 2,340 
Wesel 2,090 3,850 + 1,760 
KVR Tbtal 255,920 204,450 -51,470 
Source: Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 1981, t a b l e 3 
- 273 -
Table V I I , 4 Major branches of the Ruhrgebiet economy, 
1980 
Employment Turnover 
Absolute % Absolute % 
(xlOOO) (xlOOOm.D.M.) 
Iron and steel 139.5 19.4 21.3 20.1 
Coal mining 140.5 19.5 12.5 11.8 
Oil refining 7.2 1.0 11.5 10.9 
Chemicals 44.5 6.2 10.6 10.0 
Engineering 84.5 11.7 7.5 7.1 
Vehicle manufacture 30.1 4.2 5.9 5.5 
Construction 43.9 6.1 4.7 4.5 
Electrical Engineering 49.4 6.8 4.2 3.9 
Non-iron metal production 10.1 1.4 2.6 2.5 
Sub-total 549.7 76.3 80.8 76.3 
Total Ruhrgebiet 721.1 100 105.8 100 
Source: Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, 1982c, 33 
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Table VII»5 F i n a n c i a l d e t a i l s of the 'action 
programme' for the Ruhr, 1980-84 
m.D.M Land Bund Third parties Total 
1980 442.9 461.8 19.9 924.6 
1981 1082.2 434.2 19.9 1536.3 
1982 1212.7 210.8 19.9 1443.4 
1983 1104.6 189.4 19.9 1313.9 
1984 1512.8 174.6 19.9 1707.3 
Total 5365.2 1470.8 99.5 6935.5 
Source: NRW, 1979c, 68 
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Table VII«6 KVR a p p r a i s a l of the a c t u a l a l l o c a t i o n of 
Land finance f or the 'action programme Ruhr' 
m.D.M. Planned Land finance, 1979 Planned Land finance, 1982 
1979 - 1.0 
1980 442.9 251.9 
1981 1082.2 499.4 
1982 1212.7 918.9 
1983 1104.6 864.8 
1984 1512.8 869.1 
1985 - 613.3 
Total 5365.2 4018.4 
Source: KVR, 1982b, 1, q u o t i n g budget pl a n of 22.6.82 
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Table V I I . 7 State aid for the s t e e l industry, 1982-5 
m.D.M. 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total 
Subsidies for steel research 150 150 150 150 600 
Adaptation assistance 60 60 50 30 200 
Investment and rationalisation 
subsidy for steel companies 60 195 275 295 825 
Investment subsidy for steel 
regions 80 - - - 80 
Total 1705 
Source: KVR, 1981 ( c i t i n g Bund press releases o f 
5.8.81, 4.9.81); 1982a 
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Table V I I . 8 The aggregate westwards trend i n crude 
s t e e l production 
Crude steel output nut. 
1948(a) 1974(b) 1982(c) 
Duisburg and Rheinhausen 3.5(40) 19.9(65) ) 
) 14.2(71) 
Oberhausen and Mulheim 1.7(19) 1.0( 3) ) 
Gelsenkirchen/Bochum) 
) 0.2( 1) 3.0(10) 1.8( 9) 
Hattingen/Witten ) 
Dortmund and Hagen 3.5(40) 6.6(22) 4.1(20) 
Total Ruhr output 8.9 30.5 20.1 
Figures in brackets represent % of Ruhr t o t a l 
Sources: d e r i v e d from a. Bomer 1977, p. 78 
b. Burkhard, 1974, p.3 
c. I.H.K. Dortmund, 1983 
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Table V I I . 9 S t e e l production a t Klockner, 1971-81 
Crude iron Crude steel Concast Rolled steel 
m.t. nut. m.t. m.t. 
Year to 30.9.72 2.0 3.0 - 2.5 
73 2.0 3.2 0.3 3.0 
74 2.4 3.6 0.7 3.4 
75 2.0 3.3 0.7 2.9 
76 2.1 3.3 0.9 3.0 
77 2.6 3.9 1.4 3.6 
78 2.8 4.3 1.8 3.8 
79 3.4 5.0 2.0 4.4 
80 3.9 5.5 2.3 4.9 
81 3.4 4.8 2.1 4.3 
Source: Klockner Werke A.G. Annual reports 
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Table VII,10 Key i n d i c a t o r s of Krupp Stahl A.G,, 
1977-83 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Crude steel output m.t. 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.4 4.9 4.0 3.9 
of which special steel m.t. 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3 
Sales m.D.M. x 1000 4.5 4.4 5.3 6.2 6.1 5.8 5.5 
of which special steels % 44 43 48 46 47 46 47 
Investment in fixed assets 
m.D.M. 184 150 260 333 344 295 149 
Employees, Dec. 31, x 1000 38.6 37.6 40.2 40.9 38.6 35.8 29.1 
P r o f i t (loss) m.D.M. - (66) 10 8 (112) 298 (287) 
Rolled steel: (m.t.) 
Semis - 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Forging - 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Sections - 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 
Flats — 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 
Total 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.6 2.5 
Source: Krupp S t a h l A.G. Annual Reports 
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Table VII.11 The range of operations of Tbyssen 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
No. of consolidated companies 166 166 177 179 184 186 
Sales by division: 
( b i l l i o n D.M.) 
Steel 7.3 7.8 8.7 8.4 9.3 7.9 
Special steels 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 
Investment & capital goods 8.6 8.4 8.3 9.3 9.3 9.1 
Trading and services 11.4 13.2 14.0 14.6 16.5 15.1 
Total 29.8 32.2 34.0 35.3 38.1 34.9 
Less internal sales 6.3 6.9 6.8 7.1 7.5 6.6 
Total net sales 23.5 25.4 27.1 28.2 32.6 28.3 
Mean annual world workforce 
x 1000 161 157 152 150 145 139 
Net p r o f i t (loss) m.D.M. 100 167 117 (68) (66) (550) 
Source: Thyssen annual reports 
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Table VII.12 Employment of Thyssen s t e e l d i v i s i o n 
1979 
Workforce 
1980 
, 30-9 
1981 
x 1000 
1982 1983 
Thyssen A.G. 34.3 34.1 33.9 34.0 32.8 
Thyssen Henrichshutte 7.5 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.0 
Thyssen Niederrhein 8.7 8.3 7.9 7.8 7.4 
Ttiyssen Bandstahl Berlin 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Thyssen G r i l l o Funke 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Nedstaal (Netherlands) 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Total 53.5 52.4 51.5 51.4 49.7 
Source: Thyssen annual reports 
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Table VII»13 S t e e l output, Thyssen 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Steel division: crude steel, m.t. 11.9 12.4 11.1 10.2 8.8 
of which: 
semis (m. product t . ) 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
section " 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 
f l a t s 7.3 7.9 7.6 7.0 6.2 
forgings " 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Special steels divi s i o n : 
crude steel, m.t. 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Total crude steel, m.t. 12.7 13.1 11.6 10.9 9.4 
Source: Thyssen annual reports 
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Table VII.14 Breakdown of p r o f i t before tax by 
d i v i s i o n , Thyssen 
m.D.M. 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Steel 167.4 111.3 (7.2) (11.2) (139.8) 
Special steels 71.8 119.6 31.3 13.1 ( 93.4) 
Capital goods 102.2 66.4 (18.5) 102.3 (317.0) 
Trading and services 106.3 113.0 96.6 48.6 117.5 
Note: These figures are gross and not consolidated, hence they 
should not be compared to Table VII.11 
Source: Thyssen annual reports 
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Table VII,15 Key i n d i c a t o r s of E s t e l 
Crude steel output Steel division Net p r o f i t (loss) 
m.t. workforce x 1000 m. guilders 
1972 11.2 47.7 87 
1973 11.6 48.6 170 
1974 12.1 50.8 323 
1975 9.6 49.8 (202) 
1976 10.4 49.6 ( 69) 
1977 9.4 47.6 (417) 
1978 10.4 46.1 (288) 
1979 11.5 46.0 (174) 
Source: E s t e l annual reports 
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Footnotes t o Chapter V I I 
* "Entschiedend fur die politische I n i t i a t i v e , die mit dieser 
Ruhrkonferenz verbunden i s t , war en die bedruckend hohe 
Arbeitslosigkeit im Ruhrgebiet und die besonderen 
strukturpol itischen Probleme. " 
2 
"Die erfolgreiche Bewaltigung des Striikturwandels im 
Ruhrgebiet i s t ohne h i l f r e i c h e Begleitung und Unterstutzung nicht 
denkbar ... Die Industrie- und -Handelskammern des Ruhrgebiets 
sind bereit, daran aktiv mitzuwirken und diesen Prozess zu 
fordern. M 
3 
To be more precise, seven a f i l i a t e d companies were formed, 
with the headquarters based i n Essen. 
^ "Die Ruhr i s t nicht weniger Deutschland als die Saar" Herr 
Gunther, Krupp Stahl, quoted i n RAr Nacnricnten, 22 May 1981. 
^ "Wir konnen nicht hinnehmen, daB die Bundesregierung den F a l l 
Arbed-Saarstahl als v o l l i g anders geartet d a r s t e l l t als die 
Situation zum Beispiel an der Ruhr" Herr Godde, Krupp Stahl, i n 
l e t t e r t o Helmut Kohl, West German Chancellor, quoted i n Rita: 
Machrichten, 18 December 1982. 
"Der Vorstand i s t der Auffassung, dai3 die gegenwartige Lage 
und die grofie Unsicherheit uber die zukunftige Entwicklung es 
nicht zulassen, zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt grof3e strategische 
Investitionen i n Angriff zu nehmen", quoted i n Rnbr NaAridhten, 
8 November 1980. 
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7 Quoted i n Rite* Nachricftten, 10 Auqust 1^81. 
Q 
"Der j e t z t vorgelegte Plan i s t ein Beweis daftir, daB die 
Hollander im Estel-Konzern ihren alten Plan nicht aufgegeben 
haben, die Dortmunder Huttenwerke unter Wasser zu drucken, urn die 
Hoesch-Betriebe der Weiterverarbe itung aus Ijmuiden zu 
beliefem", quoted i n Riihr NacJirichten, 20 March 1981. 
9 
Ruhr Nachriditen, 22 July 1980, confirmed by Krupp annual 
report, 1981. 
1 0 Ruhr Kfechrichten, 7 January 1982. 
^ English language edition, p. 14. 
12 
"Der Vernichtungsstrategie der Kapitalseite rrufl deshalb eine 
nationalstaatliche entgegengestellt werden." 
13 
"Jede private Losung mit maximaler Kapitalverwertung r i c h t e t 
sich gegen die Interessen der Arbeitnehmer und der Standorte." 
14 
"die offentlichen Fmanzhilfen nicht als verlorene Zuschusse 
Oder zinslose Darlehen gewahrt werden, sondern i n Form direkter 
Kapitalbeteiligungen." 
1 5 Quoted i n Financial Tines, 21 March 1984. 
16 Quoted i n Financial Times, 21 June 1984. 
CHAPTER VTII 
Concluding ixmuents -
France, West Germany and the U-K. z points of comparison and 
implications of theoretical significance 
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V I I I . l Introduction - points of comparison and 
contrast 
In t h i s Chapter we seek to draw out points of comparison and 
contrast from the three national case studies and relate these 
back to our e a r l i e r discussion on the nature of society, the 
state and space. Clearly, there are a number of points of 
comparison between the three countries. In the f i r s t place, they 
have a l l experienced job loss on a massive scale in the steel 
industry as part of a programme of capacity reduction in response 
to a severe over-production c r i s i s . This job loss has been 
spatially concentrated in certain towns and regions over a 
r e l a t i v e l y short time-period with the effect that in many 
instances the very way of l i f e in these communities has come 
under threat. 
Secondly, the respective national states have increasingly come 
to play a d i r e c t role in the industry, due to a variable 
combination of factors including a long-term decline in 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y for private capital from steel production and the 
demands of trades unions for nationalisation in an attempt to 
secure employment. The steel industry has been nationalised 
twice in the U.K., for example, as part of a broader p o l i t i c a l 
strategy aimed at public ownership of the means of production, 
whilst i t was nationalised in France in 1978 as part of a short-
term c r i s i s rescue operation, formalised i n 1981 under a 
Socialist administration. In West Germany the industry, whilst 
under continued private ownership, is facing increasing demands 
fo r state assistance. 
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Thirdly, and in large part a consequence of other shared 
developments, the state has come to play an increasingly 
significant role in attempting to manage the consequences of 
steel closures for particular towns and regions. The broad range 
of incentives offered to private capital to invest in steel 
closure regions, co-ordinated by BSC (Industry), can be compared 
with similar measures adopted for the steel regions in France -
the 'conversion1 companies formed by Usinor and Sacilor, for 
example, and the regionally targetted funds f o r industrial 
adaptation. In West Germany too the regional (or Land) 
government has been similarly active in offering subsidies to 
private capital through the 'Action Programme' for the Ruhr. 
Fourthly, a l l countries in the European Community share the 
characteristic of management of steel measures p a r t i a l l y by the 
European Community i t s e l f , following the declaration of 'manifest 
c r i s i s ' in 1980. The wide-ranging powers of price regulation and 
production quotas apply equally to a l l countries ( i n theory at 
least) though not without tension over th e i r application. 
K16ckner*s refusal to submit to the regime in thi s instance 
epitomises West German opposition to any kind of E.E.C. cartel 
arrangement which reduces competition with other national steel 
industries, for example. At the same time a l l E.E.C. countries, 
but in particular France and the U.K., have benefitted from the 
E.E.C.'s programme of reconversion aids, i t s e l f part of the 
Community's own attempt at legitimating the consequences of i t s 
steel policy for particular regions. 
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In a l l three countries, too, the scale and timing of job losses 
in the steel industry have been contested and resisted by people 
in those towns and regions most affected. In one sense at least 
this i s a point of comparison - for without understanding the 
nature and extent of th i s opposition i t would be impossible to 
understand the degree of state involvement in production and in 
managing the consequences of closure. In another sense, however, 
i t i s a point of departure f o r an analysis of contrasting 
circumstances. For despite the obvious s i m i l a r i t i e s , job losses 
in steel have been contested in very dif f e r e n t ways within these 
three countries. 
These contrasts can be identified in a nirober of inter-related 
dimensions. In the f i r s t place, anti-closure campaigns within 
the steel industry have been 'fought 1 on a variety of diff e r e n t 
spatial scales, from town to region to national state. On i t s 
own, though, this statement is crude. I t does not even begin to 
take account of the particular coalitions of interest which have 
developed around these places; f o r the character of these 
coalitions has been both contingent upon and cause of the 
particular spatial scale at which the theme of closure and i t s 
effects has been formulated. This formulation has taken place 
through the medium of particular issues, through the very 
enactment of id e n t i f i c a t i o n with place and class. In a sense a l l 
these issues are relevant to a l l the places. What has varied, 
often in a subtle and s h i f t i n g fashion, has been the particular 
emphasis l a i d upon certain issues at certain places by certain 
groups of people. In other words the form of social action has 
varied, i n part related to the character of discourse within 
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particular contingent circumstances . And i t is from these 
variations, as much as from the points of obvious comparison from 
the three countries, that we can begin to draw lessons for our 
theoretical framework. 
In Consett, for example, the issue appeared very much one of the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y of an individual works. This was identified in 
large part as the lowest common denominator of agreement locally* 
I t was contingent, too, upon the weakness of steel trades unions 
following the end of the three-month national strike earlier in 
1980 and the long history of passive acceptance of closure 
elsewhere within BSC provided that the mythical 'alternative 
employment1 was at least offered on paper. As such the 'Save 
Consett Campaign' revolved around local people actively placing 
themselves into competition with other working (and non-working) 
people i n other steel towns. Last-ditch attempts to make the 
works a privately-owned, profitable enterprise even had this as 
an e x p l i c i t aim. Under these conditions the campaign never had a 
chance of success against a Government determined to cut capacity 
within the state-owned steel producer as part of a broader drive 
to create profitable investment space for private capital. 
Iwo further places can be identified with an emphasis upon a 
dif f e r e n t set of issues, the significance of steel employment to 
people l i v i n g and working in a l l kinds of occupations. In both 
instances t h i s drew upon a reservoir of regionalist sentiment and 
of long-term h i s t o r i c a l identity with place. The form of action 
varied, however, between them. Over the threatened future of the 
BSC Ravenscraig works in Scotland there developed a strong 
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regional -even national - alliance throughout 1982, which 
ultimately gained support from within the state apparatus. The 
active backing of the Scottish Office amidst fears over electoral 
prospects for the ruling Conservative Government were undoubtedly 
major factors in the decision to grant a three-year reprieve (or 
stay of execution?) to the works. In eastern France, by 
contrast, a regional consensus emerged around the threat to local 
society which was joined by locally-based small and medium-sized 
capitals, at least u n t i l the emergence of challenge to the 
state's monopoly on the use of physical violence during 1979. 
This regional c o a l i t i o n , along with support from the other major 
steel region, Nord/Pas-de-Calais, attained national significance 
within c i v i l society to the extent that the state was obliged to 
delay the closure timetable and inject massive f i s c a l resources 
into the steel regions. Problems i n t r i n s i c to this policy 
solution, notably a budgetary c r i s i s , and continuing uncertainty 
over steel cuts, ultimately led to the f a l l of the Government -
although the Socialist administration after 1981 has since 
attempted to resolve the problems of the steel industry within 
the same policy-forming framework with the same result of 
continued, reverberating dissatisfaction within the steel 
regions. 
And f i n a l l y , the character of demands from Dortmund, in West 
Germany, i l l u s t r a t e s clearly the point that emphasis on certain 
issues from particular places can focus upon national state and 
society as an arena for contest. I n i t i a l l y the question of the 
threat posed to Dortmund fcy vi r t u e of the internationalisation of 
cap i t a l , and subsequent preferential investment at Hooghoven's 
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coastal plant at Ijmuiden, was resolved with dissolution of the 
merger in 1982. Around th i s 'nationalist 1 theme considerable 
support gathered, from capital, labour and from the national 
state - for the l a t t e r was unwilling to inject resources into a 
company transparently based in both West Germany and Holland. 
Alternative employment for steel regions had earlier been another 
aspect of the policy response, a kind of sub-theme to the steel 
closure debate. The Land Government had made available 
considerable financial assistance to private capital in 1979 
through i t s 'Action Programme' for the Ruhr. As the prospect of 
continuing redundancies at Hoesch intensified even after the 
break-up of Estel, the extent to which this policy objective 
could be realised became increasingly uncertain, especially as 
unemployment locally and nationally continued to rise - although 
i t served to lessen, at least for a time, the social basis of 
protest against jobs lost in steel. In time, therefore, the 
debate at Dortmund, in a framework conditioned by the earlier 
'success' in arguing for a break with Hooghoven, came to focus 
upon a new version of the 'nationalist' solution, a radical one 
in West German p o l i t i c a l terms, nationalisation of the industry. 
This was an unacceptable demand for national state and c i v i l 
society, and for steel capitals, and was hastily accommodated by 
a s l i g h t s h i f t i n g of position from the union, I.G. Metall, to 
argue that state financial assistance to steel producers should 
be seen as purchase of share capital by the state within the 
industry. 
These, then, are some of the main points of comparison and 
contrast from our three case-studies. In the following section 
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we seek to expand upon their theoretical significance, commencing 
with a return to theories on the nature of the state, developing 
considerations of the relationship between state and society, and 
concluding with a fresh look at the social bases of industrial 
location theory. 
V I I I . 2 I m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
We emphasised in Chapter I I I that the state must be 
conceptualised as a social relation, taking i n s t i t u t i o n a l form 
according to circumstance. The three national societies 
considered here demonstrate clearly that relations between state 
and society within capitalism exist on a continuum, with a 
f l e x i b l e association between state and c i v i l society constantly 
adapting as a ref l e c t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t development. In the U.K., 
for example, trades unions have participated within the state, 
actively supporting nationalisation but realising ultimately and 
at a juncture when they had limited policy-forming influence that 
an unintended consequence of the particular form of public 
ownership adopted was massive job loss. In France by contrast, 
several major trades unions have remained peripheral to the state 
form, avowing h o s t i l i t y to the social relations in which i t was 
constituted u n t i l the election of a Socialist administration. 
Even then the particular constraints imposed upon policy 
formation by virtue of the c a p i t a l i s t nature of the state led to 
a gradual re-withdrawal from i t as continued redundancies and 
cutbacks became the order of the day. And in West Germany, as 
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part of the formalised regulation of social relations introduced 
after 1945, trades unions have been tied in to the regulatory 
powers of the state via the ins t i t u t i o n s and traditions of 
'social partnership', effectively binding large parts of c i v i l 
society to the state, thereby conditioning the range of options 
open to trades unions, for example. 
The character of these connections between state and society is 
also of particular interest with regard to both their form and 
th e i r discursive content. The varying forms suggest that there 
is a wealth of p o s s i b i l i t i e s in the mediation of c a p i t a l i s t 
social relations within particular national t e r r i t o r i e s which 
might or might not lead to a questioning of the rationale of the 
c a p i t a l i s t system. Whether this p o s s i b i l i t y is actualised is 
dependent upon and condition for the character of discourse, in 
particular the channelling of debate around particular issues. 
The watering-down of the c a l l for nationalisation from the 
Dortmund branch of I.G. Metall, the persistent acceptance of 
closure at BSC provided alternative employment might be provided 
or the temporary incorporation of the revolutionary French trades 
unions and Communist Party into Government after 1981 are a l l 
examples of the relationship of discourse to form resulting in an 
acceptance of the apparent logic of c a p i t a l i s t conditions of 
development. 
Crucially, however, the f u l l implications of c a p i t a l i s t 
development are f e l t most keenly at particular places where 
discourse is selectively channelled around closure - Consett, 
Dortmund and Longwy being among the most recent examples from the 
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steel industry. In other words class relations clearly do take 
expression with regard to particular places where the home-
workplace l i n k i s most apparent to a particular body of 
employees. Regions too can be places, often where a particular 
industry i s dominant for economic and social l i f e - the old 
coalfields in the U.K. or the steel region of Alsace-Lorraine 
being examples of t h i s . In such conditions the particular 
culture of the region is often of significance - the long-term 
t r a d i t i o n of being Scottish, for example, or Lorrainese. And 
under certain circumstances the significance of class relations 
within particular places can be of suf f i c i e n t magnitude to 
impinge d r a s t i c a l l y upon national state and society - for example 
in France during 1979, where the r i o t s i n Paris during March 
became translated into more general p o l i t i c a l opposition to the 
Government. 
At the same time there is a pan-national dimension, apparent most 
clearly here i n the European Community. Both in terms of 
involvement i n production regulation via quotas and in 
all e v i a t i n g the consequences of this for particular places or 
regions, the Community displays many of the characteristics of an 
embryonic supra-national state. Challenge to the consequences of 
accumulation has generally not, though, focused on the operations 
of t h i s supra-national state. In a sense this i s i m p l i c i t in i t s 
very foundation within the competing relations between member 
nation states. Rather than the European Community per se being 
seen as the actor, the confl i c t i n g ambitions of national states 
are accorded attention. I n thi s the European Community displays 
a powerful tension, for i t s very grounds for establishment were 
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to attempt to transcend these conflicts. Clearly to date i t has 
failed - generally, for example, there have been remarkably few 
attempts at European industrial co-operation and the Community's 
only major policy instrument in terms of available f i s c a l 
resources i s the Common Agricultural Policy, which ref l e c t s 
national p r i o r i t i e s in policy determination as much as supra-
national. One of the only major transnationalisations of capital 
in steel, the Hoesch-Hcoghoven merger, f e l l apart in response to 
conflicting pressures from within the two constituent partners to 
secure employment, directed at the respective national states. 
There has been, then, a variety of physical and social scales 
through which restructuring of the steel industry has taken 
place. In other words our analysis has pointed to the complex 
web of p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the terrain of class conflict over 
industrial change. What we have yet to consider i s the 
significance of this for our theory of industrial change. What 
do we mean, for example, by 'restructuring 1, and what does our 
account of the steel industry suggest about the relevance of 
social theory to industrial location? 
To take f i r s t questions f i r s t . Whilst the precise meaning of 
'restructuring' in this context i s open to debate, the basic 
premise has to be that i t encapsulates industrial change as a 
simultaneously economic, social and p o l i t i c a l process entailing 
redefinition of the relations of production. In many senses i t 
has to be related to the concept of 'spatial divisions of labour' 
(see especially Frobel et a l , 1980; Massey, 1984) in that the 
l a t t e r i s seen in some way as the product of a process of 
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restructuring of class relations. As such the concept of 
divisions of labour across space is essentially descriptive 
rather than analytic - i t accounts for changing phenomena such as 
the decentralisation of of f i c e jobs from London and the South 
East in terms of their impact upon and implications for the use 
of space. Yet as a descriptive category i t is re a l l y of l i t t l e 
use i n understanding the dynamics of change - i t t e l l s us what 
has come about, not how this happened, s t i l l less under what 
conditions i t might not have happened. 
Just as Giddens (1984) has recognised that the value of 
structuration theory to empirical research i s as a 'sensitising 
concept', so too is i t time to acknowledge that awareness of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the use of space as a means of dividing labour i s 
the major contribution of the 'spatial divisions of labour' 
thesis. l b understand precisely what conditions and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s are presented for capital and for labour over the 
use of space requires a recognition that r e a l i t y as i t exists on 
the ground today is a complex interweaving of different rounds of 
investment within different sectors over dif f e r e n t time periods, 
each round continuously under review both internally and with 
respect to other rounds. 'Sensitising concepts1 should only 
guide empirical work - they should not be the aim or ultimate 
goal of subsequent analysis. 
This theme can be i l l u s t r a t e d with respect to the West German 
steel industry. In many respects i t might be argued that a new 
spatial division of labour has emerged within the Ruhr whereby 
crude steel production i s concentrated at the junction with the 
Rhine at the expense of eastern and central parts of the basin, 
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which concentrate on special steels production and r e - r o l l i n g 
processes. Descriptively, this is fine. What i t f a i l s to take 
into account, however, and indeed misleadinqly conflates into the 
single heading of 'locational advantage1, is the great diversity 
of corporate strategies through which this pattern has emerged. 
Klockner disinvested from steel production in the eastern Ruhr as 
an integral feature of i t s move to a new coastal works at Bremen 
on the North Sea coast, out of the Ruhr basin, Krupp acquired and 
then closed crude steel making plant at Bochum in the central 
Ruhr b e l t , preferring to concentrate this part of the process at 
Duisburg on the Rhine but maintaining Bochum as a centre for 
special steel, the o r i g i n a l reason for acquisition. Thyssen have 
single-handedly accounted for much of the new pattern by reason 
of continued, sustained internal expansion of crude steel 
capacity at Duisburg along with selective acquisitions. Hoescfa, 
on the other hand, based in Dortmund, were unable to expand crude 
steel capacity there as their corporate planning came to focus 
upon an expansion of capacity at the sister company's plant at 
Ijmuiden on the Dutch coast (at least u n t i l the break-up of Estel 
i n 1982) whilst the emphasis on p r o f i l e s production, or 
speciality r e - r o l l i n g , was again part of the overall strategy for 
the Estel concern. In other words 'the' spatial division of 
labour emerged through a complex variety of causes and 
conditions. 
And yet to argue that spatial divisions of labour 'emerge' i s 
even more misleading. They are i n every sense continually 
reproduced constructs arising from the dynamics of class 
relations within society. We emphasised i n Chapter I I that class 
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theory in the Marxist sense is about the way in which the machine 
works once i t is set into operation, not the particular workinqs 
of part of the machine nor even what i t produces. Our conception 
of 'spatial divisions of labour 1 must parallel t h i s . Divisions 
of labour are about the way in which places and societies are 
reproduced, continuously and contingently, through particular 
events and circumstances. This is one reason why we have focused 
upon the dynamics of change in the steel industry, upon how plant 
closures have, or have not, come about, through the re-creation 
of the context of change - i n short, the way i n which 
restructuring of places and societies actually happens. And t h i s 
re-creation of context requires consideration of the agents and 
structures conditioning and enacting the debates. For 'divisions 
of labour' are, after a l l , about people as labour power. We have 
sought not just to recognise t h i s , but actively to incorporate i t 
into our explanation of change. A l l too often accounts of 
restructuring and of the emergence of new spatial divisions of 
labour s t a r t from the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to capital, and from 
these alone. Central to the concept of class i s the active 
participation of labour. I h i s , we would argue, should be given 
fresh emphasis in our explanation of industrial location. I n 
many senses, indeed, consideration of restructuring needs to 
st a r t from the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to labour, not those offered t o 
capi t a l . Only i n thi s way can we adequately incorporate people 
into a socially grounded account of industrial change under 
capitalism. 
Through this redirection of theoretically informed research, back 
to people as the subjects, i t i s also possible to relate 
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industrial location to other emerging themes of relevance. In 
the f i r s t instance, there has been growing awareness that 
'reproduction of labour power1 as an abstract concept in no way 
does justice to the character of social relations within the 
household or family unit (see Pahl, 1984; Redclift and Mingione, 
1985). In many senses the restructuring of production relations 
has inescapable (yet indeterminate) consequences for the division 
of labour within the household (and vice-versa). The 
significance of female waged employment in a t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
patriarchal society, nowhere more so than in steel regions and 
towns, represents just one expression of th i s relationship. And, 
secondly, abstract notions of the 'reserve army of labour' need 
to be refined to incorporate not jus t the spatial variations i n 
registered unemployment at a variety of scales, but also the 
character of relations between those 'in work' and those 
'unemployed' within a l o c a l i t y . In what ways do the unemployed 
pass into work, and vice-versa? What relationships are there 
between formal employment and those servicing formally employed 
people on a more or less informal basis? And in what ways are 
resources transferred between the 'waged' and the 'unwaged', (and 
here the question of state redistribution through social security 
payments is of relevance)? 
To what extent i s our redefinition of the social bases of 
industrial change a function of our analytical unit of study, the 
steel industry? Evidence from other steel producing regions and 
nations suggests that the experiences of the European Community 
have been by no means unique in the past decade - from the USA 
(Buss and Redburn, 1983) and from Australia (Donaldson, 1981; 
Donaldson and Donaldson, 1983), for example. Equally, industries 
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similar to steel in terms of both labour process and recent 
history of decline, notably coal-mining, have seen parallel 
developments (Beynon, 1985; Hudson et a l , 1985). I t remains to 
be considered, though, whether the particular characteristics of, 
for example, the coal and steel industries, are contingent or 
necessary conditions for the increasingly place-destructive 
consequences of the c a p i t a l i s t system. 
Certainly, coal and steel, as archetypes of the old, 
'tr a d i t i o n a l ' industries, display unique characteristics. The 
work is s t i l l largely manual - though less so than in the past -
and almost invariably associated with male employment, leading to 
a particular gender division of labour within both the workplace 
and the household. The pattern of s h i f t work in these 
industries, too, ti e s the home to the workplace via the routine 
timing and spacing of the links between them. At the same time 
social l i f e and culture are heavily conditioned by the character 
of these home-workplace relations, the more so as most p i t s or 
steelworks dominate the local labour market. Often effectively 
the only local employer, competition with other industries 
requiring male labour is blocked and female employment made less 
attractive by the strength of the social and physical ties 
binding women to the home. 
I t might be argued that these particular circumstances are such 
as to make the steel and the coal industries unique - that the 
devastation of whole communities is only a temporary phase in the 
development of capitalism, a readjustment of the spatial division 
of labour which when complete w i l l enable national societies to 
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return to prosperity and growth. Evidence, however, points to 
quite the reverse. With unemployment in the industrialised 
economies soaring to new heights and new international divisions 
of labour already emergent in industries such as cars and 
chemicals, i t is not just the 'old 1 industries of the 
industrialised countries but also the 'new1 employers which face 
a future of long-term decline as part of increased capital 
intensification and a switch to lower-wage newly-industrialising 
economies. Under circumstances such as these the issues apparent 
in steel are of considerable general significance. 
One of the most fundamental lessons from steel's recent decline 
i s that class relations are constituted with respect to different 
places in a complex, changing fashion. In many senses action 
within, f o r example, a highly localised intersection of place and 
class without regard to broader dimensions of c a p i t a l i s t 
development is regressive (see Miliband, 1985, 24). By entering 
into competition with other places, important ground is conceded 
such as the apparent necessity for unemployment and wage labour. 
At the same time recognition of shared regional interest might be 
a way t o attr a c t national p o l i t i c a l resources but is often 
dependent upon particular circumstances and in many senses only 
translates place-specificity and place-chauvinism to a broader 
scale. The progressive conclusion to draw from t h i s , then, i s 
that i t i s more than ever necessary to consider the social 
context of industrial location - not just the characteristics of 
the plant or of the employer or of the labour force, but the f u l l 
set of social relations within which location i s grounded. 
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These social relations, we have argued, are mirrored in the 
character of the state, which faces the complex problem of being 
simultaneously necessary for and problematic to continued 
accumulation. Gramsci's di s t i n c t i o n between hegemony and 
coercion i s , almost d a i l y , of increasing relevance. The problem 
of maintaining hegemony when a condition for sustained 
accumulation in U.K. society is some three and a half m i l l i o n 
unemployed ( i n the conventional sense) has led to the development 
of increasingly more sophisticated and powerful forms of 
coercion, apparent most clearly in the miners' st r i k e of 1984/85 
but by no means unique to the U.K. - for example, France during 
1979. I t is under circumstances such as these that questions 
about agency and structure take on a poignant meaning, in a l l 
walks of l i f e . 
In other words, to a degree at least, our analysis has emphasised 
particular features of industrial location within c a p i t a l i s t 
society which are readily observable within the t r a d i t i o n a l 
industries or producers of basic goods such as coal and steel 
and, to an increasing extent, bulk chemicals, shipbuilding and 
motor vehicles. The extent of direct state intervention within 
these sectors is certainly greater than in many other industries, 
although i t is a question of emphasis rather than qualitative 
difference - state provision of at least some of the 
preconditions of production is an endemic feature of contemporary 
c a p i t a l i s t society. Equally, we have focused upon a type of 
industry which u n t i l comparatively recently was notable for the 
sheer volume of labour power employed, concentrated at particular 
points of production. We have emphasised throughout the class 
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character of c a p i t a l i s t society with i t s ultimately exploitative 
rel a t i o n between capital and labour in the process of production, 
and remarked upon the more readily v i s i b l e consequences of this 
system in one-industry towns and regions. Yet just because the 
consequences are more apparent does not render them unique. 
Coal, steel and other basic industries in industrialised 
economies have led the emergent trend towards destruction of 
those places and communities which these industries established 
in the very f i r s t instance. Increasingly, the spatial mobility 
of capital coupled with continued capital intensification of the 
production process poses similar threats to other communities and 
other industries. 'Spatial divisions of labour' increasingly are 
less about divisions of labour power and more about divisions of 
reserve armies of labour, of unwaged labour. I t is precisely 
under conditions such as these that the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to 
capital for heightened exploitation of labour through 
red e f i n i t i o n of working conditions are greatest. And i t i s 
precisely under such conditions that the need to incorporate the 
social and p o l i t i c a l into our consideration of industrial 
development is of most pressing relevance. 
What sort of questions, then, should we be asking to further 
illuminate these problems? Two in particular stand out as being 
of pressing significance. In the f i r s t place, the character of 
what have been loosely labelled 're-industrialisation' strategies 
targetted at areas of high unemployment within the developed 
economies i s worthy of examination. One reason for the 
increasing frequency and strength of campaigns in defence of jobs 
has been the h i s t o r i c a l f a i l u r e of e a r l i e r attempts to create 
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alternative unemployment - the 'success' of BSC (Industry), f o r 
example, has been put into i t s proper - and p i t i f u l - perspective 
(Storey, 1983). At the same time recent job-creation 
i n i t i a t i v e s , whilst multiplying rapidly throughout the developed 
economies, have to date had l i t t l e success in terms of the i r 
stated objectives of regeneration in areas such as Consett, for 
example (see Robinson and Sadler, 1984, 1985). The complex 
relationship between state and society clearly displays yet 
another dimension in this regard. 
Secondly, we need to consider 'the unemployed'. Accepting for 
the moment the relative permanency of continued high levels of 
unemployment, we and they need to consider the implications of 
being without wage-labour in a society geared to that very 
re l a t i o n . What avenues (or cul-de-sacs) of social, cultural and 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e are open to them? What role can trades unions, 
divested of power by virtue of loss of membership, play in this? 
To what extent, indeed, can conventional party p o l i t i c s respond 
to the problems of unemployment? 
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blast-furnace 
hearth diameter 
s i n t e r 
torpedo 
open-hearth 
Basic Oxygen S t e e l 
ingot 
used for the production of iron from iron ore 
measure of the s i z e of a b l a s t furnace 
fused analgam of coke, iron ore and limestone -
raw material in the production of iron in the 
b l a s t furnace 
v e s s e l for the transport of hot iron from blast 
furnace to s t e e l converter by r a i l 
now-obsolete method for the production of s t e e l 
from iron 
method for the production of s t e e l from iron 
involving b l a s t of heated oxygen - sometimes 
referred to as Kaldo or L.D. process 
c a s t of s t e e l from converter requiring 
substantial r e - r o l l i n g - now l a r g e l y obsolete, 
replaced by continuous casting 
continuous c a s t i n g process of drawing s t e e l off from converter in 
continuous c a s t of semi-finished product 
semi-finished s t e e l , e i t h e r r o l l e d from ingot 
or continuously c a s t - three main shapes 
referred to as b i l l e t s , blooms and slabs 
narrow gauge r o l l e d products including 
p r o f i l e s , sections, beams and bars 
wide r o l l e d products, including plate (heavy 
gauge), s t r i p (narrow width, l i g h t gauge) and 
coiled plate 
high value-added grades of s t e e l with 
p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 
a l t e r n a t i v e route for production of (usually) 
low volumes of s p e c i a l s t e e l by re-melting 
scrap s t e e l 
semis 
long products 
f l a t s 
s p e c i a l s t e e l 
e l e c t r i c a r c 
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AG Aktiengesellschaft 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
BISF B r i t i s h Iron and St e e l Federation 
BOS Basic Oxygen S t e e l 
BSC B r i t i s h S t e e l Corporation 
BSJ B i i r g e r i n i t i a t i v e Stahlwerk J e t z t 
CEC Commission of the European Communities 
CFDT Confederation F§derale du T r a v a i l 
CGT Confederation Generale du T r a v a i l 
DGB Deutscher-Gewerkschaftsbund 
ECSC European Coal and St e e l Community 
ECU European Currency Unit 
EEC European Economic Community 
EFL External Financing Limit 
FO Force Ouvriere 
FSAI Fond Special pour Adaptation I n d u s t r i e l l e 
I.G.Metall Industrie-Gewerkschaft Metall 
IHK Industrie-und-Handelskammer 
ISTC Iron and S t e e l Trades Confederation 
KVR Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 
NCCC National Craftsmen's Co-ordinating Committee 
NEW Nordrhein-Westfalen 
NUB National Union of Blastfumacemen 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
PC P a r t i Communiste 
PS P a r t i S o c i a l i s t e 
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Figure 2 Selected works of the British Steel Corporation 
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In considering the methodological strategy adopted in preparing 
t h i s t h e s i s , reference must be made to the terms on which the 
So c i a l Science Research Council (as ESRC was then c a l l e d ) awarded 
a linked studentship to Dr. R. Hudson in 1981. For i t was v i a 
t h i s linked studentship that the research was car r i e d out on 
which t h i s t h e s i s i s based. Dr. Hudson's application was made 
under the t i t l e "The regional impacts of recession in the EEC" 
and went on to r e f e r to "...a case study of the regional impacts 
of restructuring in p a r t i c u l a r sectors - for example, iron and 
s t e e l . . . " . By d e f i n i t i o n , then, the terms on which the linked-
award was given to Dr. Hudson meant that international 
comparative research had to be undertaken. Within these l i m i t s , 
consideration of a number of other issues shaped the way in which 
the research was developed. 
Among these issues, there are two that are of p a r t i c u l a r 
relevance : the relationship between theory and empirical 
evidence; and the se l e c t i o n of the case studies. Since there i s 
a close r e l a t i o n s h i p between these - and because a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
answer to the former partly depends upon the l a t t e r - the issue 
of the s e l e c t i o n of case studies w i l l be considered f i r s t . The 
issue of the d e f i n i t i o n of the object of study i s , of course, a 
more general one and c e r t a i n l y not unique to t h i s research but i t 
was i n t h i s case partly pre-defined because, as indicated above, 
the issue of whether the research was to be int e r n a t i o n a l l y 
comparative was not at stake; what was to be decided was the 
p a r t i c u l a r regions and countries to be studied. Even so, the 
question can be posed : "Why study three countries when the 
decline of the s t e e l industry i s v i v i d l y apparent in any one of 
- 318 -
the three alone?" In turn, t h i s can be answered by reference to 
the question which the research on which the t h e s i s i s based 
began by posing : "Why i s i t that there has been such marked 
inter n a t i o n a l and intranational v a r i a t i o n i n the impacts of and 
reactions to international processes of change which have led to 
d r a s t i c capacity closures in the s t e e l industry?" ( I t was not 
i n i t i a l l y posed as c l e a r l y as that, of course - and the 
reciprocating theory-evidence r e l a t i o n which i s discussed below 
i s apparent here). C l e a r l y , posing t h i s question required some 
degree of foreknowledge about the world. Knowledge i s not 
constructed on a blank page. 
At about the same time, i t was becoming increasingly apparent in 
the s o c i a l sciences that what i s a truism in everyday l i f e was 
f i n a l l y beginning to deserve f u l l e r t h e o r e t i c a l consideration : 
place i s important to people, to the way in which we construct 
and order our l i v e s . I t seemed an ideal opportunity to seek to 
elucidate some of the ways in which the experience of place, as 
li v e d through by people in regions where the threat to the future 
of the s t e e l industry was r e a l , could be grounded in t h i s 
emergent debate. For what was common to a l l the (international) 
case studies i d e n t i f i e d (and more were considered than those 
reported here) was that the process of change was the r e s u l t of 
fundamental s h i f t s i n the process of accumulation under 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y competitive conditions of c a p i t a l i s t production. 
And yet what was d i f f e r e n t was the very way in which t h i s change 
was experienced at diff e r e n t places by diff e r e n t groups of 
people. Put simply, how does one account for these v a r i a t i o n s ? 
- 319 -
Vfe were t a l k i n g here about comparative a n a l y s i s across d i f f e r e n t 
s o c i e t i e s . A number of diff e r e n t reasons can be id e n t i f i e d on an 
abstract basis f or wanting to undertake t h i s kind of research 
(see Pickvance, 1985). The f i r s t i s to become aware of d i v e r s i t y 
(and overcome ethnocentrism). Secondly, there i s the need to 
c l a r i f y a t h e o r e t i c a l position with regard to a topic. And 
f i n a l l y there i s the opportunity to go beyond taking data from 
two or more s o c i e t i e s to investigate influences (which are 
constant i n one society at one point in time) upon rela t i o n s or 
phenomena (for example international competitive pressures in the 
s t e e l industry) which vary the way in which these phenomena are 
act u a l i s e d . In other words the wide range of v a r i a t i o n observed 
in the s o c i e t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n t e r e s t has to be explained 
and incorporated i n the th e o r e t i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n . The v a r i a t i o n 
i s a point of departure, not a p r i n c i p l e of explanation. By 
implication, more elaborate s t r u c t u r a l accounts of l o c a l 
d i v e r s i t y can be produced along with more s a t i s f a c t o r y 
explanations of how l o c a l d i v e r s i t y f i t s into broader structures. 
There are a number of problems with t h i s research design. 
F i r s t l y , the phenomenon of i n t e r e s t ( f or example attachment to 
place or defence of waged labour) may have a quite d i f f e r e n t 
•meaning' i n another society. In other words, concepts may not 
have a d i r e c t equivalence across s o c i e t i e s . Although the 
observable phenomena are broadly comparable, the meanings behind 
the actions constituting these phenomena are not nece s s a r i l y 
i d e n t i c a l . Our conceptualisation has to be able to account for 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . Secondly, and in a related fashion, the l e s s e r 
f a m i l i a r i t y with other s o c i e t i e s makes i t more l i k e l y that some 
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unknown feature has an important influence on the phenomena under 
investigation. I n many senses these are questions (which are by 
no means absent i n the observer's 'home1 society) concerning 
imperfect awareness of other s o c i e t i e s . This i s one reason why 
none of the case-studies reported here involved detailed personal 
descriptions of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the places where action 
occurred. At l e a s t two solutions to these problems emerge. The 
f i r s t i s to make a random choice from s o c i e t i e s showing great 
d i v e r s i t y i n an e f f o r t to make random the e f f e c t s of the unknown. 
The l i k e l y e ffectiveness of t h i s strategy i s as random as the 
choice of s o c i e t i e s . The second, followed here, i s to s e l e c t 
s o c i e t i e s with c e r t a i n degrees of s i m i l a r i t y in cer t a i n aspects 
(to minimise the d i v e r s i t y on known dimensions) in order to 
maximise the implications (and ' v i s i b i l i t y ' ) of t h e i r divergence 
in other aspects. 
C l e a r l y , therefore, comparative analysis cannot take the place of 
single-country or single-place studies. In many cases i t i s 
dependent upon secondary analyses of such studies. I t asks of 
these, what are the e f f e c t s of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l features on the 
phenomena of i n t e r e s t ? At the same time the present work sought 
to go beyond purely secondary analyses, to seek some personal 
experience of these phenomena. To t h i s end s i x months (and only 
s i x months) were spent in France and West Germany during the 
period of research (we return below to the ways in which t h i s 
evidence was incorporated into theory). Equally i t i s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to categorise comparative a n a l y s i s as of higher-
l e v e l abstraction than single country or case research, i f for no 
- 321 -
other reason than the fact that v a r i a t i o n s in phenomena can be as 
great within a country (witness f or example the d i f f e r e n t 
outcomes at Ravenscraig and Consett) as between countries* 
Comparative a n a l y s i s , as conceptualised here, seeks both to 
capture some aspects of the s p e c i f i c i t y of a society and the 
generality of experience, of meaning, from across s o c i e t i e s . 
C l e a r l y , without doubt, one way to avoid the dangers inherent i n 
comparative a n a l y s i s would be to carry out in-depth, h i s t o r i c a l 
analyses of the construction and reproduction of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
i n p a r t i c u l a r places - what one might c a l l an intensive rather 
than extensive research strategy (and one that has been followed 
elsewhere : see Robinson and Sadler, 1984; Hudson, Peck and 
Sadler, 1985). But wh i l s t such an intensive strategy solves some 
problems, i t creates others : in p a r t i c u l a r , how representative 
( i n the sense of d e c i s i v e s o c i a l processes and t h e i r outcomes 
rather than s t a t i s t i c a l l y ) are the places selected for such 
study? I n an idea l world, one would combine the intensive and 
extensive s t r a t e g i e s but a three-year research studentship i s not 
an ide a l world, a f o r t i o r i when the topic has been defined f o r 
the student as involving i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y comparative a n a l y s i s . 
The aim then was to combine the merits of intensive and extensive 
research s t r a t e g i e s as f a r as i s possible within these 
c o n s t r a i n t s , recognising that they should have been limited by 
the very terms of reference of the ESRC's linked studentship 
scheme. 
What does t h i s mean for the connections between theory and 
evidence? In an abstract sense theory can be understood as a 
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r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of situated action, as a way of coming to g r i p s 
with the world both when and where i t i s l i v e d . One 
conceptualisation of t h i s r e l a t i o n asks in what ways the 
questions we pose determine the t h e o r e t i c a l conclusions we 
produce, and in what ways our i n i t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l presuppositions 
determine the questions we ask. An a l t e r n a t i v e and more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y way of posing the question i s to conceive of a 
reciprocating process between dif f e r e n t planes of analysis where 
theory and empirical evidence constantly pose questions, one of 
the other. Theory neither determines a single appropriate body 
of evidence, nor evidence the theory. I n p r a c t i c e , there has to 
be some sor t Of ordering of empirical investigation and 
t h e o r e t i c a l consideration, but t h i s i s a question of research 
praxis, of methodology as l i v e d , not one of u n i l i n e a r cause and 
e f f e c t mechanisms in the construction of theory and evidence. 
I t i s in t h i s sense of reciprocation that the connections between 
theory and evidence must be located. Underlying assumptions 
about causal patterns need to be extracted from the research 
design or strategy and recognised for what they are. Here, we 
d e l i b e r a t e l y set out not to i s o l a t e u n i l i n e a r cause and e f f e c t 
mechanisms. For actions take place within structures, at the 
same time as r e p l i c a t i n g these structures and taking shape from 
them, in a complex d i a l e c t i c a l fashion. By extension, actions 
have neither a necessary intentional consequence nor a necessary 
r a t i o n a l purpose. That i s both the beginning and the end of our 
th e o r e t i c a l argument. In between there i s a range of questions 
to be asked, answered and conceptualised; but the prime function 
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of the theoretical discourse must be to create the analytical 
space within which events and actions can be situated on their 
place and class trajectories. I t is in this sense, then, that 
the primary connection exists between theory and evidence - the 
one occupying the middle ground between agency and structure and 
in the process the other creating a new kind of basis for 
theorisation, a new set of causal relations which is effectively 
a denial of causal relations as t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived. Theory 
must not become a set of abstract categories, s t a t i c boxes into 
which the social world is forced, irrespective of the i r 
appropriateness to i t s characteristics; rather theory must 
provide a framework for the sensitive interpretation of that 
social world, allowing both for the re-interpretation of theory 
in the process and the provision of a basis for changing that 
world. An appropriate yardstick for evaluation l i e s in that re-
integration in the social world (not just in academia). 
Clearly, t h i s has a number of implications f o r the collection, 
evaluation and presentation of evidence. What kinds of evidence 
are deemed admissible, and how should i t be evaluated and 
presented? In the present work such problems were of particular 
consequence given that the object of study was of such central 
and possibly decisive importance to ^ any of the actors' l i v e s . 
Steelworkers had, after a l l (as the saying goes) invested a great 
deal of t h e i r lives in the industry. Campaigners against 
closure, whether steelworkers and their families, p o l i t i c i a n s , 
trades unionists or from whatever background, had by and large 
put a great deal on the l i n e . As in many other social situations 
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open c o n f l i c t brought out a considerable degree of s e l f -
examination in search of reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n for action or 
inaction. And for many, this self-examination was made a l l the 
more acute when others, once friends, colleagues or comrades, 
came through the same process with a different conclusion. Put 
simply, places such as Consett and Longwy were, and to a 
considerable degree remain, highly emotively-charged with a 
degree of personal antagonism, self-doubt and regret rarely found 
even in today's b i t t e r l y divisive c a p i t a l i s t societies. 
In such situations the "normal" questions of evidence take on 
extremely poignant overtones. Repeatedly i t was expressed to me 
that there are as many versions of what happened at Consett as 
there were people involved - l e t alone why i t happened. In many 
senses this is unremarkable, for in such a f l u i d , highly-charged 
and rapidly-changing environment as Consett in 1980 there was an 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y to this situation. The maxim that actors only 
possess p a r t i a l information about the circumstances of the i r 
action could never have been more appropriate. People, l i t e r a l l y , 
didn't know what was going on. Under these conditions I sought 
to undertake verbal interviews with as many key actors as 
possible (trade unionists, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s , journalists, 
local p o l i t i c i a n s and p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s , church leaders, not a 
few of the men who were the last to leave the works and turned 
the l i g h t s out behind them,...), always putting together what one 
person said with the story of another. In the main, though, I 
have refrained from reporting these interviews verbatim here. 
There are a number of reasons for t h i s . 
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In the f i r s t place the descriptions of events are in many cases 
my descriptions, though I have endeavoured as far as possible to 
check out t h i s account with that of others. Wherever possible 
too I have backed up the story with selected written evidence -
the contemporary printed discourse of newspaper accounts, 
handbills, campaign brochures, government publications and the 
l i k e . This is not just to add authenticity to the story. 
Rather, these accounts are significant since (by and large) they 
formed both part of an input to an ongoing discourse at the time 
and an h i s t o r i c a l record (or output) of the discourse. That 
which was said and reported drew further reactions which were 
only made because of what was said and recorded. My oral 
interviews were made in the l i g h t of some of this knowledge, 
elucidated more, and encouraged a re-interpretation of the rest. 
I therefore saw them as at one and the same time part of the 
process of theory construction and evidence collection. And 
f i n a l l y , the same strategy was followed in France and West 
Germany. Conversational a b i l i t y in a foreign language can never 
be as good as the native tongue but i t was v i t a l , nevertheless, 
to test reactions to ideas forming in my own mind. Any idea of 
reporting 'foreign 1 conversations or interviews, though, doubles 
the risk - which exists even in the native tongue - of 
mistranslating or mis-specifying what was said or intended to be 
said. The risk is doubled because in addition to the 
'conventional' interview problem of formulating questions and 
interpreting answers which are meaningful to the respondent in 
the same sense as to the observer, there i s the practical 
d i f f i c u l t y of translating from one tongue to another (or indeed, 
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i n the case of some interviews, from several languages to 
another). How can one translate and 'anglicise 1 foreign phrases 
and grammatical structures without subtly altering the original 
meaning? Actually spending time l i v i n g and working in these 
countries as a kind of participatory observant was essential i n 
overcoming at least some of these barriers. 
Indeed i t is important to emphasise that interviewing was by no 
means the only research method adopted. I f e l t i t especially 
important given the problems discussed above ( i n relation to 
interviews) t o examine as far as possible the contemporary 
written evidence relevant both to these events and to th e i r 
h i s t o r i c a l context. This meant reading and evaluating 
documentation from local and national p o l i t i c a l debates; semi-
published evidence such as local government records, trade union 
archives and company records rarely accessible in their entirety 
to a wider audience; and media accounts (both printed and on 
photographic record) of what was reported to be happening. In 
many senses the discrepancies between these different forms of 
evidence, and between these and interview material, were as 
revealing in t h e i r implications as what was confirmed of one 
source by another. In other words the different forms of 
evidence were mutually supportive in the sense of posing 
questions of each other. In a similar way to spending time 
l i v i n g and working l o c a l l y , they were valuable in enabling more 
informed (and hopefully more meaningful) questions to be asked. 
What was emerging, then, was a ' f e e l 1 for these places, for what 
made them t i c k . I have endeavoured to report this by 
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concentrating on a number of issues relevant to the longer-term 
h i s t o r i c a l genesis of the i r position in the late 1970's/early 
1980' s. Why is i t that certain companies located in certain 
places; why did trade union representation take the form i t did 
in these places; how do these company and trade union strategies 
relate to the state and to c i v i l society in these countries? 
Such are the questions I f e l t crucial as an i n i t i a l step i n 
putting together a situated account of what happened. As more 
than one person put i t to me, with hindsight Consett was going to 
close at any time from the early 1960's onwards. Why i t did not 
u n t i l 1980 is in many ways as important a question as why i t did 
in that year. That is what I have t r i e d to demonstrate through 
the incorporation of a longer-term h i s t o r i c a l perspective with 
the intensive evaluation of what happened in that shorter time-
period. I t is in an h i s t o r i c a l sense, i f nothing else, that I 
have t r i e d to combine intensive with extensive research methods. 
I f the primary connection between theory and evidence is the 
creation of analytical space to observe, report on and 
participate in actions and events within their proper context, 
what are the secondary connections? In many respects these 
connections are as significant in the ways in which they relate 
back to the primary conection as in their own r i g h t . Two sets of 
dimensions can be identified along which they occur. In the 
f i r s t group, the theory addresses a number of 'subject 1 areas 
dealing with, respectively, i n d u s t r i a l , social and p o l i t i c a l 
change. Within an h i s t o r i c a l materialist perspective these sub-
classifications (and their associated bodies of evidence deemed 
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appropriate) do, indeed, f a l l on a continuum - industrial change 
i s simultaneously social just as p o l i t i c a l change* In that sense 
the theory needs to be assessed via the extent to which i t 
incorporates a diversity of deliberately fragmented bourgeois 
perspectives on industry, society and p o l i t i c s into one coherent 
ar t i c u l a t i o n of theory and evidence. 
And on the second dimension are the questions to do with the ways 
in which action takes context at a variety of scales, local, 
national and international. For whilst we have emphasised 
interviews conducted l o c a l l y , they were matched (and backed with 
similar analysis) by those conducted regionally, nationally and 
even internationally (with European trades unions or employers' 
associations, or the EEC, for example). This was done to 
iden t i f y the relations between locally situated action, and that 
at national or international scale. The questions being asked 
concerned, for example, the ways in which local action can 
influence national institutions and agents (such as trades 
unions, employers, p o l i t i c a l parties - even governments) and 
international i n s t i t u t i o n s and agents, and vice-versa, indeed, 
the ways in which any one of these three levels articulates with 
the others. In many senses this came to be a refinement of the 
ea r l i e r concern that place is important. For one conclusion of 
this set of questions was that yes, place is important, but on a 
variety of scales and in a variety of ways which can intermesh 
either in a conflictual or a reinforcing fashion. These, then, 
were the key secondary questions - how do places articulate with 
other places at a variety of scales, and how does industrial 
change ( i n the bourgeois sense) relate to that in other spheres? 
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Finally, there remains the question of the relations between primary 
and secondary connections between theory and evidence. 
In many senses, given obvious physical and social constraints, any 
research strategy involves some kind of trade-off along or between 
the two of these axes. Our concern with creating analytical space 
for the contextualisation of action, for example, meant that analysis 
of regional characteristics from more than one region in each country 
could not be undertaken with two of the three states; nor could the 
f u l l complexity of social and p o l i t i c a l conditions prior to and 
consequent upon steelworks closure be examined. On the other hand 
within these constraints the strategy at least enabled a satisfactory 
sl i c e to be taken from r e a l i t y , observing both the necessary and 
contingent relations within r e a l i t y as a whole whilst abstracting 
among the most revealing of these relations in a fashion amenable to 
sustained and coherent analysis and theorisation. I t is in that 
sense, i f nothing else, that I hope i t has proved successful. 
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